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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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IN A*TD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
B. N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D.
SANDERS and CHERYL M. SANDERS,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,

civil »o. °\0D C 1D23^7 ffc

vs,
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L.
HOFFMAN, Mayor of the City of
Draper, ROBERT BROWN, KIM
STEVENS AND JOHN DOES I
through X,

> » -%•? ""*•

Defendants.

Plaintiffs, and each of them, complain of the Defendants,
and each of them, and allege in support of their Complaint ds
follows:
PARTIES AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

That Plaintiffs Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M.

Sanders, hereinafter referred to as "Sanders11, are presently
residents of San Di ego cjunty, State of California, at other
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times relevant hereto, they have been residents of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
2.

That Plaintiff B. N. Glanville, hereinafter referred to

as "Glanville", is a resident of Malheur County, State of Oregon.
3.

That the Plaintiffs, and each of them, are or have been

at times relevant hereto, possessed of by way of legal and
equitable ownership, a parcel or parcels of real property located
at or about the street address commonly referred to as 13735
Shadow Mountain Lane, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
4.

That the parcels which the Plaintiffs own are more par-

ticularly identified in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.

The parcels referred to can be

identified as parcels .018, .019 and .020.
5.

That parcels .018 and .019 are presently owned by

Plaintiff B. N. Glanville and shall hereinafter be referred to as
"the Property".
6.

That the Property is located within the boundaries of

the City of Draper.
7.

That the City of Draper is a city municipality organ-

ized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of
Utah.
8.

That Defendants City of Draper Planning Committee, City

of Draper Board of Adjustment, the City Council of the City of
Draper, their respective members and Mayor Charles L. Hoffman,
were duly elected or appointed and as such are commissioned,
qualified and act as members of their respective municipal or
2

administrative bodies at times relevant hereto.

These Defendants

may be referred to from time to time collectively as "Draper
City".
9.

That Defendants City of Draper Planning Committee, City

of Draper Board of Adjustment, the City Council of the City of
Draper, their respective members and Mayor Charles L. Hoffman, at
all times relevant hereto have purportedly acted within the scope
of their authority in regards to the actions complained of
hereafter.
10.

That Defendants Robert Brown and Kim Stevens are both

residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and shall hereinafter be referred to respectively as "Brown" and "Stevens".
11.

That Brown and Stevens claim a legal and equitable

ownership interest in real property which is a adjacent and
contiguous to the Property.
12.

That Brown and Stevens may own their respective parcels

of property jointly with others who are unknown presently to the
Plaintiffs but are designated herein as John Does I through X.
13.

That at all times mentioned herein relevant to Brown

and Stevens, John Does I through X, together with Brown and
Stevens have acted jointly, within their respective capacity as
property owners, and, with regard to John Does I through X,
within the scope of their agency as to Defendants Brown and
Stevens.
14.

That B. N. Glanville is currently the owner of the

Property.
3

15.

That prior to B. N. Glanvillefs ownership of the

Property, the Property was owned by Sanders and conveyed to
Glanville on or about the 19th day of May, 1988.
16.

That Defendant Draper City, et aJL. is empowered and

entrusted with the responsibility and authority to manage,
regulate and police the development and improvement of real
property within its boundaries pursuant to the laws of the State
of Utah and its own municipal ordinances.
17.

That in the furtherance of the responsibility and

authority granted Draper City by the laws of the State of Utah,
Draper City has established and empowered a planning committee
and Board of Adjustment to assist in the management, policing and
regulation of real property and its development within the
municipality of Draper.
18.

That part of the authority exercised by the City of

Draper, et al. is the power to control, regulate, approve and
disapprove the subdivision of real property and to regulate the
improvements and structures built on real property within the
boundaries of the City of Draper granting variances and setting
conditions for the development of real property and the construction of improvements thereon as might be just and equitable.
19.

That in the furtherance of the power and authority of

the City of Draper as set forth above, there has been established
as political subdivisi ons or tna'C municipality, a planning

4

committee and a Board of Adjustment to regulate, administer and
administratively adjudicate petitions and applications relevant
to real property.
20.

That, among other things, the planning committee has

the authority and the responsibility to regulate, approve and
disapprove applications for the subdivision of real property.
21.

That, among other things, the Board of Adjustment has

the authority to regulate, approve and disapprove applications
and petitions for variances from zoning ordinances in effect in
the City of Draper.
22.

That all of the acts undertaken by the City of Draper

et al. complained of herein, were purportedly undertaken within
the scope of their authority as represented by the laws of the
State of Utah and the ordinances of the City of Draper and
particularly those actions of the City of Draper in awarding
variances and issuing building permits in regards to the Property
and adjacent parcels of land.
23.

That the Plaintiffs, at times relevant hereto, claim an

interest under a deed, or written contract, and their interest in
the Property is affected by a municipal ordinance and otherwise
by the actions of the Cicy of Draper.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS
24.

That Sanders purchased parcels .018 and .019 from

individuals known as Martin S. Ovard, Reva S. Ovard, Ben F. Ovard
and Helen F. Ovard, hereinafter referred to as "Ovard", on or
about November 8, 1982.
5

25.

That Sanders believed that parcels .018 and .019 were

"lots", as to which a building permit would be issued and appropriately subdivided, within the meaning of state statutes and
City of Draper ordinances.
26.

That Sanders believed this because the home in which he

was presently residing was also constructed by Ovard.

Ovard

constructed the home pursuant to a building permit issued by
Draper City as to the one acre parcel.
27.

That he believed that parcels .018 and .019 were

properly subdivided lots for which he could receive a building
permit in their present form, because a building permit had been
previously issued as to parcel .020, the parcel upon which the
home had been constructed.
28.

That application had been previously made by one Layne

Newman and others, to subdivide the Property and adjacent parcels, but the applications and petitions had been denied by the
County of Salt Lake and the City of Draper.
29.

That in fact, the Property and adjacent parcels had

never been properly subdivided receiving the appropriate approvals from City of Draper political subdivisions.
30.

That Sanders purchased parcels .018 and .019 for

consideration assuming their value to be equivalent to a properly
and legally subdivided lot as to which he could receive, without
a variance or subdivision approval, a building permit.

6

31.

That Sanders purchased those parcels for $2 6,000.

The

parcels had a market value, for the reasons set forth herein, of
$8,000.
32.

That in purchasing the Property, Sanders acted inno-

cently and reasonably and in ignorance of the true status of the
Property, relying upon the representations of the sellers and the
actions of the City of Draper.
33.

That on information and belief, the City of Draper and

its political subdivisions granted Ovard a variance to build the
home that was subsequently purchased by Sanders on an illegally
subdivided two acre parcel of land.
34.

That the subject home, constructed by Ovard and subseq-

uently purchased by Sanders, was constructed contrary to the
variance, the building permit and Draper City subdivision regulations because it was located on a one acre parcel.
35.

That the sale of parcels .018, .019 and .02 0 by Ovard

were illegal and constituted a class B misdemeanor under state
statutes and Draper City ordinances. All subsequent sales have
been likewise illegal.
36.

That subsequent to the purchase of the parcels referred

to above by Sanders, Sanders learned that the parcels were not
properly subdivided and that the building permit would not be
issued as to parcel .018 or .019 without further subdivision approval .
37.

That since that time, the City of Draper has attempted,

contrary to state law and City of Draper ordinance, to grant
7

variances which in effect attempt to approve the subdivision of
the three parcels.
38.

That the attempts of the City of Draper so to do, have

been ineffective, and are contrary to state law and City of
Draper ordinances.
39.

That since the time the City of Draper has become aware

of the conduct of Ovard which is contrary to state law and City
of Draper ordinance, the City of Draper has ignored and continues
to ignore those circumstances and has failed to enforce its laws
and the laws of the State of Utah or has attempted to enforce
those ordinances and laws in an ineffective manner.
40.

That the City of Draper has a duty to police, manage

and regulate the development of real property within its municipal borders and has utterly failed, in this case, in that duty.
41.

That by reason of the action of Ovard and City of

Draper, the Plaintiffs are reasonably confused and uncertain
about their legal rights as regards to the Properry and others.
42.

That, among other things, there is a duty on the part

of the City of Draper, by way of enforcement of its ordinances
and the laws of the State of Utah to prosecute violations of
those laws and ordinances.

This duty has been ignored and the

City of Draper has utterly failed to prosecute these violations.
43.

That on or about July, 1988 the City of Draper, acting

by and through its Board of Adjustment, attempted to ratify the
illegal conduct of Ovard by granting a "variance" on the application of Mountain West Savings, a banking institution, represented
by irs purported agent, Ovard.

That the so called "variance"

8

further confuses the legal rights and interest of not only the
Plaintiffs, but the owners of adjacent parcels of land.
44.

That the actions of City of Draper by and through its

Board of Adjustment are without or beyond the jurisdiction of the
Board of Adjustment.
45.

That in any event, the City of Draper has ignored the

enforcement of the conditions attached to the granting of the
"variance" as they relate to adjacent property owners, all of
which has damaged the Plaintiffs and created uncertainty as to
their true legal status in regards to the Property.
46.

That the Plaintiffs have been damaged by virtue of the

conduct of the City of Draper alleged above, inasmuch as their
property has been reduced in value, the Sanders have lost the
ownership and equitable interest in parcel .020 altogether and
the uncertainty surrounding these properties has resulted in
litigation was necessary to ascertain the true legal rights and
standing of the Plaintiffs.

In addition, the Plaintiffs have

been deprived of the full use and enjoyment of the Property.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Writ of Mandate or Mandamus)
47.

The Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 46.
48.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to a Writ of Mandate or

Mandamus (hereinafter "Mandamus") requiring the City of Draper to
perform its required duties and actions, and more particularly:

9

(a)

To fully prosecute the violations of its laws and

the laws of the State of Utah set forth above in relation to
the illegal subdivision and sale of illegally subdivided
"lots" (the Property).
(b)

To enforce its conditions placed upon the granting

of zoning variances by way of sanction, fine, a finding of
nuisance or action authorized by law.
(c)

Take such action as might be necessary through its

appropriate political subdivisions, namely the planning
committee, to correctly define the status of the Property.
(d)

To declare null and void the action of the Board

of Adjustment for the City of Draper insofar as it relates
to the purported subdivision of the Property.
(e)

To declare null and void the action of the Board

of Adjustment of the City of Draper insofar as it relates to
the Property and its action of July, 1988 due to the lack or
want of jurisdiction for such action.
49.

That the Plaintiffs have attempted to resolve the

issues raised above informally and directly with the City of
Draper, but without satisfaction.
50.

That there exists no plain, speedy and adequate remedy

other than this Complaint for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus.
51.

That the Plaintiffs have sustained damages by virtue of

the conduct alleged above which should be ascertained and found
by a jury.

10

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment)
52.

That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this refer-

ence the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 51 of the
Complaint.
53.

That the Plaintiffs are entitled to and should receive

a declaratory relief deciding the questions of construction and
validity under the ordinances and actions of the City of Draper
and more particularly pursuant to § 78-33-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953
as amended).
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)
54.

That Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this reference

the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 53 of the
Complaint.
55.

That the City of Draper has been negligent and Plain-

tiffs have sustained damages which were proximately caused by by
the action or inaction of the City of Draper as alleged above, as
well as the conduct set forth hereafter:
(a)

The failure of the City of Draper to properly

police the development and subdivision of real property
within its boundaries.
(i>)

The de facto

approval

of the

Ovard "subdivision"

by the issuance of a building permit as well as the inaction
of the City of Draper after being informed of the illegal
attempted subdivision by Ovard.

11

(c)

The failure of the City of Draper to ascertain

violations of its ordinances and laws, as well as those of the
State of Utah, and take reasonable steps to enforce the same.
56.

That in addition to the damages set forth above, the

Plaintiffs have suffered emotional distress, anxiety and upset to
their damages in an amount not less than $150,000.
57.

That by virtue of the conduct of the City of Draper and

as a direct and proximate result thereof, the Plaintiffs have
suffered the damages more particularly described above, in an
amount not less than $150,000 and otherwise according to proof.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Trespass)
58.

That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this refer-

ence the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 57.
59.
through X

That Defendants Brown and Stevens and John Does I
ave trespassed on the Property of the Plaintiffs, to-

wit: parcels .018 and .019, in the following particulars:
(a)

As to Defendant Brown, Defendant Brown and those

acting with him trespass on parcel .019 owned by Plaintiff
Glanville by their ongoing traverse and use of that parcel
by way of gaining access to their residence and garage and
their construction of improvements over and across the
Property owned by Plaintiff Glanville.

Additionally, Brown

and others have constructed a fence across or surrounding
parcel .018 and have attempted to convert the same to their
own use, have utilized the same for personal use, including

12

the grazing and running of horses without the permission or
consent of Plaintiff*
(b)

As to Defendant Stevens, his trespass consists of

construction of improvements and the maintenance of improvements which occupy a portion of the Right-of-Way adjecent to
parcel .019 owned by Plaintiff Glanville.
(c)

Plaintiff has made demand on Defendants Brown and

Stevens and those acting with them, to cease and terminate
their ongoing trespass which demands have been utterly
ignored and disregarded.
60.

That the actions of Defendants Brown and Stevens and

those acting with them, have not been approved or consented to by
the Plaintiffs and are in direct and total disregard of their
ownership and interest in the Property.
61.

That as a direct and proximate resulr of the trespass

of Defendants Brown and Stevens and those acting with them, the
Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount not yet determined, but
no less than $10,000 which should be proven and established at
the trial of this matter.
62.

That the actions of Brown and Stevens and those acting

with them, have been intentional, malicious and in total disregard of the rights of the Plaintiffs as herein set forth, and
as a result thereof, not only has this action been required, but
the Plaintiff is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in an
amount not less than $10,000 as to Defendant Brown, and $10,000
as to Defendant Stevens.

13

63.

That inasmuch as Defendants Brown and Stevens and those

acting with them have disregarded the reasonable requests of the
Plaintiff heretofore, it would be reasonable for the Court to
make and enter, without delay and during the pendency of this
action, on application of the Plaintiff, an injunction restraining these Defendants and those acting with them from ongoing
trespass as described above, pending a finding as to the Plaintiffs 1 damages therefore.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants, and each of them, as follows:
1.

As to the City of Draper, et al.;
(a)

A Writ of Mandamus requiring the City of Draper

and its political subdivisions to comply with the City of
Draper ordinances and the laws of the State of Utah in the
policing and management, as well as the enforcement of their
ordinances and the laws of the State of Utah.
(b)

For damages in connection with the Writ of Man-

damus as provided by law in an amount not less than
$150,000.
(c)

For declaratory relief fixing and describing the

rights of the Plaintiff in regards to the Property, both as
it relates to its current status under the laws of the State

of Utah and the ordinances of Draper City, as well as
adjoining and adjacent property owners.
(d)

For judgment in the amount of $150,000 based upon

the negligence of the City of Draper.

14
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2.

As to Defendants Brown and Stevens:
(a)

For a judgment finding that the actions of Defen-

dants Brown and Stevens and those acting with them are
trespass upon the properties of Plaintiffs.
(b)

For the immediate issuance and entry of an injunc-

tion restraining Defendants Brown and Stevens and those
acting with them from the actions described in the Complaint.
(c)

For judgment in connection with the trespass of

Brown and Stevens and those acting with them in an amount
not less than $20,000, in punitive damages and $10,000 in
general damages.
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem

proper.
DATED THIS

day of April.
Respectfully Submitted,

Z/MM^

'ITODERIClPTr. GREEN
ftorney for Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs Sanders address:
Kiewit Pacific Company
13 03 5 Pomerado Road, Suite B
Poway, California
Plaintiffs Glanville^ address;
P, O. Box 128
Westfall, Oregon
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APPENDIX
ITEM # 2

Ruling, 11/7/90

T h ' i d JJC'C!^; D«£t:'iCt

NOV 0 7 1SS0
lift

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

B. N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D.
SANDERS and CHERYL M. SANDERS,

RULING
CIVIL NO.

900902397 PR

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF
DRAPER, et al.,
Defendants.

Defendants' Motion

to

Dismiss has been

submitted

to the

Court for decision pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of
Judicial
heard

Administration.

this

advisement.

Oral hearing was

date, at which

time

reguested

the matter

was

and was

taken

under

The Memoranda of Points and Authorities filed by

both parties has been reviewed, and the Court rules as follows.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.

The said Motion

is granted for the reasons set forth in defendants' Memorandum
and Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

Defendants owe

no duty to the plaintiffs in regard to the alleged

ordinance

violations and variances.

Defendants' duty is to the public,

not

plaintiffs.

to

these

individual

Plaintiffs'

cause

000034

of

GLANVILLE V. DRAPER CITY

PAGE TWO

action rests with the seller of the property.

RULING

The defendants

cannot be liable for illegal subdivision any more than they
could be liable for violation of the Uniform Building Code or
traffic laws.

Furthermore, the statute of limitations applies.

Defendant will p,r<e£ar_£---the Order.
Dated this

/ ^daV of November, 1990.

/'

/ .LEONARD H. RUSSbN"^ '
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

0 0 0 0 D-o

/

PAGE THREE

GLANVILLE V. DRAPER CITY

RULING

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Ruling,

to the following, this

/

day of

November, 1990:

Frederick N. Green
Julie V. Lund
Attorneys for .Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, Suite 528
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jody K. Burnett
Daniel D. Hill
Attorneys for Defendants Draper City,
Draper City Board of Adjustment,
Planning Commission, City Council,
and Charles L. Hoffman
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Bruce A. Maak
Attorney for Defendant Robert Brown
185 S. State, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Hollis S. Hunt
Draper City Attorney
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake Cizy, Utah 84111

^^QanAU^

060C£6

APPENDIX
ITEM # 3

Order of Dismissal, 11/26/90

NOV 2 5 t=S0
JODY K BURNETT
DANIEL D. HILL

(A0499)
(A5202)

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Attorneys for Defendants
Draper City, Draper City
Board of Adjustment, Planning
Commission, Draper City Council,
and Charles L. Hoffman
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
B. N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D.
SANDERS and CHERYL M. SANDERS,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L.
HOFFMAN, Mayor of the City of
Draper, ROBERT BROWN, KIM
STEVENS AND JOHN DOES I
THROUGH X,

Civil No. 900902397PR
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendants.

This matter came on regularly for hearing before the aboveentitled court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding, on
November 5, 1990, for consideration of a Motion to Dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of civil Procedure,

0GG0S7

filed on behalf of defendants Draper City, Draper City Board of
Adjustment, Draper City Planning Committee and Planning
Commission, Draper City Council and Charles L. Hoffman as Mayor
of the city of Draper,
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and having
reviewed the pleadings and memoranda filed with respect to this
motion, and being fully advised, issued its Ruling dated
November 7, 1990 in which it determined that the allegations of
the plaintiffs' Complaint, even viewed in a light most favorable
to plaintiffs, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted against the defendants for the reasons set forth in the
Ruling of the Court and as more fully set forth in the
defendants' memoranda.

Based on that Ruling, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants' Motion to
Dismiss is hereby granted as to all claims made in the
plaintiffs' Complaint as against defendants Draper City, Draper
City Board of Adjustment, Draper City Planning Committee and
Planning Commission, Draper City Council and Mayor Charles L.
Hoffman, and plaintiffs' Complaint as against said defendants is
hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits, no cause of
action.
DATED t h i s ^ T ^ d a y of~^^(^f)

' , 1990. ,

BY/1THE COURT:
\ Leonard H. Russor^A^
^District Court Judge
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
; ss .
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Sharon Allhands, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martmeau, attorneys
for defendants Draper City, Draper city Board of Adjustment,
Planning Commission, City Council and Charles L. Hoffman herein;
that she served the attached ORDER OF DISMISSAL (Case No.
900902397PR, Third District Court) upon the parties listed below
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
Frederick N. Green
Julie V. Lund
GREEN & BERRY
10 Exchange-Place, #528
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Hollis S. Hunt
Draper City Atty
HUNT AND RUDD
243 E 400 S, #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Bruce A. Maack
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN 6c GEE
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P. O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
and causing the same to be mailed, first class postage prepaid,
as indicated, on the
/ 3 ^ day of November, 1990.

M^^x

(XUJ^JU^

Sharon M. Allhands
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
November, 1990.
I

JA.
y

day of

>/l<(

- ^
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah

My Commission Expires

NOTARY PUBLIC
HARV1 LYNN CHILES

ws*s*^®\
frf

fiC?*!.''*

" \

1 "> E^c^inqe Place. 11th Fl
Z i * St* C.*w l tah a ^ t l
U\/ Commission Exptros
Septembers. 1993

STATE OF UTAH

APPENDIX
ITEM # 4

Amended Complaint

GREEN & BERRY
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240)
JULIE V. LUND (4875)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650

<.-»-., i

: ; i „• J

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
B.N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D.
SANDERS and CHERYL M. SANDERS,
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L.
HOFFMAN, Mayor of the City of
Draper, ROBERT BROWN, KIM
STEVENS and JOHN DOES I
through X,

Civil No. 900902397PR

Honorable Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.
Plaintiffs, and each of them, complain of Defendants, and
each of them, and allege in support of their Amended Complaint as
follows:
PARTIES AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

That Plaintiffs Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M.

Sanders, hereinafter referred to as "Sanders", are presently
residents of San Diego County, State of California, at other
times relevant hereto, they have been residents of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

#$9134

2.

That Plaintiff B. N. Glanville, hereinafter referred to

as "Glanville11, is a resident of Malheur County, State of Oregon.
3.

That the Plaintiffs, and each of them, are or have been

at all times relevant hereto, possessed of by way of legal and
equitable ownership, a parcel or parcels of real property located
at or about the street address commonly referred to as 13735
Shadow Mountain Lane, Salt Lake County, State of' Utah.
4.

That the parcels which the Plaintiffs own are more

particularly identified in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and
incorporated herein by this reference.

The parcels referred to

can be identified as parcels .018, .019 and .020.
5.

That parcels .018 and .019 are presently owned by

Plaintiff B. N. Glanville and shall hereinafter be referred to as
"the Property".
6.

That the Property is located within the boundaries of

the City of Draper.
7.

That the City of Draper is a city municipality

organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
State of Utah.
8.

That Defendants City of Draper Planning Committee, City

of Draper Board of Adjustment, the City Council of the City of
Draper, their respective members and Mayor Charles L. Hoffman,
were duly elected or appointed and as such are commissioned,
qualified and act as members of their respective municipal or
administrative bodies at all times relevant hereto.

These
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Defendants may be referred to from time to time collectively as
"Draper City:'.
9.

That Defendants City of Draper Planning Committee, City

of Draper Board of Adjustments, the City Council of the City of
Draper, their respective members and Mayor Charles L. Hoffman, at
all times relevant hereto have purportedly acted within the scope
of their authority in regards to the actions complained of
hereafter.
10.

That Defendants Robert Brown and Kim Stevens are both

residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and shall
hereinafter be referred to respectively as "Brown" and "Stevens".
11.

That Brown and Stevens claim a legal and equitable

ownership interest in real property which is an adjacent and
contiguous to the Property.
12.

That Brown and Stevens may own their respective parcels

of property jointly with others who are unknown presently to the
Plaintiffs but are designated herein as John Does I through X.
13.

That at all times mentioned herein relevant to Brown

and Stevens, John Does I through X, together with Brown and
Stevens have acted jointly, within tneir respective capacity as
property owners, and, with regard to John Does I through X,
within the scope of their agency as to Defendants Brown and
Stevens.
14.

That B. N. Glanville is currently the owner of the

Property.
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0 0 014ft

15.

That prior to B. N. Glanville's ownership of the

Property, the Property was owned by Sanders and conveyed to
Glanville on or about the 19th day of May7 1988.
16.

That Defendant Draper City, et al. is empowered and

entrusted with the responsibility and authority to manage,
regulate and police the development and improvement of real
property within its boundaries pursuant to the laws of the State
of Utah and its own municipal ordinances.
17.

That in the furtherance of the responsibility and

authority granted Draper City by the laws of the State of Utah,
Draper City has established and empowered a planning committee to
assist in the management, policing and regulation of real
property and its development: within the municipality of Draper.
18.

That part of the authority exercised by the City of

Draper, et al. is the power to control, regulate, approve and
disapprove the subdivision of real property and to regulate the
improvements and structures built on real property within the
boundaries of the City of Draper granting variances and setting
conditions for the development of real property and the
construction of improvements thereon as might be just and
equitable.
19.

That in the furtherance of the power and authority of

the City of Draper as set forth above, there has been established
as political subdivisions of that municipality, a planning
committee to regulate, administer and administratively adjudicate
petitions and applications relevant to real property.
-4-
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20.

That, among other things, the planning committee has

the authority and the responsibility to regulate, approve and
disapprove applications for the subdivision of real property.
21.

That, among other things, the Board of Adjustment has

the authority to regulate, approve and disapprove applications
and petitions for variances from zoning ordinances in effect in
the City of Draper.
22.

That all of the acts undertaken by the City of Draper

et al. complained of herein, were purportedly undertaken within
the scope of their authority as represented by the laws of the
State of Utah and the ordinances of the City of Draper and
particularly those actions of the City of Draper in awarding
variances and issuing building permits in regards to the Property
and adjacent parcels of land.
23.

That the Plaintiffs, at times relevant hereto, claim an

interest under a deed, or written contract, and their interest in
the Property is affected by a municipal ordinance and otherwise
by the actions of the City of Draper.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS
24.

That Sanders purchased parcels .018 and .019 from

individuals known as Martin S. Ovard, Reva S. Ovard, Ben F. Ovard
and Helen F. Ovard, hereinafter referred to as "Ovard", on or
about November 8, 1982.
25.

That Sanders believed that parcels .018 and .019 were

"lots", as to which a building permit would be issued and

-5-
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appropriately subdivided, within the meaning of state statutes
and City of Draper ordinances.
26.

That he believed that parcels .018 and .019 were

properly subdivided lots for which he could receive a building
permit in their present form, because a building permit had been
previously issued as to parcel .020, the parcel upon which the
home had been constructed.
27.

That application had been previously made by one Layne

Newman and others, to subdivide the Property and adjacent
parcels, but the applications and petitions had been denied by
the County of Salt Lake and City of Draper.
28.

That in fact, the Property and adjacent parcels had

never been properly subdivided receiving the appropriate
approvals from City of Draper political subdivisions.
29.

That Sanders purchased parcels .018 and .019 for

consideration assuming their value to be equivalent to a properly
and legally subdivided lot as to which he could receive, without
a variance or subdivision approval, a building permit.
30.

That Sanders purchased those parcels for $2 6,000.

The

parcels had a market value, for the reasons set forth herein, of
$8,000.
31.

That in purchasing the Property, Sanders acted

innocently and reasonably and in ignorance of the true status of
the Property, relying upon the representations of the sellers and
the actions of the City of Draper.
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32.

That on information and belief, the City of Draper and

its political subdivisions granted Ovard a variance to build the
home that was subsequently purchased by Sanders on an illegally
subdivided two acre parcel of land.
- 33.

That the subject home, constructed by Ovard and

subsequently purchased by Sanders, was constructed contrary to
the variance, the building permit and Draper City subdivision
regulations because it was located on a one acre parcel.
34.

That the sale of parcels .018, .019 and .020 by Ovard

were illegal and constituted a class B misdemeanor under state
statutes and Draper City ordinances. All subsequent sales have
been likewise illegal.
35.

That subsequent to the purchase of the parcels referred

to above by Sanders, Sanders learned that the parcels were not
properly subdivided and that the building permit would not be
issued as to parcel .018 or .019 without further subdivision
approval.
36.

That since that time, the City of Draper has attempted,

contrary to state law and City of Draper ordinance, to grant
variances which in effect attempt to approve the subdivision of
the three parcels.
37.

That the attempts of the City of Draper so to do, have

been ineffective, and are contrary to state law and City of
Draper ordinances.
38.

That since the time the City of Draper has become aware

of the conduct of Ovard which is contrary to state law and City
-7-
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of Draper ordinance, the City of Draper has ignored and continues
to ignore those circumstances and has failed to enforce its laws
and the laws of the State of Utah or has attempted to enforce
those ordinances and laws in an ineffective manner.
39•

That the City of Draper has a duty to police, manage

and regulate the development of real property within its
municipal borders and has utterly failed, in this case, in that
duty.
40.

That by reason of the action of Ovard and City of

Draper, the Plaintiffs are reasonably confused and uncertain
about their legal rights as regards to the Property and others.
41.

That, among other things, there is a duty on the part

of the City of Draper, by way of enforcement of its ordinances
and the laws of the State of Utah to prosecute violations of
those laws and ordinances.

This duty has been ignored and the

City of Draper has utterly failed to prosecute these violations.
42.

That on or about July, 1988 the City of Draper, acting

by and through its Board of Adjustment, attempted to ratify the
illegal conduct of Ovard by granting a "variance" on the
application of Mountain West Savings, a banking institution,
represented by its purported agent, Ovard.

That the so called

"variance" further confuses the legal rights and interest of not
only the Plaintiffs, but the owners of adjacent parcels of land.
£3.

That the actions of City of Draper by and through its

Board of Adjustment are without or beyond the jurisdiction of the
Board of Adjustment.
-8-
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44.

That in any event, the City of Draper has ignored the

enforcement of the conditions attached to the granting of the
"variance" as they relate to adjacent property owners, all of
which has damaged the Plaintiffs and created uncertainty as to
their true legal status in regards to the Property.
45.

That the Plaintiffs have been damaged by virtue of the

conduct of the City of Draper alleged above, inasmuch as the
vacant property has been reduced in value, the Sanders have lost
the ownership and equitable interest in the home located on
parcel .020 altogether and the uncertainty surrounding these
properties has resulted in litigation was necessary to ascertain
the true legal rights and standing of the Plaintiffs.

In

addition, the Plaintiffs have been deprived of the full use and
enjoyment of the Property.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Writ of Mandate or Mandamus)
46.

The Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 46 of the Amended
Complaint.
47.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to a Writ of Mandate or

Mandamus (hereinafter "Mandamus") requiring the City of Draper to
perform its required duties and actions, and more particularly:
(a)

To fully prosecute the violations of its laws and

the laws of the State of Utah set forth above in relation to
the illegal subdivision and sale of illegally subdivided
"lots" (the Property).
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(b)

To enforce its conditions placed upon the granting

of zoning variances by way of sanction, fine, a finding of
nuisance or action authorized by law.
(c)

Take such action as might be necessary through its

appropriate political subdivisions, namely the planning
committee, to correctly define the status of the Property.
(d)

To declare null and void the action of the Board

of Adjustment for the City of Draper insofar as it relates
to the purported subdivision of the Property.
(e)

To declare null and void the action of the Board

of Adjustment of the City of Draper insofar as it relates to
the Property and its action of July, 1988 due to the lack or
want of jurisdiction for such action.
48.

That the Plaintiffs have attempted to resolve the

issues raised above informally and directly with the City of
Draper, but without satisfaction.
49.

That there exists no plain, speedy and adequate remedy

other than this Amended Complaint for the issuance of a Writ of
Mandamus.
50.

That the Plaintiffs have sustained damages by virtue of

the conduct alleged above which should be ascertained and found
by a jury.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment)
51.

That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this

reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 51 of
the Amended Complaint.
-10-
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52.

That the Plaintiffs are entitled to and should receive

a declaratory relief deciding the questions of construction and
validity under the ordinances and actions of the City of Draper
and more particularly pursuant to § 78-33-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953
as amended).
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence of Draper City)
53.

That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this

reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 53 of
the Amended Complaint.
54.

That the City of Draper has been negligent and

Plaintiffs have sustained damages which were proximately caused
by the action or inaction of the City of Draper as alleged above,
as well as the conduct set forth hereafter:
(a)

The failure of the City of Draper to properly

police the development and subdivision of real property
within its boundaries.
(b)

The de facto approval of the Ovard "subdivision"

by the issuance of a building permit as well as the inaction
of the City of Draper after being informed of the illegal
attempted subdivision by Ovard.
(c)

The failure of the City of Draper to ascertain

violations of its ordinances and laws, as well as those of
the State of Utah, and take reasonable steps to enforce the
same.
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55.

That in addition to the damages set forth above, the

Plaintiffs have suffered emotional distress, anxiety and upset to
their damage in an amount not less than $150,000.
56.

That by virtue of the conduct of the City of Draper and

as a direct and proximate result thereof, the Plaintiffs have
suffered the damages more particularly described above, in an
amount not less than $150,000 and otherwise according to proof.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Trespass of Brown and Stevens)
57.

That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this

reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 57 of
the Amended Complaint.
53.

That Defendants Brown and Stevens and John Does I

through X have trespassed on the Property of the Plaintiffs, to
wit: parcels .018 and .019, in the following particulars:
(a)

As to Defendant Brown, Defendant Brown and those

acting with him trespass on parcel .019 owned by Plaintiff
Glanville by their ongoing traverse and use of that parcel
by way of gaining access to their residence and garage and
their construction of improvements over and across the
Property owned by Plaintiff Glanville.

Additionally, Brown

and others have constructed a fence across or surrounding
parcel .018 and have attempted to convert the same to their
own use, have utilized the same for personal use, including
the grazing and running of horses without the permission or
consent of Plaintiff.
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(b)

As to Defendant Stevens, his trespass consists of

construction of improvements and the maintenance of
improvements which occupy a portion Q f the Right-of-Way
adjacent to parcel .019 owned by Plaintiff Glanville.
(c)

Plaintiff has made demand on Defendants Brown and

Stevens and those acting with them, to cease and terminate
their ongoing trespass which demands have been utterly
ignored and disregarded.
59.

That the actions of Defendants Brown and Stevens and

those acting with them, have not been Approved or consented to by
the Plaintiffs and are in direct and total disregard of their

&f*7n&irs&h2p and interest
50.

in che

Property*

That as a direct and proximate result of the trespass

of Defendants Brown and Stevens and thqSe acting with them, the
Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount not yet determined, but
no le^s than $10,000 which should be proven and established at
the fecial of this matter.
51.

That the actions of Brown anc} Stevens and those acting

with them, have been intentional, malicious and in total
disregard of the rights of the Plaintiffs as herein sat forth,
and a$s a result thereof, not only has this action been required,
but tiie

Plaintiff is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages

in an amount not less than $10,000 as t Q Defendant Brown, and
$10,00)0 as to Defendant Stevens.
%2.

That inasmuch as Defendants B r o wn and Stevens and those

acting with them have disregarded the reasonable requests of the
-13-
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Plaintiff heretofore, it would be reasonable for the Court to
make and enter, without delay and during the pendency of this
action, on application of the Plaintiff, an injunction
restraining these Defendants and those acting with them from
ongoing trespass as described above, pending a finding as to the
Plaintiffs' damages therefore.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence of Brown)
63.

That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this

reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 68 of
the Amended Complaint.
64.

That Brown and/or the representative of Mountainwest

knew or should have known of the existence of problems related to
rhe home due to the following:
(a) Low asking price;
(b)

Mountainwest's negotiations with the previous

owner in which they sought to require him to obtain a
variance from Draper City;

65.

(c)

The survey plat; and

(d)

The counteroffer made to Brown by Mountainwest.

That Defendant Brown disregarded the potential problems

with the property and took advantage of the bargain price.
66.

That Defendant Brown's purchase of this property has

damaged the Plaintiffs herein.
67.

That Defendant Brown has been unjustly enriched.
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SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Illegality)
68.

That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this

reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 63 of
the Amended Complaint.
69.

That § 10-9-26 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)

prohibits the sale or transfer of a parcel of property created in
violation of the subdivision ordinance.
70.

That § 6-6-1(c) of the Draper City Subdivision

Ordinances also prohibits the sale or transfer of parcels of
property created in violation of the subdivision ordinance.
71.

That the transfer or sale of the property to

Mountainwesr was in violation of the above laws and therefore
illegal.
72.

That the sale of the property by Mountainwest to Brown

was in violation of the above laws and therefore illegal.
73.

That pursuant to § 10-9-1002 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as

amended) Plaintiff's seek to rescind the sales of this land which
were made m

violation of the above laws.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Private Nuisance)

74.

That the Plaintiffs incorporate herein by this

referance the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 73 of
rhe Amended Complaint.
75.

That Defendants Brown's and Stevens' failure to comply

with the subdivision requirements have obstructed and interfered
with Plaintiffs' comfortable enjoyment of their property.
-15-
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76.

That pursuant -co § 78-38-1 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as

amended) Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief requiring these
Defendants to abate the nuisance by complying with the
subdivision requirements and an award of damages as shall be
proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the
Defendants, and each of them, as follows:
1.

As to the City of Draper, et al.;
(a)

A Writ of Mandamus requiring the City of Draper

and its political subdivisions to comply with the City of
Draper ordinances and the laws of the State of Utah in the
policing and management, as well as the enforcement of their
ordinances and the laws of the State of Utah.
(b)

For damages in connection with the Writ of

Mandamus as provided by law in an amount not less than
$150,000.
(c)

For declaratory relief fixing and describing the

rights of the Plaintiff in regards to the Property, both as
it relates to its current status under the laws of the State
of Utah and the ordinances of Draper City, as well as
adjoining and adjacent property owners.
(d)

For judgment in the amount of $150,000 based upon

the negligence of the City of Draper.
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2.

As to Defendants Brown and Stevens:
(a)

For a judgment finding that the actions of

Defendants Brown and Stevens and those acting with them are
trespass upon the properties of Plaintiffs.
(b)

For the immediate issuance and entry of an

injunction restraining Defendants Brown and Stevens and
those acting with them from the actions described in the
Complaint.
(c)

For judgment in connection with the trespass of

Brown and Stevens and those acting with them in an amount
not less than $20,000, in punitive damages and $10,000 in
general damages.
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem

proper.
DATED this

<2-f

day of January, 1993.
Respectfully Submitted,

t££^s^

GREEN
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Sander's addrass:
2717 NE 110 South
Vancouver, WA 98686
Plaintiff Glanville's address:
P.O. Box 128
Westfall, Oregon
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Tiffanee Paditios, being duly sworn, says:
That she is Employed in the offices of GREEK & BERRY,
attorneys for Plaintiffs herein, that she served the attached
AMENDED COMPLAINT upon the following parties by placing a true
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Bruce A. Maak, Esq.
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State, #13 00
Salt Lake City, UT? 84111
Jody K. Burnettr Esq,
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and hand delivering the same on the

SUBSCRIBED

AIJD

J^-N

day of January, 1993

SWORN t o before *ae t h i s c ^ d a y

of J a n u a r y ,

1993.
^

My C c i m i s s ^ j n ^ ^ p i r e ^ :

Quf^yQ

0. >CuL£i

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah

L -s-ew-tvown&Eff.'C&ir ™* ""
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APPENDIX
ITEM # 5

Title 9, Draper City Ordinances

TITLE 9
LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS
Chapter 2
PROCESSING PROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS
9-2-1.
9-9-2.
9-9-3.
9-2-4.
9-2-5.
9-2-6.
9-2-7.
9-2-8.
9-2-9.
9-2-10.
9-2-11.
9-2-12.
9-2-13.
9-2-14.
9-2-15.
9-2-16.
9-2-17.
9-2-18.

Name
Purpose
Building and Use Permits Required
Building Official/Zoning Administrator
Licensing Requirements
Fees
Inspection and Approval Required
Initial Application Process
Classification as to Use or Development
Types of Approval Processes
Appeal of Decision by Building Official/Zoning
Administrator
Compliance - A Pre-requisite to Regulatory
Approval
Time Computation
Interpreration
Conflict
Repealer
Penalty for Violations
Increase Fees
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TITLE 9
LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS
Chapter 2
PROCESSING PROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS
9-2-1.

Name.

This title shall be known as the Land Use and Development
Regulations of Draper City Ordinances, 1990.
9-2-2.

Purpose.

These regulations are designed and enacted for the
purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience,
order, prosperity, and welfare of the present and future
inhabitants of Draper City, providing for, among other things, less
congestion in the streets, the allowance and encouragement of
energy conservation and renewable energy sources, better building
and development practices, adequate light and air, a logical
classification of land uses and distribution of land development
and utilization, protection of the tax base, economy and government
expenditures, encouragement of agriculture and industrial pursuits
in appropriate locations and the protection of existing urban
development. These regulations accomplish these purposes by zoning
the area lying within Draper City and by regulating the location,
height, bulk and size of buildings and other structures, the
percentage of lot which may be occupied, the size of yard, courts,
and open spaces, the use of buildings and structures for trade,
industry, residence, recreation, public activities or other
purposes, and the uses of land for trade, industry, residence or
other purposes, and regulates the subdivision of land within Draper
City.
9-2-3.

Building and Use Permits Required.

Any construction, alteration, repair or removal of any
building or structure or any part thereof, or the change of use of
any land or building as provided or as required in this Title shall
not be commenced, or proceeded with, except after the issuance of
a written permit for the same by the Building Official of Draper
City.
a.

Unlawful.

Any building or structure erected, constructed,
altered, enlarged, converted, moved or maintained contrary to
provisions of this Title, and any use of land, building or premise

1

°002$t)

9-2-3. a.
establish, conducted or maintained contrary to provisions of this
Title shall be, and the same hereby is, declared 9-2-3, (a)
to be unlawful and a public nuisance.
b.

Restraint of Use or Building.

Tne City shall upon request of the Building Official
and with the approval of the City Council at once commence action
or proceedings for the abatement and removal or enjoinment thereof
in a matter provided by law, and take other steps as will abate and
remove such buildings, use, or structure, and restrain or enjoin
any person, firm, or corporation from erecting, building,
maintaining or using said building or structure or property
contrary to the provisions of this Title. The remedies provided
for herein shall be cumulative and not exclusive.
9-2-4.

Building Official/Zoning Administrator.

A Building Official/Zoning Administrator shall be
designated and authorized by the City Council as the officer
charged with the enforcement of this Title. From time to time, by
resolution or ordinance, the City Council may entrust such
administration in whole or in part to any other officer without
amendment to this Title.
The Building Official/Zoning
Administrator shall enforce the provisions of this Title entering
actions in the regulatory board, commissions or courts when
necessary, and such failure to do so shall not legalize any
violations of the provisions of this Title.
The Building
Official/Zoning Administrator shall not issue any permit unless the
plans of the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction,
alterations and use fully conform to all regulations then in
effect.
9-2-5.

Licensing Requirements.

All departments, officials, and public employees of the
City which are vested with the duty or authority to issue permits ^
or licenses shall confirm to the provisions of this Title and shall ?v\
issue no permits or licenses for use, building, or purpose where \J
the same would be in conflict with the provisions this Title and
any such permit or license, if issued in conflict with the
pxovi£^n^J!_this Title shall be null and void.
9-2-6.

Fees.

Fees shall be charged applicants for building, occupancy,
and conditional use permits, design review inspection and planned
unit development and subdivision approvals, Planning Commission,
and Board of Adjustment hearings, and such other services as are
required by this Title to be performed by and for in behalf of the
2
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9-2-16.
9-2-16.

Repealer.

All such Land Use Regulations previously adopted by
Draper City are hereby superceded and amended to read as set forth
herein; provided, however that this Title shall be deemed to be a
continuation of the previous ordinances, including amendments, and
not a new enactment, insofar as the substance or revisions of
previous provisions is included in those ordinances whether in the
same or in different wording.
9-2-17.

Penalty for Violations.

Whoever shall violate any of the provisions of this Title
shall be guilty of a Class ffBft Misdemeanor for each and every day
such violation shall occur or continue and upon conviction of any
such violation, shall be punishable by a fine of not more than
$1,000.00, or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or by
both such fine and imprisonment for each infraction.
9-2-18.

Increased Fees.

Notwithstanding that any violation of this Title is a
Class ffBlf Misdemeanor, the City reserves the right to increase the
permit fee up to twice the normal amount when, (1) an activity that
complies with all applicable city, county, and state regulations
has become, but has failed to first attain an appropriate permit,
or (2) when a person/business to whom an appropriate permit has
been issued has failed to comply with all the rules and regulations
which apply to that permit, but has been able to obtain a variance
from the Board of Adjustments after the non-compliance has been
discovered.
a.

Scheduled Increased Fees.

When the City exercises its right to increase its
permit fee the following schedule shall apply:
(1)

An additional ten percent (10%) shall be added
to the permit fee when the person/business in
violation files within five (5) working days
after notification of the violation from the
City, an appropriate application to correct
violation.

(2) An additional one hundred percent (100%) shall
be added to the permit fee for those who fail
to file the appropriate application within five
(5) working days after the notification from
the City.

9
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APPENDIX
ITEM # 6

Subdivision Application

EXHIBIT

A
ALL-STATE LEGAL SUPPLY CO

£D /lily

IC/7£

City of Draper
12441 South 9th East
P.O. Box 33^1 84020
ATTN: Planning and Zoning
Gentlemen:
Ue hereby submit application for a Minor Subdivision called Shadow Mountain Acres
located at approximately.647 East 13800 South.
Enclosed is a filing fee of $250.00 plus $125.00 representing a fee of $25*00 per
lot.
At Enclosure 1 is nine copies of a Reel! ml nary Plat which complies with your
Subdivision Filing Rrocedures 2d.
At Enclosure 2 are Preliminary Engineering Reports on the sewer and water nade by
Templeton. Linke and Associates.
At Enclosure 3 is proof r»f our invested interest.
We respectfully request that this subdivision be reviewed as soon as possible. If
there are any questions or problems that we can assist with please let us know.
Respectfully,

Layne J. Newman
232 E . 6715 So.
Midvale, Utah 8404?
Telephone: 261-1128

Melbourne 'T. Yergensen
2518 Newport Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: 942-1158, 5 6 I - H H
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APPENDIX
ITEM # 7

Board of Adjustments file, 4/12/1979

EXHIBIT
2QA&D 0 7 ADJUSTMENTS
Bit

April 12 1

1979 IU#tilXg

& .
| ^ AU-STATE LEGAL SUPPLY CO

Meeting called to order by Chairman Toe Ifellanthln vith the f allowing pr«ientt
Doane Sadler;

Gary lelsonj

Slaer Starling; and

Andrea Zlsneroan, Sec.

Meeting ojLlled to order at 8i2ii p.m.
Ho.

1t Appeal - Phil Bdaunda
Charge of $138 for not getting building permit from it City of Draper.
Also 5<# charge added to fee because he didn't get a building permit.
Doane Sadler moved that the $0% charge be made aa originally Issued
vith meoond by Gary Belaon.
Toting m in favor.
Queetion brought up aa to whether he need to get business license.
Bo.

2i AHTZS PSCK - Yarianoe
I
Building la on a lit foraerly less than one acre. Elmer Sterling moved
to approval varxgmoe
Second byfluaneSadler, Motion carried*

JTo.

3* MOTAL AfflgRSQS ~ Terianoe
Applying for ii-plax variance.
Ton Mellenthln moved to approve the variance on the duplex only.
Second by Slaer Sterling. Motion carried.
lo.

Us BBffllS JBUHHHAM - Yarianoe
IXiaae Sadler moved to approve maid variance vith aecond by Gary Kelson.
Hot ion carr±ed»
*o.

$t

LTKE CAKHSR - Yarianoe
I^rnn Carter vas preaent to request 100 ft. frontage variance at QkS £•
11*800 South. Ifaane Sadler moved to approve variance vith second by gbear Sterling.
Motion carried*___
~—-—
Mo.

6* LLSZ MftMAH. SAM OYAKD & M Y U BAT - Y ^ H f n ^
All of above vere present. A Mr. Stevens, neighbor, also present in
favor. Ton Mellenthln moved to approve the variance based on the folloving
j
conditionsx
\„ - . , .
/*.\ -^ -^
/
a) 70 foot oul de sac; (b; 16 ft« paved surfaoe back from main roa£,'
(0) fire hydrant and adequate vaterline.
^
Second"by^Dogae "Sadler "and motion passed unanljsoualy.
^ 1

-?-*•—-RQjyJLl) HASHffgSEN - Yarianoe regarding the l o t s i s e from 1 acre tu .90 acres.

Klaer Sterling moved t o approve variance vith second by Cuane Sadler, Moti« n
c a r r i e d unanimously.
Mae t i n g adjourned a t 9*36 p.m.

000281

March

, I979

To Whoa it Bay concern:
M. Saa Ovard and Layne Newman are applying for a variance
just North of 65O E. I38OO S.
A right of way 35 feet wide and 311 feet deep connects 138(£. S.
with a 5.I6

acre peice of land.

The land is not being used for anything at the present tine.
There is nothing on the property or right of way exoept old shed
foundations which will be removed and a concrete irrigation ditch
which will stay for irrigation. The East Jordan Canal borders the
Northern property line.
We plan to build two hones on the property for ourselves to
live in.

^ ^

^T

^^J

^r/^

s^#^

o/c^j. #
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Draper City Ordinances
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6-3-1

Enforcement

^ActA\
"tX
r
r
Hi* O>L (7 £(
LUJ^v\sJt ^r
,
..,«
£ci^£<L^^£v

4*

r

PAGE.006

959 PBS

FEE 26 '52

f

EXHIBIT

1

AU.-STATCLEOM.SUPfi.YCO.

-C^-

A#

The Building Official is designated and authorized by the City
Council as the officer charged with .the enforcement of this Title, but
from time to time, by resolution or ordinance, the City Council may
entrust such administration, in whole or in part, to any other officer
without amendment to this Title. The Building Official shall enforce
the provisions of this Title, entering actions in the courts^ when
necessary
to33us^failureUb"Jdo~-^
of
the provisions* The Building Official shall not issue any permit unless
the plans of the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction,
alternation and use fully conform to all land use development
regulations then in effect.

B«

It shall be the duty of the Building Official to inspect or cause to be
inspected all buildings and improvements in course of construction or
repair*

C.

The construction, alteration, repair or removal of any building or
structure or any part thereof, or the change of use of any land or
building as provided or as regulated in this Title shall not be
commended, or proceeded with, except after the issuance of a
written permit for the same by the Building Official.

c #

^y building or structure erected, constructed, altered, enlarged,
converted, moved or maintained contrary to provisions of this Title,
anc
^ ***? U s e °* i a n ^ J building or premise established, conducted or
maintained contrary to provisions of this Title shall be, and the same
hereby i s , declared to be unlawful and a public nuisance, and the City
Attorney s h a l l r upon -request of -the governing body, at once
commence -action or proceedings for abatement and removal or
enjoinment thereof in a manner provided by law, and take other steps
as will abate and remove such buildings use or structure, and restrain
or enjoin any person, firm or corporation from erecting, building,
maintaining or using said building, or structure or property contrary
to the pruvh*iou* of this T i t l e . The r e m e d i e s provided for herein shall

be commulative and not exclusive*
o-3-Z

Planning Commission Review
All applicants for building permits, shall submit to the Planning
Commission through their usual procedures and staff review process, a plan
for the use and development of each parcel or structure for the purposes of
meeting the requirements set forth in this Title.

6-3-3

licensing
All departments, officials, and public employees of the City which are
vested with the duty or authority to issue permits or licenses shall conform

to the provisions of this Title and shall, issue no permit or license for uses,
building or purposes where ther'sarne would be in conflict

with the

o A a "> s A
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provisions of this Title and any such permit or licences, if issued in conflict
with the provisions of this Title, shall be null and void*
6-3-4

Fees
Fees may be charged applicants for building, occupancy, and conditional
use permits, design review and planned unit development approvals,
Planning Commission and Board of Adjustment hearings* and such other
services as axe required by this Title to be performed by public officers or
agencies* Such fees shall be established by the legislative body and be in
amounts reasonably needed to defray costs to the public*

6-3-5

Interpretation
In interpreting and applying the provisions of this Title, the requirements
contained herein are declared to be the minimum requirements for the
purposes set forth*

6-3-6

Ctmllict
This Title shall not nullify the more restrictive provisions of covenants,
agreements, other ordinances or laws, but shall prevail notwithstanding
such provisions which are less restrictive.
If any provision of this Title or its application to any - person or
circumstance is, for any reason, held invalid, the remaining portion and/or
poritons of this Title or the application of the provision to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected*

6-3^7

Repealer
The existing Zoning Subdivision and other land use regulatory Ordinance of
the City are hereby superseded and amended to read as set forth herein;
provided, however that this Title shall be deemed a continuation of the
previous ordinances, including amendments, and not a new enactment,
insofar as the substance of revisions or previous provisions is included in
those ordinances whether in the same or in different language*

6-3-g

Penalty far Violation
Whoever shall violate any of the provisions of this Title shall be guilty of a
Class B miasdeameanor for each and eveiy day such violation shall occur or
continue and upon conviction of any such violation, shall be punishable by a
fine of not more than $299 or by imprisonment for not more than six
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, or by the penalty for
transfer and sale of property provided in Section 10-9-26 of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1953,

ft A ft 9 Q S
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6-6

SUBDIVISION

6-6-1

General Provisions
A.

Purpose
This chapter shalj provide for minimum standards relating tr- the
platting and recording of land subdivision in the City of Draper, Utah,
in particular it is intended, among other things, to:

B.

1.

Promote the health,
residents of the City.

safety,

and

general

welfare

of

the

2.

Promote the efficient and orderly growth of the City.

3.

Provide a basis for determining the appropriateness of and
method for approval of residential development.

4.

Establish design and installation standards for streets, water
and sewer facilities, drainage systems and other public utilities.

Evidence of Public Welfare
Any proposed subdivision and its ultimate use shall be in the best
i n t e r e s t s of the public welfare and the neighborhood and the
subdivider shall present evidence to this effect when requested to do
so by the City.

C.

6-6-2

Restrictions of Subdivided Land
1.

No person shall sell or exchange or offer to sell or exchange^ any r
parcel of land which is a part of a subdivision of a larger tract J
of land, or record for building purposes in the office of the
County Recorder any subdivision plat unless the subdivision has
been approved by the City according to the provisions of this /
Chapter.
^

2.

All lots, plots, or t r a c t s of land located within a subdivision
shall be subject to the provisions of this Chapter, regardless of
whether or not the tract is owned by the Subdivider or a
subsequent purchaser, transferee, or holder of the land.

Designation of Subdivision
A.

Regular Subdivisions
The owner/agent of any parcel of land proposed for regular
subdivision ^h^ll apply to the Planning Commission for Conditional
Use Perm it~"(Iesi gnat ion as a regular subdivision. Such application
shall include a legal description of the tract and a location map
indicating the relation of the property to existing roads, adjoining
property owners, and other information as may be required to
adequately identify and describe the property. At a regular public
meeting the Planning Commission shall hear the application and make
6-1
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a m a t t e r of minutes e v i d e n c e in support of the application, their
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of subdivision designation, and any conditions for
d e v e l o p m e n t that may be peculiar to the subdivision. Uporjapproval
of t h e designation and t h e Conditional Use Permit, t h e subdivides
shall follow procedure and submit documents for preliminary and
final plat processing as defined in this Chapter.
B.

Non-Regular Subdivisions
The o w n e r / a g e n t of any parcel of land proposed for non-regular
subdivision shall apply to t h e Planning Commission for Conditional
U s e P e r m i t designation as a non-regular subdivision of a type herein
described. Such applications shall include a legal description of the
tract and a l o c a t i o n map indicating the relation of the property to
e x i s t i n g roads, adjoining property owners, and other information as
may be required to adequately identify and describe the property. At
a regular public m e e t i n g the Planning Commission shall h e a r ) t h e
application and make a m a t t e r of minutes evidencevinsupport^of the
application, their d e t e r m i n a t i o n of subdivision designation, and any
conditions for d e v e l o p m e n t that may be peculiar to the subdivision.
Upon approval of designation and the Conditional U s e Permit, the
subdivider shall follow procedures and submit documents for
processing
consistent
with
type
of
non-regular
subdivision
r e q u i r e m e n t s listed here:
1.

Large-Lot
Subdivision.
Upon designation
of
large-lot
subdivision the subdivider shail submit documents for both
preliminary and final plat processing. All improvements and
guarantees shall be as required for regular subdivision e x c e p t ,
after r e c o m m e n d a t i o n by the Planning Commission, the City
Council may allow l o t s to be sold with only partial i m p r o v e m e n t s , provided that paved s t r e e t s and culinary water,
including fire p r o t e c t i o n c a p a c i t y , shall be available and
installed to C i t y standard s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .

2.

Minor Subdivision. Upon designation of minor subdivision, the
subdivider shall submit d o c u m e n t s for preliminary
plat
processing in a c c o r d a n c e with this Chapter. Approval of the
preliminary plat by t h e Planning Commission and the City
Council shall be authorization for the subdivider to sell lots
within the subdivision c o v e r e d by the preliminary plat by m e t e s
and bounds, and the r e q u i r e m e n t s of a final plat shall be
waived.
a.

Improvements - When a final plat is not" required, the
subdivider shall provide all i m p o r v e m e n t s required for
standard subdivision, or large-lot subdivision when so
approved. All such i m p r o v e m e n t s shall be constructed in
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter and as
defined by the City Engineer.

b.

Guarantee - In lieu of e a c h lot being fully improved prior
to the s a l e of l o t s , the subdivider shall provide improvement guarantee, which amount is to be set by the City

6-2
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Engineer and approved by the City Council according to
the procedures established for regular subdivision. All
design and improvement standards of regiilar js£iMj_yJLsion
shall ap"pTy to Minor Subdivision.
£p

6-6-3

3.

One-Lot Subdivision. Upon designation of one-lot subdivision,
the subdivider may request use of the property with the
requirements for both preliminary and final plat waived,
provided the use and lot meets all requirements of the City
Zoning Ordinance. Improvements of one-lot subdivisions shall
be consistent with regular subdivision or large-lot subdivisions
where so approved. Guarantee of improvements shall be by
building occupation restrictions or by bond or escrow at the
discretion of the City Council.

4.

Planned Development Subdivision. Upon designation of Planned
Development Subdivision, the subdivider may submit documents
for processing following the procedures for regular subdivision
approval which must include the special provisions for Planned
Development Subdivision as contained in this Chapter.

Subdivision Processing and Approval Procedure
A.

Preliminary Plat
1.

Preliminary Consultation. Each person or entity who proposes
to subdivide land within the jurisdiction of the City shall
become familiar with the City subdivision requirements and
land use related plans for the territory in which the proposed
subdivision lies by consultation with the Planning Commission
staff. It shall be the obligation of the subdivider to have a
knowledge of procedures, policies and to have an understanding
of the availabilities of utility services before submission of the
preliminary plat.

Z.

Zoning Requirements. The subdivider shall comply with all
Zoning Ordinance regulations to accomodate intended lot size
and type of development.
Conditional use and subdivision
designation approval shall be required of all subdivision
applications before submission of the preliminary plat.

3.

Preliminary Plat Filing. A preliminary plat shall be prepared in
conformance with the standards, rules, and regulations
contained herein, and eight (8) blue and white prints therof Shall
be submitted to the City for distribution to various departments
and
interested
entities
for
their
information
and
recommendations prior to formal action by the Planning
Commission.

4.

Preliminary Plat Application F e e . At the time of filing the
preliminary plat, the subdivider shall deposit with the City a
non-refundable application fee made payable to the City. The
City Council shall prescribe from time to time the amount of
such fee, which shall be for the purpose of defraying expenses
6-3
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incidental and in connection with the checking and reviewing of
such preliminary subdivision p l a t s ,
5.

Preliminary Plat R e q u i r e m e n t s . The preliminary plat shall be
drawn to a s c a l e not smaller than 100 f e e t to the ir~rh, and shall
be on standard 22 x 34 inch or 24 x 36 inch pap^r. The plat
shall show:
£>
a.

The proposed name of the subdivision (acceptable names
shall be approved by t h e County R e c o r d e r ) .

b.

The subdivision l o c a t i o n as forming a part of a larger
t r a c t or parcel. Where the plat submitted includes only a
portion of a larger tract or only a part of a parcel or
p a r c e l s of the s a m e owner, a s k e t c h plan of a prospective
major s t r e e t system shall be prepared showing logical
c o n n e c t i o n s to and through t h e larger parcel.
The
preliminary plat shall show all adjoining property owned
or having an ownership interest by the subdivider.

c.

Sufficient information to a c c u r a t e l y l o c a t e the property
including the nearest s e c t i o n corner tie. A copy of the
County property ownership plat of the property and a
l e g a l description of t h e parcel must also be submitted.

d.

The owners of all land adjoining and contiguous to the
proposed subdivision.

e.

The n a m e s and addresses of the subdivider(s), owner(s) of
land, and the engineer or surveyor of the subdivision.

f.

Contours at t w o - f o o t intervals to show the topography of
t h e land.

g.

The boundary lines of the tract to be subdivided including
total a c r e a g e proposed for subdivision.

h*

The l o c a t i o n , dimensions and o t h e r d e t a i l s of all existing
or p l a t t e d s t r e e t s and other important features such as
e a s e m e n t s , railroad lines, w a t e r courses
(including
irrigation canals and ditches), e x c e p t i o n a l topography,
bridges and buildings within or i m m e d i a t e l y adjacent to
t h e tract to be subdivided.

n

Existing sanitary s e w e r , storm drains, water supply mains,
and surface water control s t r u c t u r e s within the tract and
i m m e d i a t e l y adjacent t h e r e t o . A c o m m i t m e n t in writing
from the appropriate a g e n c i e s that utility services will be
available for the p r o j e c t .

j.

The flood hazard boundary as per Federal Flood Insurance
Administration, when applicable.

6-4
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k.

The l o c a t i o n s , dimensions, and other details of proposed
public s t r e e t , private s t r e e t s , alleys, utility e a s e m e n t s ,
parks, open s p a c e s used and l o t s , with proper labeling of
p a r c e l s to be d e d i c a t e d to the public or designated for
private use.

1.

Buffer z o n e s and proposed mitigation
c o m p a t i b l e uses adjoin the subdivision.

m.

North point, s c a l e and d a t e .

n»

A copy of proposed p r o t e c t i v e c o v e n a n t s .

o«

A preliminary Storm Drainage Study.

p.

The l a y o u t , dimension and numbering of all lots.

q.

Proposed construction of permanent
fencing
along
appropriate subdivision boundaries in conformance with
the guidelines provided in this ordinance and staff
recommendations.

r.

The proposed m e t h o d of dealing with all irrigation water
s y s t e m s relating to the properties, including a full
consideration of all run-off water conditions.

where

non-

Preliminary Plat Approval.
The preliminary pla^t shall) be
r e v i e w e d by t h e Planning Commission, and either approved or
r e j e c t e d within 45 days a f t e r its presentation to the commssion,
or if modified, within 45 days of the presentation of the l a t e s t
modification.
If approved, the Planning Commission *shall
express i t s approval in writing or a m a t t e r of minutes, with
whatever conditions are a t t a c h e d and return one copy of the
preliminary plat, signed by the Commission Chairman, to the
subdivider. If the preliminary plat is not approved, the Planning
Commission shall i n d i c a t e its disapproval in writing or as a
m a t t e r of minutes and reasons therefore by a siroilarlvs^igned
copy. Upon the Planning Commission's action, the plat(^halljbe
referred to the C i t y Council for r e v i e w , when appro v e a b y the
C i t y Council, t h e subdivider is authorized to proceed with the
preparation of the revised preliminary plat.
Time L i m i t a t i o n .
Approval of the preliminary plat shall be
e f f e c t i v e for a maximum period of one (1) year after approval
unless, upon application of the subdivider, the Planning
Commission shall grant an e x t e n s i o n which shall not e x c e e d one
(1) y e a r . If the final plat has not b e e n submitted within one (1)
y e a r , or the approved e x t e n s i o n period, the preliminary plan
must again be s u b m i t t e d to the Planning Commission for
reconsideration.
H o w e v e r , preliminary approval of a large
tract shall not be voided, provided that the developer shall
apply for t i m e e x t e n s i o n as part of the original plan of phasing,
the Planning C o m m i s s i o n shall, as part of the preliminary
period for each, proposed phase, and the final plat for e a c h
phase is filed within the maximum period so established.

6-5

0 fl 0 ? <J 0

a.

3.

D.

E.

R e l e a s e of P e r f o r m a n c e G u a r a n t e e s . The City Council shall, at
the request of the subdivider or his successors in interest,
r e l e a s e from time to t i m e , portions of the bond, for which the
construction performance has b e e n fully satisfied, provided
h o w e v e r , there shall be r e t a i n e d with the City for a period of
t w e l v e (12) months from the d a t e of acknowledgement by the
City
Engineer
that all i m p r o v e m e n t s are
satisfactorily
i m p l a c e d , a sum or s e c u r i t y of not l e s s than ten (10) percent of
the total improvement c o n s t r u c t i o n c o s t as a guarantee of good
m a t e r i a l and workmanship.

R e c o r d a t i o n and Limitations
1.

City to R e c o r d . When finally approved, the City Recorder shall
be responsible for recording subdivision plats. The subdivider
shall pay for all recording f e e s at the t i m e of recordation. No
final plats shall be recorded in the o f f i c e of the County
Recorder, and no lots included in such final plat shall be sold or
e x c h a n g e d , unless and until the plat is properly approved, signed
and a c c e p t e d by the C i t y .

2.

Time Limitation After Approval. Any final plat not offered for
recording within one (1) y e a r a f t e r t h e date of preliminary plat
approval, unless the t i m e is e x t e n d e d by the Planning
Commission shall not be r e c o r d e d , or r e c e i v e d for recording,
and shall have no validity w h a t s o e v e r .

3.

Changes in Final Plat Prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any
person to change the l i n e s , drawings, lot s i z e s or shapes, or any
other provision of a plat or support document after it has
r e c e i v e d final approval by any entity whose approval is
required.

Amended Plats
L
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Bond - The subdivider shall furnish and file with the City
Recorder a bond with c o r p o r a t e surety in an amount equal
to 125% of the c o s t of the i m p r o v e m e n t s as estimated by
the City Engineer
to assure the 'nstallation and
construction of the i m p r o v e m e n t s required u y this
Ordinance. Such bond shall be subject to approval of the
C i t y Council.

When changes are to be made in a plat of a subdivision which
has b e e n approved and r e c o r d e d , said subdivision shall be
v a c a t e d and an amended plat t h e r e o f shall be approved and
recorded in accordance with the procedures established in this
Chapter for approval and r e c o r d a t i o n of the final plat.

Required Subdivision Improvements
A.

Permanent Improvements
The subdivider of any land l o c a t e d in or p l a t t e d as a subdivision shall
at his o*m e x p e n s e , install the following improvements in compliance

Blocks intended fpr business or industrial uses shall be
designed specificAlly/ for such purposes, with adequate
space set as\de\jjr
o f f - s t r e e t parking and delivery
facilities.
Lots
1.

Standards,
a.

The lot arrangement and design shall be such that lots will
provide s a t i s f a c t o r y and desirable s i t e s for buildings, and
be properly r e l a t e d to topography and to existing and
probable future use requirements.

b.

All lots shown on the subdivision plat must conform to the
minimum area and width r e q u i r e m e n t s of the Zoning
Ordinance for the zone in which the subdivision is located
unless:
(1)

A variance is granted by the Board of Adjustment.

(2)

It is consistent with cluster subdivision approval as
provided in this T i t l e .

Each lot shall have frontage on a public s t r e e t dedicated
by the subdivision plat, or an e x i s t i n g public s t r e e t , or on
a s t r e e t which has b e c o m e public by right of use and is at
l e a s t forty (40) f e e t wide.
L o t s on private driveways,
lanes or s t r e e t s not d e d i c a t e d to the public shall be
subject to approval of the Planning Commission or Ec-ard
of Adjustment as provided in this T i t l e .
d.

Buildings c o n s t r u c t e d on corner l o t s shall comply with the
minimum setback for both s t r e e t s , as provided in the C i t y
Zoning Ordinance, and corner lot design shall anticipate
the additional s e t b a c k requirements.

e.

Side lines of lots shall be at approximately right angles to
the s t r e e t line, or radial to the s t r e e t line.

f.

Where the land included in a subdivision includes two or
more p a r c e l s in separate ownership and t h e lot
arrangement is such that a property ownership line divides
one or more lotsy the land in e a c h lot so divided shall be
transferred by deed to either single or joint ownership
before approval of the final p l a t , and such transfer shall
be ordered by t i t l e report s u b m i t t e d with the final plat.

Natural Drainage and Irrigation Water
1.

Standards.
a.

Natural Drainage and Other E a s e m e n t s - The Pla
Commission shall, unless waived for good and suff

6-18

000292

APPENDIX
ITEM # 9

Partial Summary Judgment
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Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (A2033)
Thomas R. Lee (A5991)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
Attorneys for Robert E. Brown, Jr.
and Diane Brown
Suite 1300, 185 South State Street
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
B. N. GLANVILLE,-JOSEPH D.
SANDERS and CHERYL M. SANDERS,
Plaintiffs,

)

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

vs.

)
)
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF
)
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD
)
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY
)
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER
)
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L. HOFFMAN,)
Mayor of the City of Draper,
)
ROBERT BROWN, KIM STEVENS, and
)
JOHN DOES I through X,
)
Defendants.

Civil No. 900902397PR
(Hon. Anne M. Stirba)

)

ROBERT E. BROWN, JR. and
DIANE BROWN,
Counterclaim and Crossclaim
Plaintiffs,
vs.
B.N. GLANVILLE, M.D. GLANVILLE,
JOSEPH D. SANDERS, CHERYL M.
SANDERS, KIM STEVENS, REBECCA
STEVENS, and SUSAN B. DAY,
C o u n t e r c l a i m and Crossclaim
Defendants.

iyM21$

The Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 30, 1993 of
defendant Robert E. Brown, Jr. came on regularly for hearing
before the Court, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding, at 3:00
p.m. on June 14, 1993, plaintiffs appearing through their counsel,
Frederick N. Green, defendant Brown appearing through his counsel,
Thomas R. Lee, and the Court having reviewed the submissions of
the parties filed herein, having heard oral argument, and the
Court having det ermined that there exists no genuine issue as to
any material fact bearing upon defendant Brown's Motion and that
defendant Brown is entitled to judgment dismissing with prejudice
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action of the Amended Complaint as a matter of law for the reasons set forth from the Bench
and for all of the reasons set forth in defendant Brown's memoranda submitted in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant Brown dated

March 30, 1993 be and the same is hereby granted.
2.

The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action of the

Amended Complaint herein dated January 21, 1993 of plaintiffs be
and the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon their
merits.
MADE AND ENTERED this ( p ^ day of. £M:LM^%'\

, 1993.

HonVrable^swff^T Stirba
District Judge
-2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Partial Summary Judgment
was served this

day of June, 1993 by mailing on said date

copies thereof by United States mail, first class postage prepaid,
addressed to:
Frederick N. Green, Esq.
Green & Berry
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jody K Burnett, Esq.
Williams & Hunt
Attorneys for Defendants Draper City,
Draper City Board of Adjustment, Planning
Commission, Draper City Council, and
Charles L. Hoffman
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Kim R. Stevens and Rebecca Stevens, Pro Se
13755 South Shadow Mountain Lane
Draper, Utah 84020
Susan B. Day, Pro Se
621 East 13800 South
Draper, Utah 84020
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Summary of Orders Previously Entered

C i

Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (A2033)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
Attorneys for Robert E. Brown, Jr.
and Diane Brown
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
B. N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D. SANDERS
and CHERYL M. SANDERS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L.
HOFFMAN, Mayor of the City of Draper,
ROBERT BROWN, KIM STEVENS, and
JOHN DOES I through X,

SUMMARY OF
ORDERS PREVIOUSLY ENTERED
AND
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
REMAINING FOR TRIAL

Civil No. 900902397PR
(Hon. Anne M. Stirba)

Defendants.
ROBERT E. BROWN, JR. and
DIANE BROWN,
Counterclaim and Crossclaim
Plaintiffs,
vs.
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B. N. GLANVILLE, M. D. GLANVILLE,
JOSEPH D. SANDERS, CHERYL M.
SANDERS, KIM STEVENS, REBECCA
STEVENS, and SUSAN B. DAY,
Counterclaim and Crossclaim
Defendants.

Pursuant to the Court's direction to counsel at pretrial, the following is a summary of
the Orders previously entered in this action by the Court (attached are copies of the Orders in
question) and a statement of the issues remaining for trial.
The Original Complaint. Attached as Exhibit "A" is a copy of the original
Complaint filed in this action. It contained four causes of action:
First Cause of Action sought a writ of mandamus against Draper City requiring Draper City to prosecute violations of zoning and subdivision laws.
Second Cause of Action sought a declaratory judgment of the construction and
validity of ordinances and actions of Draper City.
Third Cause of Action sought recovery of damages against Draper City
because of its negligence in administration of zoning and subdivision laws.
Fourth Cause of Action sought damages against defendants Brown and Stevens
because of their trespass upon the property of plaintiffs.
Order of Dismissal dated November 26, 1990. Draper City and its various
committees, council, and mayor (collectively referred to as "Draper City") moved to dismiss
all claims in the Complaint as against it. Draper City asserted that, for the following
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reasons, the Complaint failed to state a claim for relief: First, Draper City does not owe
plaintiffs any duty to enforce variances because enforcement of laws is a duty running to the
public generally. Second, the statute of limitations expired with respect to any challenge to
the variances in question. Third, Draper City's alleged misconduct was subject to governmental immunity. Judge Russon granted the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the Ruling, a
copy of which is attached hereto marked Exhibit "B," on November 7, 1990. That Ruling
stated that Draper City's Motion was granted for the reasons set forth in its Memorandum
and that Draper City owed no duty to Sanders/Glanville concerning alleged ordinance
violations and variances and the statute of limitations applied. Judge Russon entered an
Order of Dismissal on November 26, 1990, a copy of which is attached hereto marked
Exhibit "C." The Court's Order effected a dismissal with prejudice of First, Second, and
Third Causes of Action against Draper City.
The Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs by Stipulation filed an Amended Complaint, a
copy of which is attached hereto marked Exhibit "D." The first four causes of action
contained in the Amended Complaint were substantially identical to their counterparts in the
original Complaint. After amendment of the Complaint, the following causes of action
remained (First, Second, and Third Causes of Action having been dismissed by the Court's
Order of November 26, 1990):
Fourth Cause of Action sought damages against Brown and Stevens for their
trespass upon the property of Sanders/Glanville.
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Fifth Cause of Action sought damages against Brown based upon the claim
that Brown negligently purchased the property now owned by them, that Brown's
purchase of the property damaged Sanders/Glanville, and that Brown had been
unjustly enriched as a result.
Sixth Cause of Action sought the Court's order rescinding the sales of the
Brown property because the sales thereof were illegal.
Seventh Cause of Action sought an order requiring Brown and Stevens to
comply with subdivision ordinances and to abate the nuisance created by noncompliance with subdivision ordinances.
Partial Summary Judgment on Brown's Motion. On March 30, 1993, Browns
moved the Court for summary judgment dismissing Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of
Action of the Amended Complaint against defendant Brown. Browns' Memorandum asserted
that those claims should be dismissed because (a) Draper City had by variance validated the
subdivision and the time within which that variance could be challenged had expired, (b)
Sanders/Glanville lacked standing to force compliance with subdivision laws, (c)
Sanders/Glanville failed to establish any duty running from Browns to Sanders concerning
Browns' purchase of the property and because Browns' purchase of the property did not
harm Sanders.
Thereafter, the Court granted Partial Summary Judgment for the reasons SQt forth in
Browns' memoranda and dismissed with prejudice Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action
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of the Amended Complaint. A copy of the Partial Summary Judgment is attached hereto
marked Exhibit "E."
Browns' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Sanders/Glanville asserted that a
right-of-way conveyed to Browns along with the fee simple property they purchased
described a parcel of ground that was separated from Browns' fee simple property by a few
feet (which few feet were owned by Sanders/Glanville) and that, accordingly, the Browns
were trespassing upon the Sanders/Glanville property each time they accessed their property.
Browns filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated November 30, 1993 seeking the Court's
determination as a matter of law that the subject right-of-way was contiguous with the Brown
property and, with that determination, a dismissal with prejudice of all claims of
Sanders/Glanville for trespass over the alleged strip of land separating the Brown fee simple
property from their right-of-way. The Court granted Browns' Motion through a bench
ruling. A transcript is attached hereto as Exhibit "F." In the Summary Judgment entered by
the Court (attached as Exhibit "G"), the Court ruled, based upon the alternative grounds of
proper construction of title documents, reformation, and/or easement by necessity, that the
description of the parcel of land over which Browns had a right-of-way was located so as to
touch the Brown property, thereby eliminating any "gap" between the right-of-way area and
the Brown property. As a consequence, the Court dismissed with prejudice those portions of
Fourth Cause of Action that alleged claims arising from Browns' trespass upon any land
owned by Sanders/Glanville in any "gap" between the right-of-way, on the one hand, and the
Brown property, on the other hand.
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Issues Remaining for Trial. The foregoing orders have effected a dismissal with
prejudice of all of the claims contained in the Amended Complaint except that portion of
Fourth Cause of Action that seeks damages against Browns for their alleged trespass upon the
Sanders/Glanville property other than any trespass that could arguably be said to have arisen
through there existing a gap area owned by Sanders/Glanville between (i) the right-of-way
owned by Browns and (ii) the fee simple property owned by Browns. In addition, all
defenses of Browns to those claims remain at issue.
DATED this

\V^

day of

frrfs(hA^

1995.

Woodbury & Kesler

:, Of Counsel
JL9 PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN
&GEE
Attorneys for Defendants Browns
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Designation of Additional Exhibit
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Reid W. Lambert - #5744
Russell s. Walker - #3363
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3358
Telephone: (801) 364-1100
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLANVILLE, et al. ,

DESIGNATION OF ADDITIONAL
EXHIBIT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 900902397 PR
CITY OF DRAPER, et al.,
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Defendants.
Plaintiff Joseph Sanders hereby designates one additional for
the Trial in this matter to commence July 13, 1995. Specifically,
Sanders designates the Assignment of Claim executed by Margaret
Glanville July 6, 1995, a copy of which is attached hereto.
DATED this

/ft ^ day of July, 1995.
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.

Ra&T w7 L a « b e i f b / l V
Attorney for Sanders
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This certifies that I did deliver a true and correct copy of
the above DESIGNATION OF WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS to the following by
first class U.S. Mail this //)& day of July, 1995:
Bruce Maak
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jody K. Burnett
257 East 100 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kim R. Stevens and Rebecca Stevens
13755 South Shadow Mountain Lane
Draper, Utah 84020
Susan B. Day
o621
^x
&aai. X
J O U U South
OUUL.II
East
13800
Draper, Utah 84 020
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court for Salt I — Com**. Stat. o.

Honorable AnnaStirba, do hereby assxsn

-
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-j-ihta of action, damages, r-y
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that the estate of Ben K. c-laaville averts no
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. • the property, it havin, been held in ioint tenancy «xth
interest in the proper*,
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at the tin* of his death.
/f1". J,«
DATED this _b__
day of
or July,
u i, 1995.

Margaret Glanvxll*
O?RC:AL SHAL
JAM S. CCXNS3
NOTARY P'JEUC-OREGON
\ M V
COMMISSION NO. 021733
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES ?=B.2.19S7

S t a t e of 3&£toa€*sen
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Evidentiary Ruling, Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law

Third luminal District

Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (A2033)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
Attorneys for Robert E. Brown, Jr.
and Diane Brown
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

Deoutv Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
B. N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D. SANDERS
and CHERYL M. SANDERS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L.
HOFFMAN, Mayor of the City of Draper,
ROBERT BROWN, KIM STEVENS, and
JOHN DOES I through X,

EVIDENTIARY RULING,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 900902397PR
(Hon. Anne M. Stirba)

Defendants.
ROBERT E. BROWN, JR. and
DIANE BROWN,
Counterclaim and Crossclaim
Plaintiffs,
vs.
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B. N. GLANVILLE, M. D. GLANVILLE,
JOSEPH D. SANDERS, CHERYL M.
SANDERS, KIM STEVENS, REBECCA
STEVENS, and SUSAN B. DAY,
Counterclaim and Crossclaim
Defendants.

This action came on regularly for trial on July 13 and 14, 1995 before the Court, the
Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding, plaintiff Joseph D. Sanders appearing personally and
through his counsel, Re id W. Lambert, defendants Brown appearing personally and through
their counsel, Bruce A. Maak, and defendant Kim Stevens appearing on his own behalf, and
the Court having heard the evidence, having heard and considered the arguments of counsel,
having reviewed the file, being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing
therefor, hereby makes the following:
EVIDENTIARY RULING
During the course of trial, plaintiffs offered into evidence a certain "Assignment"
marked as Exhibit 1. The Court at that time reserved its ruling upon the admissibility of that
document. The Court now makes the following determinations and rules as follows as to the
admissibility of Exhibit 1.
1.

According to the representation of counsel, plaintiff B.N. Glanville, who is the

brother-in-law of plaintiff Joseph D. Sanders, died in May 1995.
2.

Rule 25, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, prescribes a mechanism for the sub-

stitution of a personal representative, or other appropriate party, for a party who dies during
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the course of an action. Plaintiffs did not pursue an appropriate substitution of parties for
B.N. Glanville timely, or at all.
3.

Plaintiffs offered no admissible evidence establishing that Margaret Glanville is

the personal representative of the estate of B.N. Glanville.
4.

Margaret Glanville did not appear at trial and, accordingly, was not available

for cross-examination by defendants.
5.

The only evidence offered to support the authenticity of the Assignment,

Exhibit 1, was offered by Joseph D. Sanders, who testified that, although he did not see the
document executed, he delivered the document to Margaret Glanville for her signature and
thereafter received the document back from her with a signature appearing to be that of
Margaret Glanville thereon and that Margaret Glanville told Joseph D. Sanders that she had
executed the document. Margaret Glanville's statement to Mr. Sanders is inadmissible
hearsay. The evidence offered to establish the authenticity of Exhibit 1 is thin at best.
6.

The Assignment, itself, constitutes a hearsay statement that is not admissible

under any exception to the hearsay rule.
7.

The Court finds under Rule 803(24), Utah Rules of Evidence, that the state-

ment is not more probative on the point for which it was offered than any other evidence
which plaintiff could procure through reasonable efforts and that the general purpose of the
Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice will not best be served by admission of the
Assignment into evidence. Further, the proponent of the Assignment (Joseph D. Sanders)
did not make the Assignment known to defendants sufficiently in advance of the trial to
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provide defendants with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to
offer the statement, and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
The Assignment was first made known to defendants by serving a copy of it upon them by
mail on July 10, 1995 - just a few days before trial.
8.

Joseph D. Sanders could timely have complied with Rule 25, Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, and could, substantially in advance of trial, have apprised defendants of his
intention to rely upon the Assignment, but he did neither.
9.

If the Assignment had been accepted into evidence, defendants would have

been unreasonably prejudiced because, among other things, (i) defendants would be denied
the opportunity to cross-examine declarant in the Assignment, (ii) defendants were precluded
the opportunity to conduct discovery with respect to the Assignment and the testimony of its
purported declarant, and (iii) the Assignment is, based upon all testimony concerning it, not
sufficiently reliable to allow it fairly to be admitted under the circumstances presented here.
10.

Plaintiffs did not timely advise defendants that Exhibit 1 was intended to be

offered as a trial exhibit.
RULING
Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby rules that the Assignment is inadmissible
and may not properly be considered by the Court for any purpose.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This action concerns three parcels of real property and a right-of-way de-

scribed as follows:

800*8?

The "Brown Parcel" is presently owned by Robert and Diane Brown, is
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is more particularly described as follows:
Beginning 716.85 feet North 00°23'08" East from the East quarter corner of
Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence South 76°11'02" West 186.90 feet; thence North 0°23'08"
East 202.5 feet; thence North 76°11'02" East 186.90 feet; thence South
0°23'08" West 202.5 feet to the point of beginning.
The "Glanville Parcel" is located adjacent to and north of the Brown Parcel
and is more particularly described as follows:
Beginning 919.35 feet North 0°23'08" East from the East Quarter Corner of
Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence South 76°ir02" West 221.90 feet, thence North 0°23'08"
East 163.44 feet, thence North 57°28'51" East 137.16 feet, thence North
62°46'20" East 112.81 feet, thence South 0°23'08" West 235.80 feet to the
point of beginning.
The "Panhandle Parcel" is located adjacent to and west of the Brown Parcel
and adjacent to and east of the Stevens Parcel described below and is more particularly
described as follows:
Beginning at a point 716.85 feet North 0°23'08" East and 186.90 feet South
76°ir02" West from the East Quarter Corner of Section 6, Township 4
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South
76 o ll , 02 , , West 35 feet; thence North 0°23'08" East 202.5 feet; thence North
76°ir02" East 35 feet; thence South 0°23'08" West 202.5 feet to the point of
beginning.
The "Stevens Parcel" is presently owned by Kim and Rebecca Stevens, is
located adjacent to and west of the Panhandle Parcel, and is more particularly described as
follows:
Beginning at a point at the Southwesterly most point of property conveyed by
Warranty Deed dated February 23, 1979, in which David H. Day and Susan
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B. Day, his wife, are grantors and Layne J. Newman and Jessie S. Newman,
his wife, are grantees, which deed was recorded April 2, 1979, at the office of
the Salt Lake County Recorder, as Entry No. 3258663 Book 4838, Page 358,
which point of beginning is South 57028,51" West 137.16 feet from a point
which is approximately 100 feet West and 725 feet North from the East
Quarter Corner of Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian and running thence South 57°28 , 5r West 39.65 feet to a point
on the Southerly side of a concrete irrigation ditch at a corner fence post, said
39.65 feet call being directly in line with, as though it were an extension of,
the Southerly side of said concrete irrigation ditch; thence North 32o31'09M
West 319 feet, more or less, along a fence line and Westerly side of a concrete
block wall, to the center of the East Jordan Canal; thence Northeasterly along
the center of said East Jordan Canal 235.9 feet, more or less, to a point which
is North 00°23'08" East of the point of beginning; thence South 00°23'08"
West 361.75 feet, more or less, along the West line of the above described
Newman deed/ to the point of beginning.
The "Right-of-Way Parcel" is a parcel of land 35 feet in width, which at its
northerly end lies between the Stevens Parcel and the Brown Parcel and proceeds south to
13800 South Street in Draper and is more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point which is 282.45 feet North 89°39'27" West from the East
Quarter Corner of Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, said point being the Southwest corner of the property conveyed
in that certain Special Warranty Deed to MGF Partnership, a limited Utah
partnership, recorded July 17, 1979, as Entry No. 3309585, in Book 4903, at
Page 540 of Official Records, and running thence North 0°23'08" East along
the West boundary line of said "MGF Partnership" property 186.94 feet to the
Northwest corner thereof; thence continuing North 0°23,08" East 124.36 feet,
being parallel to and 17.5 feet, perpendicular distance from the Westerly
boundary fine of the property conveyed in that certain Special Warranty Deed
to James Walter Fitzgerald and Betty Marie Fitzgerald, recorded July 20,
1978, as Entry No. 3140869, in Book 4709 at Page 990, of Official Records;
thence North 17028y East along the Easterly right of way line of that certain
35 foot wide right of way as described in that certain Warranty Deed to Ted
A. Zimmerman and Julie G. Zimmerman, recorded August 14, 1991, as Entry
No. 5111842, in Book 6346, at Page 911 of Official Records, 344.75 feet,
more or less, to a point which is South 0°23'08" West from the Southwest
corner of the property conveyed in that certain Utah Special Warranty Deed to
Robert E. Brown, Jr. and Diane Brown, recorded January 27, 1989 as Entry
-6-
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No. 4730055, in Book 6100, at Page 478 of Official Records; thence North
0°23'08" East 24.4 feet, more or less, to the Southwest corner of the aforesaid
property of "Brown"; thence North 0°23'08" East, along the West boundary
line of said "Brown" property 160.32 feet; thence West 35.0 feet; thence
South 0°23'08" West 194.0 feet, more or less, to the point of intersection with
the Westerly right of way line of the aforesaid 35 foot wide right of way;
thence South 17°28' West along said Westerly line to a point on the East
boundary line of a 0.15 foot strip of land as the same described in that certain
Warranty Deed to Susan B. Day, recorded July 09, 1990, as Entry No.
4938604, in Book 6235, at Page 484, of the Official Records; thence South
along said East boundary line of the "Day" property 314 feet, more or less, to
the quarter section line of the aforesaid Section 6; thence South 89°39'27"
East along said quarter section line 35 feet, more or less, to the point of
beginning.
This Court by Summary Judgment dated February 17, 1994 established the location and
description of the right-of-way to be as set forth above.
2.

Between November, 1982 and September, 1988, Sanders owned the Glanville

Parcel, the Panhandle Parcel, and the Brown Parcel subject to and together with a right-ofway over the Right-of-Way Parcel. The Brown Parcel together with a right-of-way over the
Right-of-Way Parcel was encumbered by a Deed of Trust in favor of Mountainwest Savings
and Loan, which was recorded on December 9, 1980 as Entry No. 3512297 in Book 5188 at
Page 1463 of the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's office (hereinafter referred to
as the "Mountainwest Trust Deed").
3.

Sanders failed to make various payments required under the Mountainwest

Trust Deed and, as a result, the Mountainwest Trust Deed was nonjudicially foreclosed.
Mountainwest was the purchaser at the trustee's foreclosure sale and, thereafter, received a
conveyance of the Brown Parcel together with a right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel
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through a Trustee's Deed recorded on September 1, 1988 as Entry No. 4670769 in Book
6060 at Page 2702 of the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's office.
4.

Sanders transferred the Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel subject to a

right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel to his sister and brother-in-law, M.D. and B.N.
Glanville, by "Grant Deeds" dated May 19, 1988. Sanders made those transfers shortly
before and with actual knowledge of the impending entry of a judgment against Sanders and
in favor of one Ovard and the foreclosure of the Mountainwest Trust Deed. Sanders transferred those properties to Glanvilles to place them beyond the reach of his creditors.
5.

Glanvilles never transferred the Glanville Parcel or the Panhandle Parcel back

to Sanders. No writing was ever executed by Glanvilles to evidence any transfer to Sanders
of any interest relating to those parcels. Sanders had no ownership of or right to possession
of the Glanville Parcel or the Panhandle Parcel following May 19, 1988.
6.

Sanders and Glanvilles had an agreement that, upon sale of the Glanville

Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel, Sanders would receive from Glanvilles a portion of the sale
proceeds. Sanders' right to receive such proceeds was the entire extent of Sanders'
interest — his interest was not an interest in land, but rather a right to receive a future
monetary payment.
7.

After the foreclosure sale, Mountainwest sold and conveyed the Brown Parcel

together with a right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel to Browns by Utah Special
Warranty Deed which was recorded on January 27, 1989 as Entry No. 4730055 in Book
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6100 at Page 478 of the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's office. Defendants
Stevens own the Stevens Parcel together with a right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel.
8.

During the fall of 1989, Browns placed their two horses in a preexisting

fenced area that included the Glanville Parcel and a portion of the Brown Parcel.
9.

With no prior communication to Browns, on or about March 2, 1990, Sanders

and Glanville, through their attorney, Frederick N. Green, demanded that Browns remove
their horses from the Glanville Parcel and that Stevenses cease trespassing. Within a
reasonable time following receipt of that notice - a few days - Browns installed a new fence
preventing their horses from moving from the Brown Parcel onto the Glanville Parcel.
Browns' horses did not thereafter intrude upon the Glanville Parcel. Sanders, not Glanvilles,
directed that attorney Green write the demand letter to Browns. Glanvilles did not object to
Browns' horses occupying the Glanville Parcel. Sanders had previously given permission to
Layne Newman for horses to occupy the Glanville Parcel. Neither Sanders nor Glanvilles
directly advised Browns that their horses could occupy the Glanville Parcel. However,
Sanders desired that horses occupy the Glanville Parcel to control plant growth there, and the
Court finds that Sanders consented to horses occupying the Glanville Parcel until further
notice. Sanders did not revoke that permission until attorney Green sent his letter of March
2, 1990.
10.

Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proving any damage flowing from

Browns' horses' occupation of the Glanville Parcel.

-9-

0 0 ^ U D :2

11.

Browns own a right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel which entitles them

to use the Right-of-Way Parcel for all purposes reasonably necessary or incident to furnishing access, ingress and egress to the Brown Parcel. The northerly end of the Right-of-Way
Parcel is located upon the Panhandle Parcel. The northerly end of the Right-of-Way Parcel
is adjacent to and west of the Brown Parcel. Most of the north-south length of the Panhandle
Parcel is burdened with a right-of-way in favor of the owner of the Brown Parcel and the
owner of the Stevens Parcel. The Panhandle Parcel is only 35 feet in width in the east-west
direction and is not reasonably usable for any purpose other than furnishing access to parcels
that are adjacent to it, including the Brown Parcel, the Stevens Parcel, and the Glanville
Parcel. There are no structures or improvements located upon the Panhandle Parcel.
12.

The driveway serving the house on the Brown Parcel has been in its present

location since prior to Sanders' ownership and occupancy of the Brown Parcel. A portion of
that driveway extends into the Panhandle Parcel. During approximately 1991, Browns installed grass and a sprinkler system in their yard area. They installed the grass entirely
within the landscaping contours that had previously been established by Sanders during his
ownership of the Brown Parcel. That grass extended over the boundary line between the
Brown Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel to the extent of approximately 5-6 feet. There was
no fence that marked the boundary between the Brown Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel in
this area. In the area in which Browns installed lawn within the boundaries of the Panhandle
Parcel, there was previously located only weeds. The area in which Browns installed lawn
was never used by anyone for any purpose. The traveled area over the Panhandle Parcel that
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was used to access the Glanville Parcel did not include the area in which Browns installed
grass. Browns' installation of grass and a few sprinkler heads did not in any way interfere
with plaintiffs' use or enjoyment of the Panhandle Parcel. The driveway is a use that is
reasonably necessary to furnishing access, ingress, and egress to and from the Brown Parcel
and does not interfere with the use of the Panhandle Parcel by its owner.
13.

Because Sanders objected to the location of the grass and sprinklers within the

boundaries of the Panhandle Parcel, Browns caused both all of the grass and the sprinklers to
be removed during October, 1994.
14.

A variance was granted by Draper City to Mountainwest with respect to the

Brown Parcel. That variance allowed the Brown house to be located within 17 feet of the
"private right-of-way," which referred to the right-of-way over the Right-of-Way Parcel.
The literal metes and bounds description of the Right-of-Way Parcel located the Right-ofWay Parcel in such a way that there existed approximately 18 feet between the easterly edge
of the Right-of-Way Parcel and one corner of the Brown house. This Court by Summary
Judgment dated February 17, 1994 in this case ordered that the Right-of-Way Parcel, based
upon the grounds stated therein, was located adjacent to the Brown Parcel, which resulted in
there being as few as 11.2 feet between the easterly boundary of the private right-of-way and
one corner of the Brown house.
15.

Draper City has determined that the Brown house location is a valid non-

conforming preexisting use and that the Brown house may be located in its present location
without requiring that Browns occupy, control or make any claim to any portion of the
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Panhandle Parcel. In any event, Browns' compliance or noncompliance with that variance
has no effect on Sanders or Glanvilles.
16.

Glanvilles did not object to the existence of the driveway or to Browns'

installation of grass and/or sprinklers within the boundaries of the Panhandle Parcel.
17.

Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of showing that they suffered any

damage as a consequence of the existence of Browns' driveway or Browns' installation of
grass and a sprinklers within the boundaries of the Panhandle Parcel.
18.

Both Browns and Stevenses periodically and temporarily parked vehicles

within the Right-of-Way Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel. That use was a reasonable use of
the right-of-way owned by Browns and Stevenses and did not interfere with Glanvilles' or
Sanders' use of the Panhandle Parcel.
19.

The trespass claims asserted by Sanders in the action have no basis in law or

fact. Under the clear evidence in this case, Sanders did not even have standing to pursue any
claims because he did not even own the subject property. Glanvilles, who owned the property, were ambivalent about the claims. The claims, themselves, are devoid of merit.
20.

Sanders brought claims in this action that were completely inconsistent with

and contradictory to his own statements and actions during his ownership of the Brown
Parcel. Among other things, both Sanders and Glanville admit that they understood that the
right-of-way was adjacent to and connected to the Brown Parcel and, during the time that
Sanders owned only the Brown Parcel (and not the Panhandle Parcel), Sanders used the
right-of-way as his only access from 13800 South Street into his driveway. In this action, on
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the other hand, Sanders asserts that the right-of-way did not connect to the Brown Parcel,
that Browns' driving over the right-of-way into their driveway constitutes a trespass, that the
Browns' driveway, which existed during Sanders' ownership of the property, constitutes a
trespass, and that Browns' making the very same use of their property that Sanders made
during the time that he owned it was wrongful. Sanders brought this action for the improper
purpose of coercing Browns to pay large amounts of money in settlement.
21.

Sanders testified that he brought this action against Browns and Stevenses

because he could not sell the Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel and because subdivision violation problems precluded his separate ownership and sale of those parcels.
Sanders, however, made no effort to resolve any subdivision problems that may have existed
and made no effort to sell the Glanville Parcel or the Panhandle Parcel (except to Glanvilles).
22.

Sanders did not make any reasonable good faith effort to resolve his com-

plaints with Browns or Stevenses. Sanders did not initiate this action to resolve or receive
fair compensation for any claim that he had against Browns or Stevenses, but rather in bad
faith to coerce Browns or Stevenses into paying him money to which he was not entitled.
23.

At multiple stages during this proceeding, Browns attempted to settle and

resolve this case to avoid incurring the substantial expense that they incurred in defending.
Sanders unreasonably persisted in pursuing his frivolous, baseless claim.
24.

Sanders pursued his claims to hinder and take advantage of Browns and

Stevenses. Sanders asserted that Browns' purchase of the property from Mountainwest,
Sanders' foreclosing lender, violated Sanders' rights. He asserted that Mountainwest's sale
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of the property to Browns (a transaction to which Sanders was not a party) was illegal and
should be rescinded. He asserted that the Brown Parcel (which Sanders, himself, owned and
occupied separately) violated zoning ordinances that should be enforced against the Browns.
He asserted that the Browns' occupation of the same property that Sanders, himself, had
previously occupied constituted a "private nuisance." Sanders claimed that he initiated this
action to resolve what he believed to be a "subdivision problem," but he never made any
effort to resolve that issue. Browns attempted repeatedly to resolve their differences with
Sanders and even to pay Sanders money to which he was not entitled, but Sanders steadfastly
refused to make any reasonable effort to resolve his differences with Browns. Instead,
through taking the positions he took and pursuing this litigation, Sanders attempted to subject
Browns to economic pressure and to bother and harass them to induce them to pay unreasonable amounts of money to Sanders.
25.

This action was without merit and was not brought or asserted in good faith by

plaintiff Sanders.
26.

Browns incurred in excess of $29,700.00 in defending against the claims of

Sanders in this action, of which $6,750.00 is attributable to time expended in the trial of this
case. The Court finds the charges of Browns' counsel to be reasonable under all of the
circumstances.
27.

Defendants Stevens acted as their own counsel and did not incur any legal fees

in defense against the claims of Sanders.
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From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Browns and Stevenses are not liable to plaintiffs for trespass.

2.

As a matter of fact and law, Glanvilles were the owners of the Glanville

Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel at all material times. In any event, the Statute of Frauds has
not been satisfied with respect to any claim of Sanders to ownership of any interest in that
property. Sanders did not own any interest in the Glanville Parcel or the Panhandle Parcel at
any time following May 19, 1988.
3.

Since Sanders did not own or have the right to possess the Panhandle Parcel

and the Glanville Parcel at the times that Browns and Stevenses are claimed to have trespassed, he has no standing to assert any trespass claim against Browns or Stevenses.
4.

Sanders, who conveyed the Glanville Parcel and the Panhandle Parcel to

Glanvilles to place it beyond the reach of his creditors, is estopped to assert that he has any
ownership of or right to possession of that property.
5.

Glanvilles, the owners of the Glanville Parcel, did not object to Browns'

horses' brief occupation of the Glanville Parcel. B.N. Glanville had no personal complaint
with the Browns and admitted that the Browns never did anything about which he was
complaining. Although Glanville claimed that Sanders told him that the Browns trespassed
on the Glanville Parcel, Glanville never communicated to the Browns that he did not want
them trespassing on the Glanville Parcel.
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6.

Browns' horses' occupation of the Glanville Parcel was with permission and

consent. Prior to the Browns' placing their horses on the property, Sanders had given
permission to Layne Newman for horses to occupy the Glanville Parcel. Neither Sanders nor
Glanvilles directly advised Browns that their horses could occupy the Glanville Parcel.
Nevertheless, Sanders desired that horses occupy the Glanville Parcel to control plant growth
there, and the Court concludes that Sanders consented to horses occupying the Glanville
Parcel until such consent was withdrawn.
7.

Browns and Stevenses did not trespass upon the Glanville Parcel.

8.

Plaintiffs have not proved that they suffered any damages as a result of

Browns' horses' occupation of a portion of the Glanville Parcel.
9.

Browns' and Stevenses' periodic occupation of the Panhandle Parcel was

allowed by and consistent with their right-of-way over it.
10.

Browns' installation of minimal grass and sprinklers on the Panhandle Parcel

did not in any respect interfere with plaintiffs' occupation or possession of the Panhandle
Parcel. Browns are entitled to keep their driveway in its present position. That driveway is
a reasonable use of Browns' right-of-way and does not improperly interfere with plaintiffs'
use of the Panhandle Parcel.
11.

Browns and Stevenses did not trespass on the Panhandle Parcel.

12.

Plaintiffs have not proved any damage caused by Browns' or Stevenses'

activities upon the Panhandle Parcel.

-16-

'000903

13.

The location of Browns' house in relation to the location of the "private right-

of-way," which is the Right-of-Way Parcel, is a valid non-conforming preexisting use and
does not violate the variance issued by Draper City during 1988.
14.

Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert any violation by Browns of any var-

iance affecting the Brown Parcel, and even if Browns had violated the variance by having
their house located closer than 17 feet from the "private right-of-way," that fact does not
constitute a trespass.
15.

This action is without merit and was not brought or asserted in good faith

within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.
16.

Plaintiff Sanders is liable to Browns in the amount of the attorney's fees in-

curred by Browns in preparing for and attending trial and any post trial proceedings in this
action.
17.

Browns reasonably and necessarily incurred reasonable attorney's fees in the

amount of $6,750.00 in preparing for and attending trial and preparing Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment, for which Sanders is liable.
18.

Sanders owes to Browns and Stevenses their taxable costs.

Honorable Anne M. Stirba
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Evidentiary Ruling, Findings of Fact, and
Conclusions of Law was served this / / day of December, 1995 by mailing on said date
copies thereof by United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to:
Russell S. Walker, Esq.
Reid W. Lambert, Esq.
Woodbury & Kesler
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Jody K Burnett, Esq.
Williams & Hunt
Attorneys for Defendants Draper City, Draper
City Board of Adjustment, Planning Commission, Draper City Council, and Charles
L. Hoffman
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Kim R. Stevens and Rebecca Stevens, Pro Se
13755 South Shadow Mountain Lane
Draper, Utah 84020
Susan B. Day, Pro Se
621 East 13800 South
Draper, Utah 84020

Rosalie Jones, Secretaj?y
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
B. N. GLANVILLE, JOSEPH D. SANDERS
and CHERYL M. SANDERS,

FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 900902397PR

THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD
OF ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L.
HOFFMAN, Mayor of the City of Draper,
ROBERT BROWN, KIM STEVENS, and
JOHN DOES I through X,

(Hon. Anne M. Stirba)

Defendants.
ROBERT E. BROWN, JR. and
DIANE BROWN,
Counterclaim and Crossclaim
Plaintiffs,
vs.

00O9U

B. N. GLANVILLE, M. D. GLANVILLE,
JOSEPH D. SANDERS, CHERYL M.
SANDERS, KIM STEVENS, REBECCA
STEVENS, and SUSAN B. DAY,
Counterclaim and Crossclaim
Defendants.

This action came on regularly for trial on July 13 and 14, 1995 before the Court, the
Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding, plaintiff Joseph D. Sanders appearing personally and
through his counsel, Reid W. Lambert, defendants Brown appearing personally and through
their counsel, Bruce A. Maak, and defendant Kim Stevens appearing on his own behalf, and
the Court having heard the evidence, having heard and considered the arguments of counsel,
having reviewed the file, having entered its Evidentiary Ruling, Findings of Fact, and
Conclusions of Law, being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor,
hereby makes and enters the following Judgment:
1.

Fourth Cause of Action of the Amended Complaint be and the same is hereby

dismissed with prejudice and upon its merits.
2.

Defendants Robert E. Brown, Jr. and Diane Brown be and they are hereby

awarded Judgment against Joseph D. Sanders in the amount of $6,750.00, together with
interest thereon from and after the date of this Judgment at the rate prescribed by law.
3.

Defendants Stevenses shall have and recover .their costs from Joseph D.

Sanders in the amount ofr$

r

Defendants Browns shalrnave and recover tneir costs

from Joseph D. Sanders in the amount of
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MADE AND ENTERED this
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, 1995.

BY THE COURT

Honorable Anne M. Stirba
District Judge

\N.Y

The address of Joseph D. Sanders is:

The Social Security number of Joseph D. Sanders is:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Final Judgment was served this J?0 toy of
October, 1995 by mailing on said date copies thereof by United States mail, first class
postage prepaid, addressed to:
Russell S. Walker, Esq.
Reid W. Lambert, Esq.
Woodbury & Kesler
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Jody K Burnett, Esq.
Williams & Hunt
Attorneys for Defendants Draper City, Draper
City Board of Adjustment, Planning Commission, Draper City Council, and Charles
L. Hoffman
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Kim R. Stevens and Rebecca Stevens, Pro Se
13755 South Shadow Mountain Lane
Draper, Utah 84020
Susan B. Day, Pro Se
621 East 13800 South
Draper, Utah 84020

Rosalie Jones, Secretary

APPENDIX
ITEM # 14

Court's Ruling on Brown's Motion for
Summary Judgment, 6/14/93

19
the same statute.
the same case.

The same issues were at stake and it was

And Judge Russon squarely ruled that the

statute of limitation as employed —

if you look at the last

sentence of his ruling, which is at, I believe it's tab 8 of
the tabs attached to our Memorandum, he says, "Furthermore,
the statute of limitations applies."

He fairly ruled that

the statute applies.
The Utah Supreme Court has squarely ruled that
there are not standing to bring the sorts of claims that are
being attempted here. And based on these two independent
reasons, we invite the Court to grant the Motion for Summary
Judgment.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, counsel.

Well, this has been briefed very thoroughly and
very effectively.

I am prepared to rule at this time on the

Motion for Summary Judgment by defendant Brown.
First of all, with regard to the argument
pertaining to the statute of limitations, plaintiffs'
argument is that —

or rather defendants' argument is that

the plaintiffs failed to challenge Draper City's validation
of the subdivision within the period prescribed by law.
It does appear to me, first of all, that this
issue was put before Judge Russon.

And I think that, at

least my understanding of the issue is, that the same issue
then is being presented now.

At least I am persuaded to that

/i A

A

r

*

in

20
1

effect.

So in effect, Judge Russon's ruling can be

2

considered the law of the case.

3

But I have also looked at it separately.

I view

4

that my rule is that if there is a previous ruling of this

5

court, that I am entitled to alter that if I feel that I

6

should.

7

Judge Russon's analysis of this.

And I have looked at that.

8
9

But I agree frankly with

And I do think that there was a 30-day statute of
limitations as it pertained to the Board of Adjustments

10

validation, if you will, of the subdivision.

11

there was not an appeal taken within that time period.

12

feel that for that reason the Motion for Summary Judgment is

13

valid.

14

And clearly
So I

The defendants' argument then is that that really

15

takes care of the nuisance and illegality claims as well.

16

And I understand —

17

limitations as it pertains to those two causes of action.

18

However, they are predicated upon a showing that there was an

19

illegality.

20

because that can no longer be challenged as being invalid,

21

what the Board of Adjustments did.

22

defendants' argument with regard to that.

23

clearly there is no 30-day statute of

And that showing cannot be made, at least

So I understand the

But turning also to whether the Board of

24

Adjustments had the authority to do that, I am persuaded that

25

the Board of Adjustments did have the authority to do what it
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did, for the reasons argued by Mr. Lee in court and also in
the Memorandum and also in light of the ordinances that were
presented to the Court here today.
I feel that the Board of Adjustments did act
within the scheme of — with regard to the Ellis case,
that's a very interesting problem, because clearly Mr. Green
is correct.

This statute is very clear in what it says, and

it's also clear the Ellis case didn't address that
language.
Now, it may be that in Ellis the Supreme Court
simply was not aware of a statute that said —
in 1962 —

if one existed

that said what the statute says now.

But I think

that calls for this Court to speculate on what the Supreme
Court did.

As an inferior court, this Court is generally

bound by what the appellate court says is the common law.
And I think that it's clearly an appealable issue,
and it may be that on appeal an appellate court in light of
that statute might rule differently.

But I feel constrained

at this point to act conservatively from the judicial
standpoint.

And I am going to follow Ellis , which does

appear to me otherwise to be on all fours with this
particular case.
So I am not going to rule differently from that in
Ellis.

And clearly in Ellis the Utah Supreme Court held

that there is no private right of action to challenge a sale
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APPENDIX
ITEM # 15

Trial Transcript — Cross Examination
of Joseph Sanders

1

A

Foreclosure for a time until we could straighten

2

things out.

3

Q

And that property has been vested in the name of

4

your brother-in-law and sister for about seven years; is that

5

right?

6

A

Yes, sir.

But I stated many times it was done

7

solely for the purpose of trying to buy time so we could

8

resolve these issues.

9

to resolve this simple issue.

I have been in court since 1984 trying
Everybody that has come in

10

contact with this property, including the Browns, Ovards,

11

Mrs. France, has been damaged by it.

12

together.

13

I am not running from the problem.

14

solve the problem.

15

buy time so I could solve the problem.

16

was illegal.

17

It is time this is put

Q

I am trying to

I transferred it to my brother-in-law to
I knew at the time it

I was taking that chance.

There was nothing that prevented your

18

brother-in-law and sister from conveying the property back to

19

you some time during the past seven years, is there?

20

A

That's

right.

We talked about

21

There is no real need to do it.

22

they have it.

23

Q

that

at

times.

It's common knowledge why

It's there.

And you agree with me, don't you, that since the

24

title is vested in their name, they have a right to sell the

25

property?
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1

A

Yes, sir.

2

Q

And you agree with me that you don't have any

3
4
5
6

interest in the property?
A

I don't have a legal interest, but I certainly

have a moral interest.
Q

And I have a right in this claim.

I'd like to show you now, Mr. Sanders, what has

7

been marked as Exhibit 6, Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant

8

Robert E. Brown, Jr.'s Interrogatories.

9

tell me, everybody, you signed that document under oath on

10

And first will you

the last page?

11

A

Yes, sir, I did.

12

Q

I'd like to direct your attention to Interrogatory

13

No. 1 where 2 states,

14

"State the name and address of each person who

15

owns any fee simple interest in the Glanville

16

property."

17

Do you see that?

18

A

Yes, sir.

19

Q

And the answer is, "B.N. Glanville and his wife

20

M.D. Glanville of Malhure County, Oregon, are the

21

sole owners of the Glanville property."

22

Is that correct?

Do you see that?

23

A

Yes, sir.

24

Q

That question is "fee simple owner."

25

And they are

fee simple owners, does it say, Mr. Sanders?
7*

1

A

The question does.

2

Q

And with respect to Interrogatory No. 2, it asks

3

that you,

4

"Identify each holder of an encumbrance, lien,

5

mortgage, deed of trust, right-of-way, or other

6

interest in the Glanville Property."

7
8

And do you see in your answer there that you don't
identify any interest of your own?

9

A

Well, I have no encumbrances, lien, mortgage, deed

10

of trust, right-of-way.

11

that.

12
13
14
15
16

Q

Other interest I guess.

I signed

Mr. Sanders, do you or don't you have an interest

in the property?
A

I have an equitable interest in the property and

it will be deeded to me when I ask it to be deeded to me.
Q

And you will agree that the interrogatory asked

17

you to identify anybody who had any interest in the property;

18

is that right?

19

A

I maybe misinterpreted the question.

20

Q

Is that not what it says?

21

A

It starts out "encumbrance, lien, mortgage, deed

22
23
24
25

of trust, right-of-way.
Q

I was looking for a legal document.

And you prepared these answers in consultation

with your attorney, Mr. Green; is that right?
A

Yes, sir.
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1

Q

And no place in these interrogatory answers did

2

you state that you have a beneficial interest or equitable

3

interest or any other interests in the Glanville property.

4

Isn't that true?

5
6

A

I would have to look at the rest of the

interrogatories.

7

Q

If you feel you did, take a minute.

8

A

If you say it's not there, I'll concede that.

9

Q

As of the date you transferred the property to

10

Glanville, Mr. Sanders, the Browns did not own and had not

11

purchased the Brown property, had they?

12

A

That's true.

13

Q

And Mountain West had had a foreclosure sale, had

14

they not?

15

A

No, sir.

16

Q

So before the Browns ever appeared on the scene,

17

you conveyed the property to your brother-in-law and sister?

18

A

Yes, sir.

19

Q

If I understand you correctly, you are complaining

20

of the following:

trespass problems —

first, driveway;

21

second, landscaping; third, horses; and fourth, car parking?

22

A

The use of the yard.

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

That covers it.

25

Q

Browns' horses were not on the property at any

Anything else?
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1

time before you conveyed the property to Glanville, were

2

they?

3

A

No, sir.

4

Q

During your ownership of the Glanville property

5

before you conveyed it, you gave Layne Newman permission to

6

run horses on the property.

Is that right?

7

A

Yes, sir.

8

Q

And you didn't ever tell him that he could only

9
10

run horses that he, himself, owned there, did you?
A

He asked me if he could run his horses. And I

11

replied, Yes, you can run your horses.

12

horses discussed.

13
14
15

Q

There were no other

Are you testifying that you can recall seven or

eight years ago saying, Newman, you can only run your horses?
A

I didn't say that.

I didn't say "only."

He said,

16

May I run my horses on your property, or something to that

17

effect.

18

property, or something similar to that.

And I said, Yes, you can run the horses on the

19

Q

Did he tell you how many horses he would run?

20

A

I knew how many he would run.

21

Q

Did he tell you, is the question.

22

A

No, sir.

23

Q

So as far as you are concerned, he could run

24
25

I was his neighbor.

whatever he had there?
A

Yes.

0 0109 4
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1

A

Yes, sir.

2

Q

And you were not a party to that transaction at

3

all, were you?

4

A

No, sir.

5

Q

You had nothing to do with that transaction.

6

A

I had nothing to do with the transaction, no, sir.

7

Q

Aside from at your deposition, you have never met

8

nor spoken with Bob and Diane Brown?

9

A

No, sir.

10

Q

And you filed this lawsuit against them because of

11

horses, the grass, the driveway and the variance.

12

right?

13

A

14
15

Is that

It's the use of the yard is the principle reason,

yes, sir.
Q

It is a fact, is it not, Mr. Sanders, that you

16

have filed this lawsuit against the Browns because you want

17

to put intense pressure on them to pay you settlement money?

18

A

I have two motives in my lawsuit.

And the lawsuit

19

is all-inclusive; it involves the entire subdivision:

20

would like to recover some of the very large money that I

21

have spent; and two, I would like to get a case built so that

22

the City of Draper will process their subdivisions properly

23

so we don't have to do this time and time again as more and

24

more people get involved this trap.

25

Q

One, I

I want to ask you the question again, Mr. Sanders.
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1

The question is, is it not a fact that you filed this lawsuit

2

against the Browns to put intense pressure on them to pay

3

settlement money to you.

4
5

A

The reason for this lawsuit —

if you are talking

about this particular one right here?

6

Q

Yes, sir.

7

A

The reason we are doing it is, no one will certify

8

without going to appeal.

9

up appeal rights.

10
11

No one would settle without giving

If they would let us appeal, we would have

settled today.
Q

Apart from this hearing, we are talking about the

12

whole lawsuit, Mr. Sanders, and this is the third time now,

13

is it not a fact that you have filed and pursued this lawsuit

14

against the Browns to subject them to intense pressure so

15

that they would pay you settlement money.

16

A

That is part of the answer, yes.

17

MR. MAAK:

18

THE COURT:

19
20
21

Isn't that true?

No further questions.
Redirect?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. LAMBERT:
Q

Let's start where we left off, Mr. Sanders.

22

Wasn't the original reason for filing a lawsuit because there

23

was a gap between the right-of-way and the Brown property?

24

A

Yes, sir.

25

Q

And every time they drove across it it was a

001198
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1

not Mr. Sanders had ever understood that that agreement

2

included the entire strip?

3
4
5

A

Mr. Green admitted to me that his client reneged.

I don't know what he told his client.
Q

Of the time you testified to, it appears that 45

6

hours of that time was incurred from the time after the

7

second summary judgment motion up until projecting through

8

the end of today, I assume.

9

A

No.

Is that right?

Forty-five hours was consumed in the second

10

summary judgment motion. And in addition, 45 hours has been

11

and will be consumed from the entry of that second summary

12

judgment'through this morning.

13

Q

Okay.

14

wasn't clear.

15

until today.

I apologize for asking you a question that

I meant from the time of the summary judgment

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

That is 45 hours. That 45 hours was spent on the

18

discrete trespass claims we have been addressing here today;

19

is that correct?

20

A

That is correct.

21

Q

Back in March, just before we were set to go to

22

trial the segond time, you received a settlement offer to

23

settle the discrete claims in this proceeding that we have

24

gone through here for $2500; is that right?

25

A

An offer to settle these claims and still pursue
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1

an appeal?

2

Q

That's right.

3

A

Yes,

4

Q

And you didn't respond to that offer until our

5

phone conversation until on about Tuesday of this week; is

6

that right?

7

A

I don't think that is right.

When you and I met

8

and discussed exhibits, I told you that if there was going to

9

be an appeal we were not interested in settling.

10
11

Q

That meeting took place before I sent you the

letter on March 15th, didn't it?

12

A

I don't believe that's the case.

13

Q

Okay.

In any event, just prior to the

14

commencement of this trial yesterday, it was indicated to you

15

that to compromise just these discrete trespass claims

16

Mr. Sanders would come down to a figure of $1,000.

17

right?

18

A

You told me that yesterday morning.

19

Q

Right.

20

A

You also told me he would continue to pursue an

Is that

21

appeal of all the other issues in this case.

And I told you,

22

as I had always told you, we wanted to settle this case and

23

stop spending attorney's fees and settle this.

24

were interested in terminating litigation and not paying

25

piecemeal.

The Browns
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1

Q

That perhaps answers the next question 1 was going

2

to ask.

3

that any settlement that you would be willing Lo enter on

4

behalf of the Browns would require Sandy to give up his

5

appeal rights

6

A

And the basis for rejecting both of those offers was

Is that right?

That is not the basis at all.

The basis is,

7

anybody who has litigated with Mr. Sanders in this case would

8

be a fool to pay a nickel unless they had absolute assurance

9

that he could not do anything more in the case.

10

Q

So is it accurate for me to say you were unwilling

11

to settle the issues we were discussing yesterday and today

12

unless Sanders would also forego his right t o appeal the

13

issues that had been decided previously on summary judgment?

14

A

With the exception of the offer <»f Judgment that

15

we filed, we offered to allow judgment to be taken for the

16

trespass claims for $750,

17

that.

18
19

MR. liAMBERT:

Mi, Sanders never responded to

I think that's all I have, your

Honor.

20

THfc "OURT; Anything else?

21

MR. MAAK:

22

THE COURT: Mr. Stevens?

23

MR. STEVENS: No.

74

THE COURT: Very well.

25

I have nothing further, your Honor.

You may call your next

witness.
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1

that you abandon a claim or abandon a position on an issue or

2

omit a position on an issue and you agreed to go along with

3

that?

4

A

Yes, they have suggested some things.

Both you

5

and Rick suggested some things that wouldn't be appropriate

6

and I have agreed to drop them.

7

Q

And as far as the investigation into the legal

8

basis for your claims, have you ever had a lawyer tell you

9

that the claims you were asserting were in bad faith?

10

A

11

No, sir.
MR. LAMBERT:

12

That's all I have.

CROSS EXAMINATION

13

BY MR. MAAK:

14

Q

You say, Mr. Sanders, that the reason you brought

15

this lawsuit is to rectify an illegal subdivision problem.

18

Is that right?

17

A

That•s correct.

18

Q

Have you ever proposed to the Browns that they

19
20

sign any document ' assist you in that regard?
A
Q

22
J

I have not precisely done that, no, sir.
But that's why y :>ii brought the lawsuit, right?

You wanted to fix the subdivision problem, right?
A

That's why — we brought the lawsuit because I

24

refused to acknowledge the notice of claim and suggest

25

anything.
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1

Q

Please tell me, Mr. Sanders, what the Browns can

2

do to fix what you perceive to be a subdivision problem, what

3

can they do?

4

A

They can acquire the rest of their side yard that

5

is required by them.

6

record the property.

7
8

Q

And they can see to it that we can

So they could buy your property, right?

That's

the first thing they could do?

9

A

That would be part of it.

10

Q

And the second thing is to record a document; is

11

that right?

12

A

13
14
15

That's correct.

Someone has to record the

document.
Q

And you have never asked them to record any

document ever, have you, Mr. Sanders?

16

A

No, sir.

17

Q

And, in fact, in this lawsuit you don't ask for

18

the Browns to sign anything, do you?

Do you?

19

A

I guess not.

20

Q

What you ask for is money.

21

Mr. Sanders?

22

A

I don't think —

23

Q

Your Complaint in this case asks for only one

Isn't that right,

my testimony is not that.

24

thing from the Browns, and that is money, is it not,

25

Mr. Sanders?
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1

A

In this precise case today?

Q

In this lawsuit.

3

A

In this case today?

4

Q

In this entire lawsuit you ask for only one thing

5
h
7

')
ID
11
12
13
14
15

from the Browns and that is money.
A

Right?

1 don't think that's true, but I would have to

review the information.
Q

What else do you ask for besides money?

A

The one lawsuit was specifically to enforce the

subdivision ordinance.
Q

I am asking you what in this lawsuit you ask the

Browns for other than money.
A

The entire — what do you mean by "lawsuit"?

finite hearing today?
Q

I mean everything in this case that has been

16

decided against you and is being considered today.

17

you ask of the Browns besides money?

18

This

A

What do

I ask to correct the -- as I understand it, the

two summary judgments with the Browns:

One, that reformed

the right-of-way, if that's a proper term; and the other one
was that I didn't have the ability to force the Browns to
22
2!
24
25

help us get the subdivision approved.
Q

I am going to show you what•s marked as Exhibit

16, Mr. Sanders.
A

Can you identify that for us, please?

Well, it says Amended Complaint for Civil Case
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1

9009- —

whatever.

2

Q

Who is the plaintiff there?

3

A

B.N. Glanville.

4

Q

Who are the defendants?

5

A

Draper City, the Board of Adjustment, the Planning

6

Committee, The City Council, Mayor Charles L. Hoffman, Robert

7

Brown, Kim Stevens John Does I through X.

8
9

MR. MAAK:

May I approach the witness briefly, your

Honor.

10

THE COURT: Yes.

11

Q

In your Complaint in the prayer there is two

12

paragraphs.

13

Draper, et al.

The first asks for relief as to the City of
Do you see that?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And the second asks for relief as to defendants

16

Brown and Stevens.

Do you see that?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Will you read the entirety of the relief you ask

19

for against Browns and Stevens, please.

20

A

My counsel wrote this for me.

21

Q

I'll just read it for you.

22

A

Well, I'll read it.

23

"For a judgment finding that the actions of the

24

Defendants Browns — "

25

THE COURT:

Wait, wait.

You are going to have to
227
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1

slow down.

2

you speak fast anyways. And for the reporter's sake and so I

3

hear clearly, please slow down.

4

A

People tend to read faster than they speak and

"For a judgment finding tii: it actions of the

5

Defendants Brown and Stevens and those acting

6

with him are trespass on the properties of

7

Plaintiffs.

8

"For the immediate issuance and entry of an

9

injunction restraining Defendants Brown and

10

Stevens and those acting with them from the

11

actions described in the Complaint•

12

"For judgment in connection with the trespass of

13

Brown and Stevens and those acting with them in

14

an amount not less than $20,000, in punitive

15

damages and $10,000 in general damages."

16

Q

Now, Mr. Sanders, you agree with me, don't you,

17

that you haven't asked the Browns and Stevens to do anything

18

to help you with your subdivision problem, have you?

19

A

II appears not.

20

Q

Okay.

21
22
23

Did you read that ever before it was filed

or si lie :e it has been filed?
A

I am not an attorney.

I hired the best counsel I

know how and I haven't always had good judgment.

24

Q

Did you read it?

25

A

I read it, yes.
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1
2

Q

Is it important to you that you resolve this

subdivision problem?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

In reading it now, you can tell, can't you,

5

Mr. Sanders, that you are not asking to resolve any

6

subdivision problem there, are you?

7

A

Well, I have talked to my lawyer.

And I say, This

8

is what I want, and he writes the words.

And what I see here

9

it says, "For..entry of an injunction restraining defendants

10

Brown and Stevens and those acting withr them from the

11

actions described in the Complaint."

12

subdivision they could stop trespassing.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. MAAK:

If they would get the

Counsel, your point has been made.
Thank you, your Honor.

15

Q

16

complaint?

17

A

Yes, sir, I did.

18

Q

Did he refuse?

19

A

He did not refuse to sign it.

20
21
22

Did you ever ask Rick Green to sign a RICO

He felt he was not

qualified and brought in other attorneys to do it.
Q

Is it your testimony today, sir, under oath, that

Rick Green did not refuse to sign your RICO Complaint?

23

A

He didn't prepare it.

24

Q

Who prepared it?

25

A

I guess he started to prepare it, but he brought
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1

in the firm of

—

2

Q

Who prepared it?

3

A

I don't recall all the details.

But Rick prepared

We 1 lad < \ ] arge meeting with Russ Walker, I think —

4

it.

5

I don't know whether Reid was there or not, but there was

6

another attorney in this thing.

7

they reviewed it and decided to go forward with it.

And we talked at length and

8

y

Rick prepared it.

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And Rick wouldn't sign it.

11

A

He didn't sign it.

12

O

He declined to sign it?

13

A

Yes.

14

Correct?

Correct?

The reason he gave me, that he poorly served

me and that he wasn't qualified to do it.

15

Q

And you signed it, didn't you, Mr. Sanders?

16

A

Yes, sir.

17

Q

And you f:i 1 ed i t?

18

A

Yes, sir.

19

MR. MAAK:

20

THE COURT:

21

Mr. Stevens, do you have any other

MR. STEVENS:

23

25

No further questions.

questions?

22

24

and

Yes, please.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. STEVENS:
Q

Mr. Sanders, do you feel that you have been
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1

wronged in this case?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Do you feel that you have been wronged by the

4
5

Browns?
A

The Browns just stumbled into the middle of the

6

case.

7

a piece of property that had problems associated with it.

8

And I am attacking the property, not the Browns.

9
10
11

Q

But the Browns have not done anything except they got

Have you been wronged by the Newmans while you

lived in your home?
A

The fact that Newman did not —

Newman and Ovard

12

did not record the subdivision they got permission to do has

13

hurt me greatly.

14

of these problems, none of these problems would exist today.

Had they recorded their subdivision, none

15

Q

Have you been wronged by the Days?

16

A

It was the Days1 property that was subdivided.

It

17

was the Days that would not pay off Mrs. France so we could

18

have it recorded.

19

myself had they been —

I would have probably fixed the problems

20

Q

Have you been wronged by the Stevens?

21

A

You unfortunately bought a part of the problem

22

when you bought from the Days.

23

Q

Have you been wronged by the Ovards?

24

A

Yes, sir, very greatly.

25

Q

You have been wronged by everybody that surrounds
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1
2

FRIDAY, JULY 21, 1995; 2:15 P.M.
J U D G E ' S

BENCH

R U L I N G

3
4

THE COURT:

Back on the record.

This is the matter

5

of Glanville versus The City of Draper, Case No. 900902397.

6

The record should reflect Mr. Stevens is here. And counsel,

7

would you state your appearances.

8

MR. MAAK:

Your Honor, I am Bruce Maak and I

9

represent Diane and Robert Brown.

10

MR. WILLIAMS:

11
12
13

Your Honor, I am David Williams and

I am he;re on behalf of the plaintiff Mr. Sanders.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Williams.

First of all, I apologize for being a few minutes

14

late on the bench.

15

exhibits to make sure that I was correct in my understanding

16

of some of the evidence.

17

since the conclusion of the trial last Friday I have had an

18

opportunity to read all of the evidence that was submitted to

19

the Court and the cases that were submitted.

20

considered all of that.

21

I was double-checking some of the

The record should also reflect that

And I have

I have considered the proposed Findings of Fact

22

and Conclusions of Law.

I have considered the briefs. And I

23

had a transcript made of the closing argument and have

24

reviewed that*

25

well-informed and I am prepared to rule today.

And in light of all of that, I feel very
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2

1

flow,

the record should also reflect that this

2

morning I attempted to initiate a telephone conference call

3

with all of the parties. Mr. Maak was available; Mr. Lambert

4

was available.

5

Mr. Stevens, there should be a message on your

6

answering phone to the effect that we tried to get in touch

7

with you and you had your answering machine on and we had no

8

other way to contact you.

9

wanted to ask Mr. Lambert and Mr. Maak, it really pertained

In light of the question that I

10

to a legal issue. And because you really throughout the

11

trial deferred to Mr. Maak for the issues regarding the legal

12

issues, I felt that it would be all right to go ahead without

13

you.

14

And the legal issue that I was raising was

15

pertaining to Exhibit 1, the admissibility of which I had

16

reserved ruling on until this time. And I just indicated

17

that I had not made my decision yet as to whether I would

18

rule on Exhibit 1 or whether I might this afternoon request

19

some additional briefing on that issue.

20

to alert counsel that that was a possibility and to notify

21

their respective clients to that effect.

22

made no decision or gave an indication of how the Court was

23

going to rule ultimately in this case.

24
25

And I simply wanted

And I certainly

Mr. Stevens, do you feel uncomfortable in any way
that you were not involved in that particular conversation?

~. c\ O
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1

MR. STEVENS:

2

THE COURT:

3

No.

I am fine.

All right.

Do you have any questions

about that conversation?

4

MR. STEVENS:

5

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

In light of that I am prepared to rule

6

at this time on the issues before the Court.

And this is a

7

bench ruling.

8

certainly many findings.

9

present in the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

I no doubt will overlook some matters, and
The prevailing party is entitled to

10

Law any findings consistent with the Court's ruling.

11

my ruling will not be all encompassing.

12

objections to any of the findings that are proposed, I will

13

rule on the objections as to what I feel I can find or don't

14

find based on the evidence.

15

I know

If there are any

Now, the first issue that needs to be addressed is

16

the admissibility of the Assignment of Claim.

I have

17

considered that in several different respects, and I just

18

want some verification, counsel.

19

various deeds, including:

20

and then Sanders to Glanville.

21

two deeds from Sanders to Glanville are to Mr. and Mrs.

22

Glanville.

There is before the Court

Ovards, Nipkos, Newmans, Sanders,
And the deed to Sanders, the

Is that consistent with your understanding?

23

MR. MAAK:

That is correct, as joint tenants.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. WILLIAMS:

And you agree with that also?
Yes, I do, your Honor.
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THE COURT:

And the status of the record also is

2

that what Mr. Sanders' interests are —

3

no standing in this lawsuit except that which he has

4

specifically received from the Glanvilles.

5

Mr. Glanville appears to have been deceased —

6

deceased.

7

date of that death.

8

MR. MAAK:

9

Now,
or he is now

And correct me, I couldn't find in my notes the
Does either one of you have that?
It was some time —

Mr. Lambert said it

was May of 1995. That's the only information I have.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. WILLIAMS:

12

THE COURT:

13

well, Mr. Sanders has

Do you have reason to dispute that?
I don't, your Honor.

I remembered May.

I wasn't clear for

sure on that.

14

Now, Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

15

sets forth a procedure that is to be followed when a party

16

dies.

17

there be a Suggestion of Death filed with the court and there

18

was in this case a Suggestion of Death filed.

19

what is to happen is that there be a motion for substitution

20

of the parties. And the personal representative of the

21

estate of the deceased may move to be substituted as a party

22

plaintiff.

23

25.

And that is, within 90 days following the death, that

After that

And that is the procedure called for under Rule

24

That did not happen in this case. What happened

25

is that, I believe it was the Friday before the trial which
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1

began on Tuesday following that Friday, there was filed with

2

the Court an Assignment of Claim which is in the record as

3

proposed Exhibit No. 1.

4

is notarized, Mrs. Glanville purports to represent to the

5

Court that she is the personal representative of the estate

6

of her husband and the owner of the real property located in

7

Draper which is the subject matter of this litigation. And

8

that she does,

9

In that Assignment of Claim, which

"Hereby assign any and all rights of action,

10

damages, rights and claims which she may have in

11

the above described case to Joseph Sanders, my

12

coplaintiff" —

13

coplaintiff; he is coplaintiff with her deceased

14

husband —

15

of Ben N. Glanville asserts no interest in the

16

property, it having been held in joint tenancy

17

with her at the time of his death."

18

he is actually not her

"and do further state that the estate

Now, that purports to bear her signature dated

19

July 6, 1995 and shows that it was notarized.

20

recall testimony in the trial —

21

will —

22

signature.

23

I do not

help me with this, if you

as to whether Mr. Sanders authenticated her

MR. MAAK:

Mr. Sanders gave evidence that he was

24

familiar with her signature and that it appeared to be her

25

signature.

He said he did not see her sign the document but

\J I o £ •>
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1

testified that she told him she had signed the document.

2

said he took the document to her, left and came back a day or

3

so later, or hours later, and she handed it to him executed

4

and notarized.

5

recall.

6
7

That's the sum and substance of what I can

THE COURT:

Is that consistent with your

recollection, Mr. Stevens?

8

MR. STEVENS:

9

THE COURT:

10
11

He

That is consistent.

That's consistent with the recollection

I have as to what his testimony was.
Now, obviously Exhibit 1, the Assignment of Claim,

12

is not a self-authenticating document.

13

authenticated in some fashion.

14

of Mr. Sanders at trial, that he recognizes his sister's

15

signature and that the signature on the document is her

16

signature, I think that does authenticate the document,

17

although given all the circumstances, it is very thin

18

authentication for a document of this type.

19

doesn't authenticate the document.

20

authenticity is a bar to the Court considering this Exhibit.

21

It needs to be

I think given the testimony

Now, the notary

But I don't believe that

Now, there was no evidence presented to the Court,

22

however, that Mrs. Glanville is, in fact, the personal

23

representative of the estate of Ben N. Glanville.

24

appears to be an assignment of claim, it also contains her

25

representation that she is the personal representative of the

While this
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1

estate of Ben Glanville.

2

She was not produced at trial nor were there any documents

3

certifying that she is, in fact, the personal representative

4

of the estate of Ben Glanville presented to the Court. And

5

accordingly, there is a hole here.

6

She did not testify at the trial.

There has to be a sufficient chain showing what

7

all of this purports to show. And an affidavit, if you

8

will —

9

merely an assignment of claim -- this doesn't contain any

and this doesn't purport to be an affidavit; it is

10

probative evidence that she is, in fact, the personal

11

representative of the estate of Ben Glanville.

12

For that matter, if she had appeared at trial as a

13

witness and been subject to cross examination, that could

14

have been determined in that fashion.

15

And there was nothing, no court order for example appointing

16

her as personal representative, no indication if there are

17

any competing claims for this property.

18

in the proof; there is a failure of proof on that point.

19

But she didn't appear.

So there is a hole

I do not believe that the Assignment of Claim is

20

sufficiently probative to establish, in fact, there has been

21

an assignment of claim.

22

entitled to assign the claim, given the comments I have just

23

made.

24

to this property, and that as personal representative she is

25

entitled to make this claim.

That she is, in fact, legally

It is her burden to establish a bona fide legal claim
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1

Now, this problem of the transfer, if you will, of

2

a claim of Mr. Glanville's and Mrs. Glanville's claims to

3

this property to Mr. Sanders is something that could have and

4

should have been dealt with well before it was. This was the

5

product of Mr. Sanders' own conduct and not that of the

6

Browns and Stevens.

7

certainly at the time of Mr. Glanville's death.

8

about the circumstances preceding his death or how sudden it

9

was, and I have no judgment about that.

This is something that was known
I don't know

But certainly since

10

May, the time of his death, this is a subject that could have

11

been dealt with before it was right before trial.

12

Now, in my view there is prejudice to the

13

defendants, therefore, for this late filing.

14

prejudice because there was no opportunity for the defendants

15

to do discovery regarding whether Mrs. Glanville is, in fact,

16

the personal representative of the estate of Mr. Glanville

17

and that there are no competing claims for this position.

18

Accordingly, there is a failure of proof in this Assignment

19

of Claim.

20

And there is

It is only through this Assignment of Claim that

21

Mr. Sanders has any standing whatsoever.

And in light of the

22

finding that there is a failure of proof, the Court finds

23

that Mr. Sanders has no standing in this action.

24

Mrs. Glanville has never been made a party to this action.

25

And accordingly, the claims that were litigated at trial are

6013'^

1

therefore dismissed and judgment will be rendered in favor of

2

the defendants.

3

Now, with regard to the defendants' bad faith

4

claim, Mr. Sanders testified that he undertook this lawsuit

5

to clear title and easement issues so that he could sell this

6

property.

7

property on the market for sale.

8

one of them made any effort regarding attempts to cure this

9

problem short of five years of litigation.

Mr. Sanders nor Mr. Glanville has ever put this
He made no effort, neither

10

Mr. Glanville in his deposition knew essentially

11

nothing about this property except in the vaguest of terms.

12

And obviously he was not pursuing this except at the request

13

of his brother-in-law, Mr. Sanders.

14

according to Mr. Glanville1s testimony, was acting as his

15

agent in this lawsuit.

16

And Mr. Sanders,

Putting aside any question about whether

17

Mr. Sanders could, in fact, do so, I think that it's fair to

18

say that Mr. Sanders and Mr. Glanville did intend that

19

Mr. Sanders deal with the attorneys, make litigation

20

decisions, and in that way act as Mr. Glanville's agent.

21

I believe there was enough there for Mr. Sanders to act as

22

Mr. Glanville's agent.

23

So

I was very disturbed about the testimony at trial

24

that there were almost no efforts short of Mr. Green's letter

25

to advise the defendants of any of these problems, and
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1

particularly the problems with —

well, I'll let that

2

statement stand.

3

attempt to resolve the problems that he perceived existed

4

without having filed a lawsuit.

There were no efforts by Mr. Sanders to

Now, it is certainly Mr. Sanders1 right to have

5
6

filed the lawsuit.

7

Court well recognizes that right.

8

here.

9

impression of him while he was testifying and the conduct

10

that was referenced in evidence and in oral argument, the

11

Court is persuaded that the weight of the evidence clearly is

12

that Mr. Sanders is someone who likes to litigate.

13

the remaining issues that were not resolved by way of partial

14

summary judgment previously could not be resolved without a

15

trial, notwithstanding the fact that the defendants did, in

16

fact, attempt to resolve this case prior to trial.

17

He has a legal right to do so, and the
That is not the problem

The problem is that Mr. Sanders, based on the Court's

That even

It is the Court's finding, based on all of the

18

circumstances involved in this case, that Mr. Sanders had no

19

apparent desire to settle this case or resolve it short of a

20

trial.

21

always wanted a full-fledged trial.

22

are his precise words but his testimony was similar to that

23

by his own admission.

24
25

In his own testimony he wanted a trial and he has
I don't believe those

While this is his right, and the Court recognizes
his right to litigate, under all of the evidence before the

ft f, 1 f, :i ft

1

Court regarding his actions, vis-a-vis some of the trespass

2

claims, the Court finds that his efforts were unreasonable

3

and in my judgment in bad faith.

4

this, also because he had the ability to deal with the

5

Assignment of Claim issue and because there was a failure for

6

properly proceeding under Rule 25, also a failure independent

7

of that of securing the evidence and presenting the evidence

8

necessary to support that claim, the Court finds that the

9

defendants, Browns and Stevens — well, excuse me, Browns —

Specifically because of

10

prevailed on the issues litigated in trial regarding the

11

trespass claims involving the horses, the grass and the

12

sprinklers.

13

prevailed on all the issues litigated at trial.

14

with regard to whether these issues were without merit,

15

without any merit as the statute requires, the Court finds

16

that the claims involving the horses, grass and sprinklers

17

were without merit and that they were not asserted in good

18

faith.

19

Actually the Court finds that Browns and Stevens
Specifically

With regard to the issues regarding the trailer

20

and regarding the portion of the cement driveway that is

21

occupying the premises —

22

continuing; for the trailer, that's periodic and has

23

continued beyond the litigation, it appears to be something

24

that has continued in the past — with regard to those two

25

claims the Court finds that, while they prevailed on those

for the driveway, obviously that's
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1

claims for the reasons I previously expressed, that the

2

claims of Mr. Sanders —

3

this.

4

rethinking this.

strike that,

I correct myself on

The claims involving the horses —

5

excuse me, I am

The claims regarding the driveway and the trailer,

6

when brought by Glanville and Sanders were not without merit

7

as a matter of fact and law.

8

claims to assert those issues. And accordingly, as to

9

Mr. Sanders, those issues are without merit.

10

However, Mr. Sanders had no

There is no

other party in the lawsuit as plaintiff at this time.

11

Therefore, as to all the claims that were

12

litigated at trial, the Court finds that as to Mr. Sanders,

13

those claims were pursued in violation of —

14

manner as I previously described so that attorney's fees,

15

reasonable attorney's fees are going to be awarded as to the

16

claims that were litigated at trial only.

17

claims that were involved with regard to the partial summary

18

judgments are not included under the findings regarding

19

78-27-56.

20

well, in such a

All the other

Now, Mr. Stevens did not incur attorney's fees so

21

he is not awarded any attorney's fees.

22

awarded reasonable attorney's fees consistent with the

23

Court's ruling here.

24
25

The Browns are

Are there any questions?
MR. MAAK:

I have no questions, your Honor.
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1

THE COURT:

2

Very well.

Do you have any questions?

3

MR. WILLIAMS:

4

THE COURT:

I don't, your Honor.

Then Exhibit 1, implicit in this

5

ruling, is not received in evidence for the reasons I have

6

stated.

7

Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order of dismissal

8

consistent with this ruling, including the ruling on the

9

Assignment of Claim, Exhibit 1.

10

Very well.

11

And I want Mr. Maak to prepare proposed Findings of

Hearing no questions then, court is in

recess. And I thank all counsel. Very well.

12

MR. MAAK:

Thank you, your Honor.

13

(This concludes this Judge's Bench Ruling).

14

* **

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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C E R T I F I C A T E

2

STATE OF UTAH

3

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

4

)

I, SUZANNE WARNICK, RMR, CSR, do certify that I am

5

a nationally certified Registered Merit Reporter, a state

6

Certified Shorthand Reporter, and a Notary Public in and for

7

the State of Utah.

8

That at the time and place of the proceedings in

9

the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court reporter in the

10

Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judge Anne M.

11

Stirba, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the

12

proceedings had therein.

13

That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of the

14

Judge's Bench Ruling were transcribed by computer into the

15

foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true and

16

correct transcript of the same.

17
18

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on
this, the 12th day of October 1995.

19
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20
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APPENDIX
ITEM # 20

Deposition of Joseph Sanders

Q

In the four-and-a-half or five years since you

transferred the property to Glanville you haven't done
anything to transfer it back to yourself; is that right?
A

We've talked about it and we figured why clutter

the thing, just leave it where it's at.
secret.

It's been no

We've said all that have asked what the arrangement

is.
Q

If I had said to Mr. Glanville this morning during

his deposition, Mr. Glanville, I would like to buy from you
the panhandle property and the Glanville property, I'd like
to pay you X dollars for it, would there be anything to
prevent him from taking my money and giving me a deed?
A

None whatsoever.

Q

Okay.

So I take it you would agree that he has

the right, in your opinion, free and clear of any interest on
your part, to sell and transfer that property whenever he
wants; is that right?
A

He has the legal right, yes, sir.

Morally I don't

think he does.
Q

Okay.

Do you own any interest in the Glanville

property or the panhandle property today?
A

Not according to the law.

Q

Okay.

A

My name is not on any instrument or document.

Well

~

I've been paying taxes on it, but that's all.
79
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Q

If you go to Mr. Glanville and say, hey, Ben, why

don't you sign these and deed these back to me, would he do
that

~
A

Probably.

Q

—

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Do you feel that's his obligation?

A

We have a business arrangement.

for free?

I think it's his

obligation, yes, sir.
Q

So he holds the legal title, but basically you

have all of the other incidents of ownership?
A

I 'think that's true, yes, sir.

Q

Did Mr. Glanville ever hand you cash in the amount

of $10 for that property?
A

Not specifically, no, sir.

Q

Not at all, did he?

A

We have —

we're in a business together, we've

transferred money back and forth.

But not specifically, no,

sir.
Q

He never said, here is $10 to buy that property?

A

No, sir.

Q

What was the purpose for which you transferred the

Glanville property and the panhandle property into
Mr. Glanville's name?
A

Haven't I answered that several times?
80
Associated Merit Reporters
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APPENDIX
ITEM # 21

Draper City Board of Adjustment File
1988 Variance Application

APPLICATION FOR VARIANCE

Fee Title Owner W ^ \ABS<^W'/i6S
Appl. Date 6 ~6 ' ?%
mail, addr: ^y-^3" tt-3T~ 3 3 n & 3.
~S L.3 ,d/r-~
^4im
Property Addr. /37S'S~ J^^i^u)
telephone:
/^g,-W3/
Applicant/Agent /TPbQrtAj 54mn (QvA^tQ
Requesting Variance to the
mail, addr:
^5/&-B, /^?7a* s.
requirements of the Building
.Sfczw&•
y-yg?^^.
and/or Land Use Regulations,
telephone:
QU-Z-'HZbS
specifically sections:

nnr.

l^^

,

Applicant requests a Variance on structures and/or property indicated above
of
l_
acres, and which legal description i s :

See-

d^/^y aA -r?7T^e: / / > ^ « ^ ^ e £ : ^r?^. ik£Cfro <&&.*-<•

1. What is the present use of the property?

i
2.

State the facts upon which you base your reguest to show that granting
said request will not be contrary to the public interest. What special
circumstances affect your property that do hot affect other properties
in the same zoning district? Do those circumstances deprive your
property of privileges possessed by other properties in the area? What
hardships or special difficulties would be imposed upon you by a
literal enforcement of the City's Regulations?

7?^

0&£tAlAL-

/+ I/AX.>A/SC£.

MAS

osJt-y.
jr tsee&

f=£*£€-(lL&SC*-/Z£:

TO

S/hZiArtiie.

/-^i/e -ws

0g-r&//V€^£>

HOUSB

TMB VAMIASJ(±£ T*
3*L£.

f7?0U"T#>4

TO

3#/<-&

o*t 77f£< &&•'**•*•-

tg-zarj
UJ&ZT-

fh^A^Q.,^c
S^^CS

/ •£.

PAGE TOO
Application for Variance
Owner / > 7 r .
ftjlgsy
£&S/fiJ<$S
Property /^7£TS
•^tWWO'
^>r
Date
^ - g g

State of Utah

L&**&

}
Applicants Affidavit

County of Salt lake

}

j being duly sworn, depose and say that I
am the cwner/agent of the subject property of t h i s application. The
statements, informations, e x h i b i t s , and any and a l l plans herein or
attached or submitted present the intentions of the applicant and are i n a l l
respects true and correct to the best of my knowledge and b e l i e f .
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"MAYOR

CITY ADMINISTRATOR

CHARLES L HOFFMAN

ANDREW HATTON-WARD

COUNCIL MEMBERS

CITY RECORDER

TODD ANDERSEN
WAYNE H. BALLARD
CLAIR L. HUFF
B JEFF RASMUSSEN
B LAMONT SMITH

BARBARA L. SADLER
12441 SOUTH 900 EAST. PO BOX 1020
DRAPER. UTAH 84020 (801) 571-4121

CITY TREASURER
KAREN L. WILKINS

DOCUMENT CERTIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
This /£ ~ day of
scorder of the
I Barbara Sadler, Recorder

19 ££,

City Of Draper, by my signature
below, certify hereby that the documents described below and attached
hereto are true and accurate copies of the original documents in the
official City files.
^7

(J./Y^i

;%t4*4e,/n%.

3.
4.

/c^/rtArJj. Ms-/HfSS,

Barbara Sadler, City Recorder
City Of Draper, State Of Utah

MINUTES OF THE REGULAR MEETING OF THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS HELD
JULY 20, 1988. BEGINNING AT 7:05 P.M. IN THE COUNCIL CHAMBERS OF
THE DRAPER CITY HALL.
MEMBERS PRESENT:

Chairman Duane
Floyd Nielsen.

Sadler, George Westbrook and

OTHERS PRESENT:

Attorney Hollis Hunt, Rick Smith, Pat Cutler,
Wayne King, Cindy King, Ben Cutler, Grant
Beagley, Barbara Sadler, Jean Hendricksen,
Mike Dowland, Norm Franz, Mr. & Mrs. Ovard,
Joseph Sanders, Mr. Stevens, Attorney Tom
Crowther and Kathy Anderson.

A22roval_of_m_nutes_f gr_July._6.i_ 1988 .
Hollis Hunt indicated an error on page 3, paragraph 6 where
it reads: "Attorney Hollis Hunt then explained that the Board of
Adjustments is
an appellate
for the Planning and Zoning
Administrator of the City. . . "
This should read:
"Attorney
Hollis Hunt then explained that the Board of Adjustments is an
appellate Board for the Planning and Zoning Commission of the
City. . . "
George Westbrook made a motion to approve the minutes of
July 6, 1988, with the correction on Page 3 and a stipulation
that a copy be sent to Mr. Scott Jolley for his signature and
returned to the City. Duane Sadler seconded the motion.
Floyd
Nielsen abstained due to his absence, George Westbrook and Duane
Sadler voted yes.
Voting was unanimous in the affirmative.
Y§ri§nce___Ben_and_Patricia_Cutler_are_reguesting
§_Y§_iance_for
a_lot split_gn I^Q4_acres
in_an_RR-43_zone_district__gcated_at
240_East_l3800_South.
Grant Beagley explained that the proposal is to take the
West end of an existing lot and create another lot with a 100
foot frontage which would contain .38 of an acre (a little larger
than 1/3 acre) leaving approximately 2/3 of an acre where the
existing house exists in an RR-43 (one acre) zone.
The action
required is a motion to grant or deny a Variance to allow a lot
split on 1.04 acres in an RR-43 zone; and a motion to approve or
deny a site plan and authorization to issue a building permit on
subject property according to an approved site plan with or
without conditions. Grant explained that the Planning Department
took an adjacent area of 300 feet and checked the existing lot
sizes.
The breakdown for those lots, consisting of 24 parcels,
are: 12 parcels of the 24 are 1/3 acre or less, 7 parcels are
larger than 1/3 but less than 1 acre and 5 lots are over 1 acre.
Should the Board approve the Variance, the issuance of a building
permit is
subject to
all stipulations
of the Land Use
Regulations, Fire Marshall, all applicable fees, subject to
frontage improvements including curb, gutter, sidewalk and paved
streets including fire hydrant. Granting of this Conditional Use
and stipulations hereof does not constitute building permit
approval.

Minutes of the Board of Adjustments Meeting Held 7-20-88
Page 2
Rick Smith with
Engineering
Planning
Group
and
the
consulting engineer
for the Cutlers explained the reason for the
hardship on subject property is due to the existing home which is
the old Riley A Erma Fitzgerald home, that has an old rock mound
which has prevented any irrigation or farming and the soil is not
conducive to this. They would like to build a home, plant grass
and improve the looks of the property.
Floyd Nielsen made a motion to deny a variance based
on the
fact that this falls within proper zoning to have a one acre lot.
Floyd suggested
that
the owners
look at
adjacent properties
available that could be considered as a group in a larger mass of
property that would be able to be rezoned
and put
into smaller
lots compatible
to this
request for one lot. George Westbrook
seconded the motion.
Floyd Nielsen
voted yes;
George Westbrook
voted yes
and Duane
Sadler voted
yes.
Voting was unanimous in
the affirmative.
Variance
- Martin
Sam Qvard
k Mountain
West
Savings
are
requesting
a variance
to allow
a
lot^split_in_an_RR-43_zone
l2S§±ed_at_1375 5_South_Shadow_Mountain
Lane^.
bj._A
variance.to
allow a side yard
setback
of
6_feet_on_the_west_side_of_the
street^ cl_A_variance_tg_allgw_a_side_yard_se tback_gf _JL3_f eet_gn
ib^-^ast^side^of^the^street^
dj._A_yar iance_tg_allgw_the_Igt_area
gf_the_lgt_gwned_by_Mguntain_W^
^84_acres
in_an
SBz43_zgne^ §l_A_variance_tg_waive_the_street_i
.
Grant Beagley
explained that
some years ago about the time
that Draper
became a City, a 3-lot Variance
was created which
resembled a subdivision but was not called a subdivision.
There
were
conditions
placed
on
that
private
lane
with
some
improvements. The request is to take one of those original 3-lot
variances and divide
it.
Grant
read
the
5 requests
and 4
recommendations
from
the Planning
Department's _ Review and
Recommendation dated 7-14-88 (copy attached).
Attorney Tom Crowther,
legal
counsel
for
the Ovard's,
explained
briefly
the background
of
the 3 lots and the legal
discrepancies the Ovard's have
encountered
which
in turn have
inflicted hardships on the property.
Mr. Crowther explained that
when the home was built
it did not
totally meet
the setback
requirements• but
it was approved and
a building permit issued
and this needs an adjustment.
An adjustment
may or may not be
needed on the size of the acre as there is a dispute. Mr. Ovard
has a certificate of survey that indicates this
is one acre and
the City's
plat indicates
it to be .8482 acres.
If this is one
acre, there would not need to be a Variance on
the size.
With
respect to other requirements such as expanding the cul-de-sac to
100 feet, requiring
fire
hydrants
and
the water
being close
enough
to the back
lot, we believe
these are hardships for
several reasons:
(1) They were not required for the building of
the home which is what Mr. Ovard is acquiring now.
What is there
now, as soon as the improvements are completed
for which he has
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paid the money, will be adequate to meet the conditions of that
Variance, but it is out of the Ovard's hands to accomplish these
things and unfair to require Mr. Ovard the expense
of widening
the cul-de-sac and putting in the water mains and fire hydrants
to benefit the back lot which he does not own and is owned by Mr.
Sanders. Mr. Sanders may eventually wish to build on that lot
and should bear the expense and burden of doing that. (2) With
respect to widening the cul-de-sac which would only be necessary
because of the back lot, the hardship is that there is not enough
room to expand the cul-de-sac to 100 feet and Mr. Ovard has not
physical or monetary means of doing so because other people own
those properties and the Ovard's cannot force them to do this.
The Ovard*s asked the Board to leave in place the conditions that
were required when the house was built on the front lot. The
Ovard's would like for the improvements to be required whenever
the back lot is developed.
Attorney Hollis Hunt
explained
in
detail
some the
requirements and the reasoning for them.
One of the main
problems discussed was the 100 foot cul-de-sac needed for the
Fire Department to turn a fire truck around. Hollis explained
that if the 3 property owners have deeded or given a recorded
easement for the existing 70 ft. cul-de-sac, the additional 30
foot radius would be a hardship. If in fact the record owner, and
whoever the owner where the diameter of the turn-around is, have
not yet given for record the 70 ft. easement, then they could be
required to give the 100 ft. The problem however is that 70 feet
is not adequate for the public safety vehicle to turn around.
Attorney Hollis Hunt briefly discussed another issue that
would make a great difference especially to the Ovard's and in
reality to the other property owners, Steven's and Newman's, and
that is they have large lots in excess of an acre and if this
area follows true to plan they may want to divide their lots in
the future and they will be prohibited from doing so because they
do not have an adequate turn around.
Mr. Stevens, one of the property owners, explained where his
property was situated and stated several reasons why he was
opposed to additional footage on his property indicating it would
be ugly due to all the expenses. There was much discussion
regarding Mr. Stevens' property, legal difficulties between the
other two parties and a signed easement mainly for the cul-desac. Grant Beagley explained the recommendation in detail and
that Mr. Stevens would be the benefactor of the recommendation.
There was much discussion regarding this subject.
Attorney
Hollis Hunt clearly stated that unless the 100 foot turn around
is in there, none of the property owners will ever be able to
obtain a building permit, subdivide or modify existing lots or
anything thatwTTI require regulatory a p p r o v a l d u e to the fact
that we, the City, cannot service you with public safety.
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Mr. Joseph Sanders submitted a recent survey map of the lots
and explained briefly the court problems
with the Ovard's over
this.
After much discussion,
Floyd
Nielsen
made
a motion to
approve the lot division subject to the following:
(1) Granting
of this variance and
the stipulations
hereof do not constitute
Building
permit
approval;
(2) A certified
survey shall
be
provided and
indicate whether
the lot
is .84 of an acre or in
fact 1 acre and the property staked by a registered
surveyor to
verify property
boundaries, setbacks
and access
right of ways;
(3) Professionally
drawn
site plans
and
building
plans, and
required documentation
shall be submitted to the City according
to the usual
procedures
for
review
and
approval
of building
permits; (4) All street
improvements are required including 100
foot diameter turn around unless
there
is a recorded document
which indicates
and has been technically recorded with the City
and is legal and binding for
something less
than that dated in
the year
1979 and
if not
it would
be thei^OO feet required as
indicated,
pavement,
water
main
extension,
fire hydrants,
drainage system and irrigation system, and must be satisfactorily
designed and installed to City standards
to the
satisfaction of
the City engineer except as modified by the Board of Adjustments,
prior to issuance of any building permits or execute a completion
agreement in an amount
estimated by the City for the guaranteed
installation of said improvements;
(5) Issuance
of a building
permit is subject to all Stipulations of the Board of Adjustment;
Fire Marshall
approval;- City Engineer
approval
of
offsite
improvements
and utilities;
all building
codes
currently in
effect, and
payment of all applicable
fees including; building
permit,
plan check,
tradesman
permits
and
impact.
George
Westbrook seconded the motion. George Westbrook voted yes; Floyd
Nielsen voted
yes
and Duane
Sadler
voted
yes. Voting
was
unanimous in the affirmative.
George Westbrook
reviewed
the applicant
request
for a
Variance to allow a side yard setback from a private right of way
to be 6 feet
on the west side
of the
right of
way; Title 6,
section 6.5.2.D.3.(d), which requires minimum front or side yard
setback from right of way
to be
30 feet;
and
to approve a
Variance to allow a side yard setback from a private right of way
to be 13 feet on the east side
of the
right of
way.
Title 6,
section 6.5.2,D.3.(d), which requires minimum front or side yard
setback from right of ways to be 30 feet.
George Westbrook made
the motion based on
staff recommendations
to allow a side yard
setback from the private right of way to be 17 feet on both the
west and
east sides of the right of way which said right of way
shall be recorded and shall be 20 feet wide across parcel no. 3406-277-019 (owned by Joseph D. Sanders), and no less than 30 feet
wide from 13800 South
across
parcels
no.
34-06-2^7-022
k 021
(owned by Layne Newman) to the south end of parcel no. 34-06-277018. This motion requires a 54 ft. right of way, and the
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installation of the 20 ft. asphalt roadway (Sander's lot) shall
be installed by the property owner of Parcel #34-06-277-018
(Sander's lot) at the time a Building Permit is issued on this
Parcel.
Floyd Nielsen seconded the motion. Floyd Nielsen voted
yes; George Westbrook voted yes; Duane Sadler voted yes. Voting
was unanimous in the affirmative.
Floyd Nielsen made a motion to grant a Variance to allow the
lot area of the lot owned by Mountain West Savings et.al., parcel
ID no. 34-6--277-020 to be .84 acres. Title 6, section 6.5.8.C.1,
requires minimum lot area to be 1.00 acre based on staff
recommendations to allow the lot area of the lot owned by
Mountain West Savings et.al., parcel ID no. 34-6-277--020 to be
.84 acres, as per a certified survey. George Westbrook seconded
the motion. George Westbrook voted yes; Floyd Nielsen voted yes,
Duane Sadler voted yes. Voting was unanimous in the affirmative.
George Westbrook reviewed the request to allow the Variance
to waive street improvements.
Title 6, section 6.5.2.D.3 (b),
which requires "improvements equivalent to...public streets'*
installed to City standards on private right of ways. George
Westbrook made the motion based on staff recommendations to grant
a variance to waive curb-gutter and sidewalk only.
All other
street improvements as enumerated under stipulation no. 4 are
required beginning from the North part of the cul-de-sac back to
the beginning or southern boundary of Parcel #34-06-277-018.
Floyd Nielsen seconded the motion.
George Westbrook voted yes;
Floyd Nielsen voted yes;
Duane Sadler voted yes.
Voting was
unanimous in the affirmative.
Floyd Nielsen made a motion to adjourn at 8:30 p.m.
Westbrook seconded the motion.

George

CITY OF DRAPER
PLAITSIJTG DEPARTMENT

TO:

BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS
Hearing Date: 7-20-88
REVIEW And RECOMMENDATION
By Tom Spencer
7-14-88

APPLICATION:
BOA-88-90
MARTIN SAM OVARD and MOUNTAIN VEST SAVINGS, owners;
13755 So. Shadow Mountain Lane, Draper
REQUEST:
Appeal to the BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT for the following VARIANCE(s).
1. Permit to divide a lot (parcel ID nos. 34-6-277-018, 019 & 020).
Title 6, section 6.2.4.C., authorizes that the Board may "permit
a redivision pf a lot,• . ."
2. Variance to allow a side yard setback from a private right of way
to be 6 feet on the west side of the right of way.
Title 6,
section 6. 5. 2. D. 3. <d) , requires minimum front or side yard
setback from right of ways to be 30 feet.
3. Variance to allow a side yard setback from a private right of way
to be 13 feet on the east side of the right of way. Title 6,
section 6.5.2.D.3. Cd), requires minimum front or side yard
setback from right of ways to be 30 feet.
4. Variance to allow the lot area of the lot owned by Mountain Vest
Savings et.al., parcel ID no. 34-6-277-020 to be .84 acres.
Title 6, section 6.5.8.C.1, requires minimum lot area to be 1.00
acre.
5. And, variance to waive street improvements.
Title 6, section
6.5.2.D.3.(b), requires
"improvements equivalent
to...public
streets" installed to City standards on private right of ways.

RECOMMEND AT I PIT:
The Board may find favorably for applicant only if in the Board's
opinion the conditions for such appeal under Section 6.2.3.C. are
satisfied.
Should the Board find favorably for the applicant,
I recommend
the following motions and stipulations as minimum conditions of the
variance(s)•
1. Motion to permit the redivision of the subject lot and authorize
the issuance
of building permits, conditional upon the prior
satisfaction of the following stipulations;
1) Granting of this variance and the stipulations hereof do not
constitute Building permit approval.

Page 2
KTJT. VEST/OVARD; BOA-88-90
Review, 7-14-88,
2)

A certified survey shall be provided and the property staked
by a registered surveyor to verify property boundaries,
setbacks and access right of ways.
3) Profesionally drawn site plans and building plans, and
required documentation shall be submitted to
the City
according to the usual proceedures for review and approval of
building permits.
4) All street improvements are required including 100 foot
diameter, turn
around, pavement,
water main extension,
firehydrants, drainage system and irrigation system, and must
be satisfactorily designed and installed to City standards to
the satisfaction of the City engineer except as modified by
the Board Of Adjustments,t prior to issuance of any building
permits or execute a completion aggreement
in an amount
estimated by the City for the guaranteed installation of said
improvements.
5) Issuance of a building permit is subject to all Stipulations
of the Board Of Adjustment; Fire Marshall approval; City
Engineer approval of offsite improvements and utilities; all
building codes currently in effect, and payment of all
applicable fees including; building permit, plan check,
tradesman permits, and impact.
,
2. Motion to allow a side yard setback from a private right of way
to be 17 feet on bath the west and east sides of the. right of way
which said right of way shall be recorded and shall be 20 feet wide
across parcel no. 34-06-277-019 (owned by Joseph D. Sanders), and no
less than 30 feet wide from 13800 South across parcels no. 34-06-277022 & -021 (owned by Lavne Newman) to the south end of parcel no. 3406-277-019.
3. Motion to allow the lot area of the lot owned by Mountain Vest
Savings et.al., parcel ID no. 34-6-277-020 to be .84 acres.
4. Motion to grant a variance to waive curb-gutter and sidewalk
only.
All other street improvements as enumerated under stipulation
no. 4) are required.

FACTUAL SUMMARY
1. The following comments refer to application and plan
June 6, 1988,
2.

stamp dated

The property is 1.86 acres located in a RR-43 zone.

3. The applicants desire the above referenced variance(s) to allow
the resale of a parcel of land (Mountian Vest's) smaller than was
originally approved by the Board Of Adjustments April 12, 1979. The
lot approved and upon which the Board authorized a building permit in
1979 was 2 acres in area. Mountain Vest apparently accepted a Trust
deed on property less than the approved lot area.
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4. Currently the property is accessed an an exclusive private right
of way that varies in width from 16 feet to 35 feet. The redivision
will require an extension of a right of way along the west side of
the property to access the north half.
5.
The north half will (under current circumstances) be unusable
unless the Board also resolves the issues of access right of way and
setbacks of the existing structures from the right of way to that
lot.
There is no reason to permit the lot redivision unless the
issues of access to the north half are resolved. The current owner
of the north half (Joseph Sanders) does have other alternatives that
might be pursued, but, the probability of working out an alternate
access is less.

PRIOR ACTIOff
April 12. 1979; The Board Of Adjustments approved the formation of
three building lots reconfigured from 6 parcels.
The subject lot
under current consideration was approved as 2 acres in area.
The
Board also authorized three building permits (one on each lot) with
certain stipulations regarding street improvements on the private
right of way.
The right of way has not been fully established nor
have the required improvements been completed.
June 10, 1988;
Mr. Ovard (the current co-applicant with Mountain
Vest Savings) has executed a completion guarantee to the City for his
potential share of the previously required improvements should he
aquire the property.

REVIEVt
1. The site plan submitted is very incomplete, requested information
on the application form has not been provided, i.e. fences, ditches,
accurate parcel areas, parcel no. 34-06-277-019, canal easement,
etc., and with some information shown being inaccurate such as parcel
areas.
2. The original 2 acre lot was an authorized and approved lot. No
space needed to meet the ... building requirements may be sold or
leased away from such lot or building C6.5.2.B.4].
3. The design, right of way dedication, installation and guarantee
for completion of full street improvements are required C6.5.2.D. or
6.5.2.E. as either may be applied].
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4. Minimum setbacks from any street right of way (public or private)
in a RR-43 zone is 30 feet C6. 5. 2. D. 3. <d> and 6.5.8.D. 1 & 3].
5. Minimum diameter
C6.5.2.D.3. <b> & <c>.

of

a

turn

around

shall

be

100

feet

6. A drainage^ plan and installation of drainage facilities is
required by the City engineer conforming to standards of the Drainage
Guide of Draper City and/or as modified and required by the City
engineer.
|
7. The north half, if approved as a lot will more than likely needto extend the water main and install a firehydrant to be within 250
feet of any structure on that parcel.
8. Except for conditions upon which this appeal is requested and the
stipulations imposed,
the proposed
redivisian and uses shall
otherwise be required to conform to all other minimun development
standards of Draper City C6.3., 6.4.2.A.39,, and 6.5.].

cc: Martin Sam Ovard, 2316 E. 10375 So., Sandy, 84092
Douglas Malan, Mountain Vest Savings,
Suite 500, 40 E, South Temple, SLC. , 84111
Joseph D. Sanders, 13550 Aldrin, Poway, CA., 92064
Layne J. Newman, 13735 So. Shadow Mountain Lane, Draper, 84020
City Council
Planning Commission
Mayor Charles Hoffman
City Attorney, Hoilis Hunt
City Administrator, A. Hatton-Vard
City Engineer, Palmer-Vilding
G« Beagley
file
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APPENDIX
ITEM # 22

Utah Code Ann. §10-9-1002

MUNICIPAL LAND USE

10-9-1002

with respect to property boundary lines, and other permissible forms of land
use controls.
(2) The legislative body may refuse to approve or renew any plat or
subdivision plan, or dedication of any street or other ground, if the deed
restxictions, covenants, or similar binding agreements running with the land
for the lots or parcels covered by the plat or subdivision prohibit or have the
effect of prohibiting reasonably sited and designed solar collectors, clotheslines, or other energy devices based on renewable resources from being
installed on buildings erected on lots or parcels covered by the plat or
subdivision.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-901, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 52.

PART 10
APPEALS AND ENFORCEMENT
10-9-1001. Appeals.
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under
authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative
remedies.
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered.
(3) The courts shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal.
History: C. 1953,10-9-1001, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 53; 1992, ch. 30, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-

ment, effective Apnl 27,1992, made grammatical changes in Subsection (1).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and
Planning § 1019 et seq.

10-9-1002,

C.J.S. — 101A C J S Zoning and Land Planning § 265 et seq.

Enforcement.

(1) (a) A municipality or any owner of real estate within the municipality in
which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority
of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other
remedies provided by law, institute:
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate
actions; or
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful
building, use, or act.
(b) A municipality need only establish the violation to obtain the
injunction.
555

10-9-1003

CITIES AND TOWNS

(2) (a) The municipality may enforce the ordinance by withholding building
permits.
(b) It is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter, or change the
use of any building or other structure within a municipality without
approval of a building permit.
(c) The municipality may not issue a building permit unless the plans of
and for the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, or
use fully conform to all regulations then in effect.
History: C. 1953,10-9-1002, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 54.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Laches as defense in suit by governmental entity to enjoin zoning violation, 73
A.L.R.4th 870.

10-9-1003. PenaltiesCD The municipal legislative body may, by ordinance, establish civil penalties for violations of any of the provisions of this chapter or of any ordinances
adopted under the authority of this chapter.
(2) Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or of any ordinances
adopted under the authority of this chapter are punishable as a class C
misdemeanor upon conviction either:
(a) as a class C misdemeanor; or
(b) by imposing the appropriate civil penalty adopted under the authority of this section.
History: C. 1953,10-9-1003, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 55; 1992, ch. 23, § 24.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, added Subsection
(1), designated Subsection (2), and added a ei-

ther* to precede new Subsections (2Xa) and
(2Kb).
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

CHAPTER 10
CITIES OF FIRST AND SECOND CLASS
[REPEALED]
10-10-1 to 10-10-75. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 169, § 66 repeals
§ 10-10-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating
to division of city into wards, effective April 25,
1988.
Sections 10-10-2 to 10-10-8 (Utah Code Annotated 1953; L. 1957, ch. 20 § 1) relating to
y
h f f s ^ 4 6 " 1 ' W6re reP€
cn.24, J 2.
, . , . , . , „ , . . .
Sections 10-10-9 to 10-10-22 (Utah Code Annotated 1953; L. 1953, ch. 20, § 1; 1955, ch. 16,
§ 1; 1955, ch. 17, § 1), relating to the cml

service commission, were repealed by $ 10-1114, enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 48, § 1. For
present provisions, see § 10-3-1001 et seq.
Sections 10-10-23 to 10-10-75 (L. 1961, ch.
24 § 1- 1967 ch 24 § 1- 1971 ch 14, § 1;
x^12 ( l s t s s { c h ' x> § ' § x ^ 1 2 ; 1 9 7 3 (i 8t 's.S.),
ch

- !• 5 1). * e Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act, were repealed by Laws 1979, ch.
,.. , . P ' _ „ „ f _ ! , „ . , ' . „ M iru?-l01
f1'* « i £ P
P™™"*. " • «« 1 0 - « - 1 0 1
w iu
loa
-°- -
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APPENDIX
ITEM # 23

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56

78-27-54

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — Utah's Inherent
Risks of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol
Hill, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 355.

78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing
inherent risks and limitations on liability.
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations
within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing
and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act'
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4.
Meaning of "this act." — See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-51.

78-27-55.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch.
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of

skiing and the statute of limitations on such
action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § i

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except
under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees
under the provisions of Subsection (1).
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted the
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where not
otherwise provided by statute or agreement"

following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); substituted "shall" for "may" following "the court"
in Subsection (1); added "except under Subsection (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and added
Subsection (2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer.
Discretion of court.
Essential elements.
Findings.
Frivolous appeal.
Hearing.
State of mind.

"Without merit" and "good faith."
Cited.
Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer.
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by an insurer does not
show the bad faith necessary for an award under this section. Canyon Country Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
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APPEiNDIX
ITEM # 24

Leake v. Cain. 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986).

152
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Ciie a» 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. !9S6)

James LEAKE, Jerry Couch, John Volpl,
Daniel Garcia, James Green, and Commerce City, Colorado, Petitioners,
v.
H. Marie CAIN, nka H. Marie Burrows,
individually and as natural mother and
next friend of the deceased, Jeffrey
Mark Cain, and Delores Chase and
Jack Chase, individually and as natural
parents and next friends of the deceased Jay Chase, Respondents.
No. 85SC66.
Supreme Court of Colorado,
En Banc.
June 9, 1986.

Wrongful death action was brought
following death of pedestrians struck by an
automobile driven by intoxicated person
whom police officers had released in the
custody of a younger brother. The trial
court granted officers' motions for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, 695
P.2d 798, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court, Erickson, J., held that: (1)
public-duty rule no longer applies in Colorado; (2) duty of public entity is determined
in the same manner as if it were a private
party for purposes of determining negligence liability; (3) police officers owed no
duty to decedents after having detained
intoxicated person at party and calmed him
down and then released him to custody of
his younger brother, who assured officers
that he would drive intoxicated person
home; (4) officers' failure to commit intoxicated person under the emergency commitment statute did not give rise to cause of
action; and (5) officers exercised discretionary function in determining whether to release intoxicated person, and thus enjoyed

qualified immunity.
Reversed and remanded.
Rovira, J., filed a specifically concurring opinion.

1. Municipal Corporations «»723
I
Public-duty rule cannot be used to
'avoid liability where special relationship exists between public entity and plaintiff.
2. Municipal Corporations «=*723
Public-duty rule is not applicable
/where tortious conduct of public entity violates statute or ordinance enacted for benefit of class of persons to which plaintiff
belongs.
3. Municipal Corporations «=>723
Public-duty rule no longer applies in
Colorado and, for purposes of determining
liability in negligence action, duty of public
entity is determined in same manner as if it
were a private party; overruling Miller v.
Ouray Electric Light & Power Co., 18
Colo.App. 131, 70 P. 447; People v. Hoag,
54 Colo. 542, 131 P. 400; and Richardson
v. Belknap, 73 Colo. 52, 213 P. 335; disapproving Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board of County Commissioners, 38 Colo.App. 44, 554
P.2d 317; disagreeing with Shore v. Town
of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d
1379; Fryman v. JMK/Skewer, Inc., 137
UI.App.3d 611, 92 Ill.Dec. 178, 484 N.E.2d
909; Cox v. Department of Natural Resources, 699 S.W.2d 443 (Mo.App.); O'Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184,
447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485; Barratt
v. Burlingham, — R.I. — , 492 A.2d 1219;
Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100
Wash.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451; Hage v. Stade,
304 N.W.2d 283 (Minn.); Riss v. City of
New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 293 N.Y.S.2d
897, 240 N.E.2d 860; and Motyka v. City of
Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 256 N.Y.S.2d
595, 204 N.E.2d 635.

while he was handcuffed at party but they
discharged their duty by restraining him
until he calmed down and their duty began
and ended at party and did not extend to
period after he was released to his younger
brother, who assured officers that he
would drive intoxicated person home.
6. Municipal Corporations <S=>747(3)
Police officers who subdued apparently
intoxicated person at party and then released him to his younger brother who
assured officers that he would drive him
home did not assume duty to persons thereafter killed when struck by automobile
which intoxicated person was driving, did
not induce any reliance on the officers'
conduct, and did not create any peril or
change the nature of any existing risk.
7. Negligence <£=:>6
Breach of statutory duty is actionable
only by one who is a member of class
which the statute was designed to protect
and only where the injury suffered by that
person is the type of injury which the statute was enacted to prevent.
8. Municipal Corporations <s=»717(3)
Police officers' failure to make emergency commitment pursuant to statute
does not create claim for relief by person
who is injured by one who should have
allegedly have been committed after officers have released intoxicated person into
custody of apparently sober and responsible relative. C.R.S. 25-1-310(1).

enjoys qualified immunity from negligence
liability based on his decision. C.R.S. 2 5 - 1 310(1).
11. Municipal Corporations <£=>747(3)
Decision of officers as to whether to
take intoxicated person into custody or release him to custody of his brother, who
promised to drive him home, was discretionary and they were thus protected by
official immunity in action brought by relatives of those killed when struck by automobile driven by the intoxicated person.
C.R.S. 25-1-310(1).
Hall & Evans, Alan Epstein, Arthur R.
Karstaedt, III, Denver, for petitioners.
Leland S. Huttner, P.C., Anne M. Vitek,
Denver, for respondents.
ERICKSON, Justice.
In this wrongful death action, respondents seek damages for the deaths of their
children, who were killed when they were
struck by an automobile driven by Ralph
Crowe. The trial court granted petitioners'
motion for summary judgment. In Cain v.
Leake, 695 l\2d 798 (Colo.App. 1984), the
court of appeals reversed and remanded
the case for trial. We granted certiorari,
and we now reverse and remand to the
court of appeals with directions to reinstate
the trial court's order granting summary
judgment.

9. Municipal Corporations <S=>170
Public official performing discretionary acts within scope of his office enjoys
qualified immunity.
10. Chemical Dependents <^1
Municipal Corporations «=»747<3)
Police officer who encounters intoxicated person who is not driving an automobile has no authority to take that person
into protective custody unless he has probable cause to believe that the person is

FACTS
The tragic sequence of events leading to
the accident in this case is undisputed. On
the evening of September 9, 1978, Ralph
Crowe, eighteen years of age, attended a
large, outdoor party of teenagers in Commerce City.1 Over the course of three and
one-half hours, Crowe drank eight cups of
beer and three cups of alcoholic punch.2

victim.

clearly dangerous, and officer exercises
dtecretion in determining to do so, and thus

At approximately 11;30 p m., Commerce
City police officers were dispatched to

5. Municipal Corporations <&=>747(3)
Police officers had duty to prevent intoxicated person from harming others

1. There weie between thirty and sixty youths at
the party.

2. In his deposition, Crowe stated that the cups
held four or five ounces of liquid.

4. Negligence ®=>2f 10
Where person should reasonably foresee that his act or failure to act will involve
unreasonable risk of harm to another,
there is duty to avoid that harm; there is
no duty to prevent third person from harming another absent special relation between
actor and wrongdoer or between actor and
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break up the party after a neighbor complained. When the officers arrived a t the
party, they ordered the teenagers to disperse. Ralph Crowe became disruptive and
was handcuffed and detained by the officers. Shortly thereafter, the officers were
approached by seventeen-year-old Eddie
Crowe, Ralph Crowe's younger brother.
Eddie Crowe requested that Ralph be released to him and told the officers that he
would drive Ralph home. After noting
that Eddie Crowe appeared sober and after
checking his driver's license, the officers
agreed to permit Ralph Crowe to leave the
party with his brother.
Ralph Crowe and another individual left
the party as passengers in a vehicle driven
by Eddie Crowe. The Crowe brothers took
the individual home and then proceeded to
a convenience store, where Ralph Crowe
purchased some cookies. When the two
youths left the store, Ralph Crowe drove
the car. He proceeded to a location near
Stapleton Airport, where the party which
had been broken up by the Commerce City
police was to continue. At the new site of
the party, the car driven by Ralph Crowe
struck six persons on the street, killing two
of them (respondents' decedents). Ralph
Crowe's blood alcohol content at the time
of the accident was .20, well in excess of
the legal presumption of intoxication in Colorado.*
Respondents filed a wrongful death action 4 in the Denver District Court against
Ralph Crowe, James Crowe (the father of
Ralph Crowe), the five Commerce City police officers who responded to the party
which Ralph Crowe attended on September
9, 1978, and the City of Commerce City.5
Respondents alleged that the police officers
3. Section 42-4-1202(l)(a), 17 C.R.S. (1984), provides:
"It is a misdemeanor for any person who is
under ihe influence of intoxicating liquor to
drive any vehicle in this state." Under section
42-4-1202(2)(c), "lijf there was (at the time of
the offense or within a reasonable time thereafter] 0.10 or more grams of alcohol per one
hundred milliliters of blood as shown by
chemical analysis of such person's blood . . .
it shall be presumed that the defendant was
under the influence of alcohol." After the

had reason to believe that Ralph Crowe
was intoxicated at the time he was detained, and that they negligently failed to
take him into custody. Respondents further alleged that the officers were negligent in releasing Ralph Crowe to his
younger brother, that it was foreseeable
that Ralph Crowe would drive an automobile in an intoxicated condition, and that
injury to the public was a foreseeable consequence of the officers' failure to arrest
Ralph Crowe.
The police officers and the City of Commerce City (petitioners) filed a motion for
summary judgment, contending that the
duty of the officers to enforce the law was
a public duty, and that the officers' negligence, if any, was not actionable because
they did not owe a special duty to the
respondents' decedents. After a hearing,
the trial court granted petitioners' motion
for summary judgment, stating that:
in order for one to recover on a tort claim
of negligence brought against a public
official by an individual member of the
public, they are required to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence . . . that
the defendant owes a special duty to the
plaintiff and that [the] duty was breached, resulting in damage or injury.
The court concluded that the Commerce
City police officers, in exercising their discretion to release Ralph Crowe, did not owe
a special duty to the respondents' decedents.
The court of appeals reversed and held
that petitioners were not immune s from
suit. Cain v. Leake, 695 P.2d at 798. In
denying immunity, the court of appeals reasoned that (1) the decision of the police
officers to release Ralph Crowe was not a
accident, Ralph Crowe's blood was tested for
alcohol content. The test indicated .20 grams
of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of
blood.
4. §§ 13-21-201 to -204, 6 C.R.S. (1973 & 1985
Supp.).
5. James Crowe was subsequently dismissed
from the action by stipulation between Ihe parties. Ralph Crowe is not a party to this appeal.

discretionary act and (2) denying immunity
would not unduly interfere with the governmental function. The trial court's reliance upon the public duty/special duty
distinction in granting summary judgment
was not addressed by the court of appeals.
II.
DUTY
Nothing is more basic to tort law than
the requirement that, in order to recover
for the negligent conduct of another, the
plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of
a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) which actually and proximately caused (4) damage to
the plaintiff. Franklin v. Wilson, 161
Colo. 334, 422 P.2d 51 (1966); W. Keeton,
D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts 164-65
(5th ed. 1984). This case focuses on the
first element. We must decide whether the
Commerce City police officers owed a duty
to respondents' decedents to take Ralph
Crowe into custody.
6. The public duty doctrine was apparently accepted by most state courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The leading treatise on tort law during the era stated:
The rule of official responsibility, then, appears to be this: That if the duty which the
official authority imposes upon an officer is a
duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or
an inadequate or erroneous performance,
must be a public, not an individual injury,
and must be redressed, if at all. in some form
of public prosecution. On thc^other hand, if
the duty is a duty to the individual, then a
neglect to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and may support
an individual action for damages.
T. Cooley, A Treatise on ihe Law of Torts 379
(1879). The author provides an example of
particular relevance to this case;
The rule stated does not depend at all on the
grade of the office, but exclusively upon the
nature of the duty. This may be shown by
taking as an illustration the case of the policeman; one of the lowest grade of public officers. His duty is to serve criminal wnnanls;
to arrest persons who commit offenses in his
view, to bring night-walkers to account, and
to perform various offices of similar nature.
Within his beat he should watch the premises
of individuals, and protect them against burglaries and arsons. But suppose he goes to
sleep on his beat, and while thus off duty a
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A.
The Public Duty

Doctrine

In granting petitioners' motion for summary judgment, the trial court relied upon
what has become known as the "public
duty doctrine." The origin of the public
duty doctrine can be traced to South v.
Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 15 L.Ed.
433 (1855). In South, the plaintiff alleged
that he was kidnapped and held for a period of four days and released only when he
secured the ransom money demanded by
his kidnappers. He also asserted that the
local sheriff knew that he had been unlawfully detained yet did nothing to obtain his
release. The plaintiff sued the sheriff for
refusing to enforce the laws of the state
and for failing to protect the plaintiff. The
circuit court awarded plaintiff a substantial
judgment. The Supreme Court reversed
and declared that a sheriff's duty to keep
the peace was "a public duty, for neglect of
which he is amenable to the public, and
punishable by indictment only." 59 U.S.
(18 How.) at 403.*
robbery is committed or a house burned
down, cither of which might have been prevented had he been vigilant,—who shall bring
him to account for this neglect of duty? Not
the individual who has suffered from the
crime, certainly, for the officer was not his
policeman; was not hired by him, paid by
him. or controlled by him; and consequently
owed to him no legal duty. The duty imposed
upon the officer was a duty to the public—to
the State, of which the individual sufferer was
only a fractional part, and incapable as such
of enforcing obligations which were not individual but general. If a policeman fails to
guard the premises of a citizen with due vigilance, the neglect is a breach of duty of exactly the same sort as when, finding the same
citizen indulging in riotous conduct, he fails
to arrest him; and if the citizen could sue him
foi the one neglect, he could also for the
other.
Id. at 381 (footnote omitted). The public duty
rule was repeated in subsequent editions of the
treatise without criticism. Sec T. Coolev. A
Treatise on the IMW of Torts 446 (2d ed. 1888); 2
T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Ixtw of Torts 756-57
(3d ed. 1906); 2 T. Cooley. A Treatise on the
IMW of Torts 385-86 (4th ed. 1932). See also W.
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts 1049 (5th ed.
1984).
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1.

The Colorado Cases
The public duty rule first surfaced in
Colorado in Miller v. Ouray Electric Light
& Power Co., 18 Colo.App. 131, 70 P. 447
(1902). The plaintiffs decedent in Miller
died while he was incarcerated in the Ouray County jail. The plaintiff alleged that
defective wiring in the jail caused a fire
which resulted in the death.
Plaintiff
sought to hold the county commissioners
liable for the death based upon a statute
that required the county commissioners to
inspect the county jail and to correct irregularities. The court of appeals held that
the statute created only a public duty to
insure the safety of the jail, not an individual duty to any person who was incarcerated in the jail. The opinion stated that the
obligation of the county commissioners was
"an official duty, owing to the public by
virtue of their office, and for a breach of it
the statutes specifically provide a remedy
by suit upon their official bonds." 18 Colo.
App. at 138, 70 P. at 449. Without the
protection afforded by the public duty rule,
the court concluded, no person would be
willing to serve as a public officer because
of the fear of exposure to liability.
In People v. Hoag, 54 Colo. 542, 131 P.
400 (1913), we addressed the public duty
rule when the plaintiff, the only newspaper
in Prowers County, sued the county clerk
for refusing to publish a list of candidates
before an election. The plaintiff relied
upon a statute requiring the county clerk
to publish such a list and alleged that it
suffered monetary damages as a result of
the clerk's refusal to publish the list. The
plaintiff conceded that the statute imposed
a public duty but argued that the statute
also imposed a duty to the publishing company, which suffered a special injury by
virtue of the clerk's failure to employ the
newspaper's services. We rejected the
plaintiffs contention and affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the action against the
clerk, stating:
The statute requiring the clerk to publish the list of nominations was clearly
intended for the benefit of the public,
and not for the benefit of newspapers.

The benefit to the latter was only incidental. Certainly the law was not passed
with the idea of benefiting publishers.
So that the duty imposed was purely a
public one. When the duty imposed upon
an officer is one to the public only, its
non-performance must be a public, and
not an individual injury, and must be
redressed in a public prosecution of some
kind, if at all. 2 Cooley on Torts, (3d
Ed.) 756.
54 Colo, at 544, 131 P. at 401. The court
distinguished cases outside of Colorado
holding public officials liable where the
plaintiff had parted with consideration in
reliance on an official's representation or
where the duty of the official was for the
benefit of an identifiable class of persons
to which the plaintiff belonged. Id.
We subsequently held that the duty of a
county to maintain its highways is a public
duty, and that any breach of the duty is not
actionable by a person who suffers damages as a result of negligent highway design and maintenance. Richardson
v.
Belknap, 73 Colo. 52, 213 P. 335 (1923).
The court thus reaffirmed the public duty
rule set forth in Miller v. Ouray Electric
Light & Power Co. and People v. Hoag. In
Richardson, the court added a new rationale for the rule, stating that since counties were not liable for tortious conduct, it
would be inconsistent to impose liability on
their officers.
More recently, we discussed the public
duty rule in the context of a claim against
the Industrial Commission by an individual
who was injured when a machine in the
plant where he was employed malfunctioned. Quintano v. Industrial Commission, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137 (1972).
The plaintiff relied on a statute charging
the Industrial Commission with the responsibility of inspecting factories to protect
employees and guests against defective or
dangerous machinery. After holding that
the Industrial Commission was protected
by sovereign immunity, we concluded that
the commission members were not individually liable. The issue was whether "the
statutory duty is public or is for the action-

able benefit of an individual." Id. at 135,
495 P.2d at 1138. We observed that the
statutes in Miller, Hoag, and Richardson
clearly imposed duties for the benefit of
the public generally and not for that of
particular individuals or classes. In contrast, the statute here under consideration specifically designates the classes of
individuals for whose benefit it is intended, viz.: employees and guests. Under
|the public duty rule| it might be said
that this duty was created for the benefit
of the petitioner and that, therefore, nonfeasance by the individual members of
the commission subjects them to liability.
178 Colo, at 135, 495 P.2d at 1138-39. Relying on Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968
(1971), we said that in the area of sovereign
immunity, courts should not attempt to infer the General Assembly's intent as to
whether a statute may be relied upon as a
source of duty in a civil action for damages. Because the statute in question did
not authorize a private cause of action for
its violation, we upheld the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint.
In refusing to resolve the case on the
basis of the public duty rule, Quintano left
the viability of the doctrine in this state in
considerable doubt. Predictably, subsequent decisions by the court of appeals
reached opposite conclusions as to the continued validity of the doctrine in Colorado.
Compare Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board of
County Commissioners, 38 Colo.App. 44,
554 P.2d 317 (1976) (affirming dismissal of
action on the basis of public duty rule) with
7. In his special concurrence, Justice Rovira asserts that the validity of the public duty rule
need not and should not be addressed in this
case. He argues first that the issue was no;
propcily identified when we granted certiorari
and second that the issue was not briefed by the
parties in this court. In granting certiorari, wc
phrased the duly issue in the bioadcst possible
language: "Whether the defendants owed a duty
to the plaintiffs and their decedents such that
the defendants' failure to protect them is actionable." The public duty rule has been central to
this case since the petitioners filed their motion
for summary judgment in the trial court. In
support of their motion, petitioners submitted a
brief which fully discussed the public duty rule
and argued that summary judgment should be

Martinez v. City of Lakcwood, 655 P.2d
1388 (Colo.App. 1982) (reversing summary
judgment that was premised upon the public duty rule). In Martinez, the court of
appeals stated:
[T|he concept of public duty, i.e., a general duty versus a special duty "is [merely]
a function of municipal sovereign immunity and not a traditional negligence concept which has a meaning apart from the
governmental setting. Accordingly, its
efficacy is dependent on the continuing
validity of the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Commercial Carrier Corp. v.
Indian River [371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.
1979)]. The concept of a public duty
cannot stand either with the enactment
of the statute abrogating sovereign immunity, nor in instances where there is a
common law duty of a public entity to
the plaintiff. As noted in numerous
opinions from various jurisdictions, application of the public duty—special duty
dichotomy results in "a duty to none
where there is a duty to all." Stewart i\
Schmieden
386 So.2d 1351 (La.1980);
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian
River, [371 So.2d at 1010]; Adams v.
Alaska, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976).
655 P.2d at 1390. In view of the trial
court's reliance on the public duty rule in
granting summary judgment in this case,
and because of the conflicting decisions by
the court of appeals in Gold Run and Martinez, we are squarely confronted with the
question of whether the public duty rule is
still good law in Colorado.7
granted on that basis. Respondents, in turn,
filed a brief in opposition to summary judgment, contending that the public duty rule was
no longer good law. As wc have noted, the trial
court relied upon the public duty rule in granting summaiy judgment. See supra text pp. 154,
155.
Respondents appealed the trial court's ruling
to the couit of appeals, where they again argued
that the public duty rule was an improper basis
for granting summary judgment. Thus, although the trial court awarded summary judgment on the basis of the public duty rule and
although that rationale was contested on appeal,
the court of appeals inexplicably did not address
the issue. Justice Rovira correctly points out
that the public duty rule was not briefed in this
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2. Abolition of the Public Duty Rule
The public duty rule is probably followed
by the majority of courts. See, e.g., Shore
v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444
A.2d 1379 (1982); Fryman v. JMK/Skewer,
Inc., 137 Ill.App.3d 611, 92 Ill.Dec. 178, 484
N.E.2d 909 (1985); Cox v. Department of
Natural Resources, 699 S.W.2d 443 (Mo.
App.1985); O'Connor v. City of New York,
58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d
485 (1983); Barratt v. Burlingham,
—
R.I. — , 492 A.2d 1219 (1985); ChambersCastanes v. King County, 100 Wash.2d
275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983); Annot., Modern
Status of Rule Excusing
Governmental
Unit from Tort Liability on Theory that
On Iy General, Not Particular, Duty was
Owed Under Circumstances, 38 A.L.R. 4th
1194 (1985). The two principal rationales
offered in support of the doctrine are (1)
protection against excessive governmental
liability and (2) the need to prevent hindrance of the governing process. J & B
Development Co., Inc. v. King County,
100 Wash.2d 299, 669 P.2d 468 (1983); Miller v. Ouray Electric Light & Power Co.,
18 Colo.App. at 131, 70 P. at 447. However, a growing number of courts have
concluded that the underlying purposes of
the public duty rule are better served by
the application of conventional tort principles and the protection afforded by statutes governing sovereign immunity than by
a rule that precludes a finding of an actionable duty on the basis of the defendant's
status as a public entity. Adams v. State,
555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State,
134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982); Com-

mercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979); Wilson
v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979);
Schear v. Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County, 101 N.M. 671,
687 P.2d 728 (1984); Brennan v. Eugene,
285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); Coffey v.
Milwaukee, 74 Wis.2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132
(1976). Significantly, the rule has been repudiated by two courts whose earlier decisions are frequently cited in support of its
continued validity. See Ryan v. State, 134
Ariz, at 308, 656 P.2d at 597 (overruling
Massengill v. Yuma, 104 Ariz. 518, 456
P.2d 376 (1969)); Commercial
Carrier
Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d
1010 (Fla.1979) (overruling Modlin v. City
of Miami Beach, 201 So.2d 70 (Fla.1967)).
The public duty rule has also been condemned by commentators and by judges
dissenting to opinions upholding the doctrine. Chambers-Castanes, 100 Wash.2d
at 275, 669 P.2d at 451, 460 (Utter, J.,
concurring); Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d
283, 288 (Minn.1981) (Scott, J., dissenting);
Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579,
293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861
(1968) (Keating, J., dissenting); Motyka v.
City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 256
N.Y.S.2d 595, 598, 204 N.E.2d 635, 637
(1965) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting); 1A C.
Antieau, Municipal
Corporation
Law
§ 11.74 (1986); Note, State Tort Liability
for Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 Colum.
J.L. & Soc. Probs. 303 (1977); Note, Court
of Claims Act, 58 St. John's L.Rev. 199
(1983).

courl. During oral argument, petitioners maintained, contrary to their position in the trial
court, that the public duty rule was not at issue.
In our view, however, it is necessary to address
the public duly rule because it was the basis of
the trial court's ruling and because it Tell within
the issue that was formulated for review on
certiorari.
Judicial economy favors an immediate resolution of the issue which Justice Rovira would
have us postpone until a later date. As we have
pointed out, our last decision involving the public duty rule, Quintano v. Industrial Commission, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137 (1972). cast
doubt on the viability of the doctrine in this
state. Two court of appeals' decisions since
Quintano have reached opposite conclusions re-

garding the continued validity of the rule. In
this very case, the trial court expressed some
hesitation in ordering summary judgment on
the basis of the public duty rule. In view of the
inroads on sovereign immunity and the attendant increase in the number of lawsuits against
public officials and governmental entities, we
believe that the bench and bar are entitled to
clear guidance on an issue which has in the past
substantially controlled litigation involving tort
claims against public entities and their employees. We are persuaded that this case provides
the appropriate factual and legal basis for abolishing the public duty rule and substituting the
more conceptually satisfactory conventional
tort analysis. See infra text p. 160.

[1, 2) Even where the rule still prevails,
its scope has been substantially narrowed
by the creation of significant exceptions.
For example, the public duty rule cannot be
used to avoid liability where a "special relationship" exists between the public entity
and the plaintiff. Campbell v. Bellevue,
85 Wash.2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975) (city
electrical inspector knew of nonconforming
underwater lighting system and of extreme
danger to residence near stream but failed
to disconnect the lighting system). Nor is
the rule applicable where the tortious conduct of the public entity violated a statute
or ordinance enacted for the benefit of the
class of persons to which the plaintiff belonged. Compare Irwin v. Town of Ware,
392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984) (statutes created duty on the part of police
officer to arrest intoxicated driver for the
benefit of the motoring public) with Dinsky v. Town of Framingham, 386 Mass.
801, 438 N.E.2d 51 (1982) (building code did
not create special duty to individual property owners upon which an action for negligent issuance of building permits could be
predicated).

tus of the defendant a crucial factor in
determining liability. Courts rejecting the
public duty rule reason that proof of one of
the elements in an action for negligence
should not be made more difficult simply
because the defendant is a public entity.
It has also been argued that the same
rationales that were used to justify absolute sovereign immunity—the financial impact on government and interference with
governmental operations—are asserted in
defense of the public duty rule. Ryan, 134
Ariz, at 308, 656 P.2d at 597; ChambersCastanes, 100 Wash.2d at 275, 669 P.2d at
451, 460 (Utter, J., concurring) Those justifications were rejected with the abrogation of absolute sovereign immunity and
should likewise be rejected as a policy basis
for the public duty rule. The argument is
particularly compelling if the public duty
doctrine is seen as a function of sovereign
immunity, rather than as an independent
concept of negligence. See Commercial
Carrier, 371 So.2d at 1010.

The major criticism leveled at the public
duty rule is its harsh effect on plaintiffs
who would be entitled to recover for their
injuries but for the public status of the
tortfeasor. A duty to all, it has been said,
is a duty to none. Commercial Carrier,
371 So.2d at 1010; Adams, 555 P.2d at 235.
Courts that have abandoned the rule have
sometimes relied on provision^ in statutes
abrogating sovereign immunity stating
that public entities are to be treated like
private parties for purposes of determining
liability. E.g., Schear v. Board of County
Commissioners of Bernalillo County, 687
P.2d at 728. Cf § 24-10-107, 10 C.R.S.
(1982) ("Where sovereign immunity is abrogated as a defense under section 24-10106, liability of the public entity shall be
determined in the same manner as if the
public entity were a private person."). In
apparent contravention of these statutes,
the public duty rule makes the public sta-

Perhaps the most persuasive reason for
the abandonment of the public duty rule is
that it creates needless confusion in the
law and results in uneven and inequitable
results in practice. Ryan, 134 Ariz, at 308;
656 P.2d at 597; J & B Development Co.,
Inc. v. King County, 100 Wash.2d 299, 669
P.2d 468, 474 (1983) (Utter, .1. concurring);
Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent
Fire Inspection,
13 Colum..).l>. & Soc.
Problems 303 (1977); Note, Court of
Claims Act, 58 St. John's L.Rev. 199
(1983). As the Supreme Court of Arizona
said in abandoning the public duty rule,
"[w]e shall no longer engage in the speculative exercise of determining whether the
tort-feasor has a general duty to the injured party, which spells no recovery, or if
he had a specific individual duty which
means recovery." Ryan, 656 P.2d at 597.
Instead, the court stated, "the parameters
of duty owed by the state will ordinarily be
coextensive with those owed by others."
/d. 8

8. The Supreme Court of Washington has recently considered and rejected an attempt to discard
the public duty doctrine. Chambers-Costanes,

100 Wash.2d at 275. 669 P.2d at 451. See also J
A B Development Co., Inc. v. King County, 100
Wash.2d at 299, 669 P.2d at 468. In addition to
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In our view, the problems associated
with the public duty rule far outweigh the
benefits of the rule, which are more properly realized by other means. The fear of
excessive governmental liability is largely
baseless in view of the fact that a plaintiff
seeking damages for tortious conduct
against a public entity must establish the
existence of a duty using conventional tort\
principles, such as foreseeability, in the
same manner as if the defendant were a'
private entity. City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309 (Alaska 1985). Another hurdle the plaintiff must surmount in
order to recover is proof of proximate
cause. The traditional burdens of proof
tied to tort law adequately limit governmental liability without resort to the artificial distinctions engendered by the public
duty rule.
Nor do we believe that the abolition of
the public duty rule will unduly interfere
with governmental operations. By this decision, we create no new cause of action
which would make a public official hesitant
in the performance of his duties. Public
officials will continue to enjoy qualified immunity. See Trimble v. City and County
of Denver, 697 P.2d 716 (Colo.1985).
Finally, whether or not the public duty
rule is a function of sovereign immunity,
the effect of the rule is identical to that of
sovereign immunity. Under both doctrines, the existence of liability depends
entirely upon the public status of the defendant. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was abrogated in Evans v. Board of
County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 482
P.2d 968 (1971). Nothing in the provisions
of the statutes dealing with governmental
immunity, sections 24-10-101 to -118, 10
C.R.S. (1982 & 1985 Supp.), leads us to
the traditional rationales underlying the public
duty doctrine, the Washington court discussed
the use of the rule as a focusing device to
determine whether a duty is owed to a specific
individual or merely to the public at large. Id.
The public duty rule serves to avoid the conclusion that every duty owed to the public is a duty
to the individual members of the public. The
court rejected the contention that the public
duty doctrine is merely a function of sovereign
immunity and declared that the abrogation of
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conclude that the General Assembly intended to reintroduce a concept so closely related to absolute sovereign immunity. Quite
the contrary, section 24-10-107 instructs
courts to resolve the plaintiff's claim without regard to the public status of the defendant.
I [3] Accordingly, we reject the public
I duty rule in Colorado. Henceforth, for
1 purposes of determining liability in a negli\gence action, the duty of a public entity
Vhall be determined in the same manner as
n it were a private party.
B.
Duty of the Commerce City
Police Officers
Having discarded the concept that the
existence and extent of the police officers'
duty is dependent on status, we now analyze the duty question by applying conventional tort principles.
1. The Special Relation Rule
[41 Where a person should reasonably
foresee that his act, or failure to act, will
involve an unreasonable risk of harm to
another, there is a duty to avoid such harm.
Metropolitan Gas Repair Service, Inc. v.
Kulik, 621 P.2d 313 (Colo.1981); Mile High
Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489
P.2d 308 (Colo.1971). However, there is no
duty to prevent a third person from harming another, absent a special relation between the actor and the wrongdoer or between the actor and the victim. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965).
Here, the Commerce City police officers
were summoned to a party of teenagers
where alcoholic beverages were being
sovereign immunity was not intended to create
new claims for relief.
We are unpersuaded that the public duty rule
is necessary as a focusing device. The existence
of an actionable duty can, in our view, be more
effectively determined by resort to the familiar
principles of foreseeability and by balancing the
social utility of the defendant's conduct against
the risk of harm resulting from such conduct.
See infra text p. 160.

served. Ralph Crowe was handcuffed after he attempted to interfere with the officers' efforts to disperse the group attending the party. The officers in this case did
not release an intoxicated person knowing
that he would thereafter operate an automobile. Instead, the officers permitted
Ralph Crowe's younger brother, Eddie
Crowe, who appeared sober, to drive Ralph
Crowe home.
[5, 6] While the officers obviously had a
duty to prevent Ralph Crowe from harming
others while he was handcuffed at the party, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319
(1965) (duty of those in charge of person
having dangerous propensities), the officers discharged their duty by restraining
Crowe until he calmed down. The officers'
duty, as it related to the conduct of Ralph
Crowe, began and ended at the party. It
did not extend to the period after Ralph
Crowe was released to his younger brother,
who assured the officers that he would
drive Ralph Crowe home.9 The officers did
not assume a duty to the respondents' decedents, induce reliance, or create a peril or
change the nature of an already existing
risk. See Jackson v. Clements, 146 Cal.
App.3d 983, 194 Cal.Rptr. 553 (1983).10
In support of their contention that a special relationship existed between the Commerce City police officers and the respon9. The record also reflects that Ralph Crowe
promised the officers that he would allow his
brother to take him home.
10. In Jackson v. Clements, police officers investigated a party where alcoholic beverages were
being served to minors. Although the officers
knew that two of the minors were intoxicated
and that each intended to drive, the officeis
failed to prevent the minors from driving. The
plaintiffs, heirs and parents of three persons
who were killed when the two minors were
involved in a collision after leaving the party,
sued the police officers and their employer, the
county. The complaints asserted that, once the
officers undertook to investigate the party and
observed that the minors were intoxicated, the
officers had a duty to prevent the minors from
driving. Plaintiffs contended that a special relationship was created between the officers and
the minors when the minors acted in a manner
suggesting that they were too intoxicated to
drive, which was evidenced by the detention of

dents' decedents, respondents cite Irwin v.
Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292
(1984). In Irwin, police officers stopped a
car suspecting that the driver was intoxicated. Plaintiffs alleged that the officers
negligently failed to arrest the driver, and
that plaintiffs were entitled to recover for
injuries sustained when the driver collided
with the plaintiffs' car after he was released by the police. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that "there is
a special relationship between a police officer who negligently fails to remove an intoxicated motorist from the highway, and a
member of the public who suffers injury as
a result of that failure." 467 N.E.2d at
1303-04. Contra Horns v. Smith, 157
Cal.App.3d 100, 203 Cal.Rptr. 541 (1984).
In finding a special relationship, the court
relied on Massachusetts statutes relating
to a police officer's authority to arrest intoxicated persons operating automobiles.
The court determined that the statutes indicated a legislative intent to protect intoxicated persons and other members of the
motoring public and concluded that the
foreseeable consequences of releasing an
intoxicated driver were all too obvious.
Quite apart from the question of whether
this court would recognize a special relationship under the circumstances of Invin
v. Ware, the case is readily distinguishable
one minor. The trial court dismissed the complaints, and the court of appeal affirmed. Distinguishing prior cases thai found a special relationship bciwecn stale personnel and a wrong
doer, the court of appeal staled thai in the
instant case there was no allegation of an ongoing custodial relationship between the officers
and the inloxicaicd minors. Accordingly, the
court concluded that a special relationship did
not exist between the police officers and the
minors. The court then considered and rejected
plaintiffs' contention that a special relationship
existed between the officers and one of the
victims, who was a passenger in one minor's car
at the time of the collision. The court said that
such a relationship could not be found because
the police (I) did not voluntarily assume a duty
of care toward the injured parties, (2) did not
induce the victims to rely on a promise that the
police would protect them, and (3) did not create the peril or change the nature of an existing
risk against which the victims relied upon the
police for prolcction.
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from this case. Here, the Commerce City
police officers did not contact Ralph Crowe
while he was driving an automobile. During their entire encounter with Ralph
Crowe, the officers had no reason to believe that he had been driving under the
influence of alcohol or that he intended to
do so in the immediate future. In fact, the
officers released Ralph Crowe to his
younger brother only after receiving assurances from both men that Eddie Crowe
would drive Ralph Crowe home. The potential harm resulting from the release of
Ralph Crowe was far less foreseeable than
the release of the intoxicated driver in Irwin v. Ware.
2.

The Emergency Commitment
Statute
Respondents rely on section 25-1-310(1),
11 C.R.S. (1982), as a source of the officers'
duty in this case. The statute provides:
Emergency commitment.
(1) When
any person is intoxicated or incapacitated
by alcohol and clearly dangerous to the
health and safety of himself or others,
such person shall be taken into protective
custody by law enforcement authorities
or an emergency service patrol, acting
with probable cause, and placed in an
approved treatment facility. If no such
facilities are available, he may be detained in an emergency medical facility
or jail, but only for so long as may be
necessary to prevent injury to himself or
others or to prevent a breach of the
peace. A law enforcement officer or
emergency service patrolman, in detaining the person, is taking him into protective custody. In so doing, the detaining
officer may protect himself by reasonable methods but shall make every reasonable effort to protect the detainee's
health and safety. A taking into protective custody under this section is not an
arrest, and no entry or other record shall
be made to indicate that the person has
been arrested or charged with a crime.
Law enforcement or emergency service
personnel who act in compliance with this
section are acting in the course of their

official duties and are not criminally or
civilly liable therefor. Nothing in this

subsection (1) shall preclude an intoxicated or incapacitated person who is not
dangerous to the health and safety of
himself or others from being assisted to
his home or like location by the law enforcement officer or emergency service
patrolmen.
Id. Respondents contend that under section 25-1-310(1), the Commerce City police
officers had a duty to take Ralph Crowe
into "protective custody" or to escort him
to his home. The respondents claim the
officers were guilty of a breach of duty in
releasing Ralph Crowe to his younger
brother.
[71 A duty of care may be created by
legislative enactment. Dare v. Sobule, 674
P.2d 960 (Colo. 1984). However, the breach
of a statutory duty is actionable only by
one who is a member of the class the
statute was designed to protect, and only
where the injury suffered by such person is
the type of injury which the statute was
enacted to prevent.
[8] Section 25-1-310(1) was enacted as
part of a comprehensive legislative scheme
dealing with alcoholism and intoxication
treatment. See §§ 25^1-301 to -316, 11
C.R.S. (1982). The legislative declaration
preceding the statutory scheme states:
(1) It is the policy of this state that
alcoholics and intoxicated persons may
not be subjected to criminal prosecution
because of their consumption of alcoholic
beverages but rather should be afforded
a continuum of treatment in order that
they may lead normal lives as productive
members of society. The general assembly hereby finds and declares that alcoholism and intoxication are matters of
statewide concern.
§ 25-1-301(1). We recognize that a cursory reading of the emergency commitment
statute may suggest that the statute was
intended to protect members of the public
against intoxicated persons who appear
"clearly dangerous." However, in our
view, the General Assembly did not intend

to create a claim for relief against police
officers who, in their discretion, release an

intoxicated person into the "custody" of nn
apparently sober and responsible relative.
Since we conclude that the respondents'
decedents were not included within the
class of persons that section 25-1-310(1)
was designed to protect, the respondents
may not rely on the statute as a source of
the officers' duty in this case.
The respondents in this case have failed
to establish that a duty was owed to their
decedents by the Commerce City police officers. Therefore, they have not established a prima facie case of negligence.
Although the trial court granted summary
judgment on the basis of the public duty
rule, which we have repudiated in this decision, the order of summary judgment was
proper since respondents failed to establish
a legally cognizable duty. Accordingly, the
court of appeals erred in vacating the trial
court's order of summary judgment
Our conclusion that the Commerce City
police officers did not owe a duly to respondents' decedents under the facts of this
case is the basis for our decision reversing
the court of appeals. However, it is necessary to address the issue of immunity because the court of appeals erroneously narrowed the scope of official immunity afforded police officers.
III.
IMMUNITY
[91 A public official performing discretionary acts within the scope bf his office
enjoys qualified immunity. Trimble v.
City and County of Denver, 697 I\2d 716
(Colo. 1985). He is protected against civil
liability if his conduct is not willful, malicious or intended to cause harm. /(/. The
court of appeals held that the Commerce
City police officers were not protected by
official immunity because the decision to
take Ralph Crowe into custody was not
discretionary. We disagree.
The court of appeals relied on Irwin v.
Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292
(1984). We have already determined that

Irwin ia inapposite for purposes of deter
mining the duty of the Commerce City po-

lice officers in this case. Irwin is also
unpersuasive authority for the conclusion
that the officers were not shielded from
civil damages by official immunity.
In Irivin, the court held that the decision
of a police officer to arrest a driver he
knows or reasonably should know is intoxicated is not a discretionary act. The court
said:
No reasonable basis exists for arguing
that a police officer is making a policy or
planning judgment in deciding whether
to remove from the roadways a driver
who he knows is intoxicated. Rather,
the policy and planning decision to remove such drivers has already been
made by the legislature.
Id. at 467 N.E.2d 1299. Relying on Irwin,
the court of appeals concluded: "The same
reasoning applies to a decision by a police
officer to release a disputatious, intoxicated person from custody, and to send that
person onto the roadway under the ostensible supervision of a younger brother as
caretaker." Cain v. Leake, 695 P.2d at
SOU-01.
This case does not involve the question
of whether a police officer's decision to
arrest a person suspected of driving under
the influence of alcohol is a discretionary
decision. Although we express no opinion
on the issue, we note that at least one
other court has taken a position contrary to
Irwin v. Ware. See Evert on v. Willard,
468 So.2d 936 (Ha. 1985) (the decision to
arrest is a basic judgmental or discretionary governmental function that is immune
from suit).
110] Assuming that an officer's decision
to arrest an intoxicated driver is not a
discretionary decision, it hardly follows
that the decision whether to take an intoxicated person into protective custody under
the emergency commitment statute is a
nondiscretionary judgment. A person who
operates an automobile under the influence
of alcohol violates section 42-4-1202, 17
C.R.S. (1984). When a police officer stops

a person he knows, or reasonahly flhould
know, is driving under the influence, the
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officer arguably has no discretion but to
arrest the suspect. By contrast, an officer
who encounters an intoxicated person who
is not driving has no authority to take such
person into protective custody under section 25-1-310(1) unless the officer has
probable cause to believe that the intoxicated person is "clearly dangerous to the
health and safety of himself or others."
§ 25-1-310(1). While it may be said under
Irwin v. Ware that the General Assembly
has determined as a policy matter that an
intoxicated driver is a public danger, and
that an officer encountering such a person
accordingly has no choice in determining
whether to arrest or release the person, the
same is not true with respect to the emergency commitment statute. Under section
25-1-310(1), it is the officer who must determine whether the intoxicated person is
clearly dangerous. The General Assembly
plainly did not intend for the police to take
into protective custody every intoxicated
person they meet. Instead, the General
Assembly designated a specific class of intoxicated persons who are subject to emergency commitment and left the determination of whether a particular individual is
clearly dangerous to the police. Accordingly, the decision to take a person into protective custody is discretionary and protected
by official immunity.

officers not to assist Ralph Crowe to his
home is protected by official immunity.
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the court of appeals
with directions to reinstate the trial court's
order granting summary judgment to petitioners.
ROVIRA, J., specially concurs.
ROVIRA, Justice, specially concurring:
I agree with the majority's conclusions
that respondents' claims against the Commerce City police officers fail on conventional tort principles and that the decision
by the officers not to take Ralph Crowe
into custody or assist him home is protected by official immunity. However, I disagree with the conclusion that "we are
squarely confronted with the question of
whether the public duty rule is still good
law in Colorado," majority op. at 157, and
therefore do not join in part II A of the
majority opinion.

[11] Respondents have also asserted
that since the officers did not take Ralph
Crowe into protective custody, the officers
should have at least escorted him to his
home. Section 25-1-310(1) states: ''Nothing in this subsection (1) shall preclude an
intoxicated or incapacitated person who is
not dangerous to the health and safety of
himself cr ethers from being assisted to his
home or like location by the law enforcement officer or emergency service patrolman." Whether the officers should have
taken the action suggested by respondents
was a discretionary judgment. Therefore,
the decision by the Commerce City police

Since respondents' claims fail under traditional tort analysis, I see no need to address the public duty issue in this case. As
the majority points out, the public duty
issue was not addressed by the court of
appeals. Majority op. at 154. Moreover,
the issue upon which certiorari was granted relating to petitioners' duty to respondents did not specifically raise the public
duty question. In granting certiorari we
asked the parties to address: "Whether the
defendants owed a duty to plaintiffs and
their decedents such that the defendants'
failure to protect them is actionable."
Both parties responded by presenting traditional tort duty arguments, and neither addressed the public duty issue.
In my view, the court should not decide
an issue of considerable public importance,
such as the abolition of the public duty
rule, which was not briefed and is not
necessary for resolution of the case at bar.1
As the majority points out, the public duty
rule is controversial; and while there may

I. Neither of Ihc parties cited any of the cases
discussed by the majority in part II A 1, The
Public Duty Doctrine. This clearly reflects their
lack of understanding that the public duty rule

was to be considered due to the failure of the
court to frame the certiorari issue in a manner
which would result in a discussion by the parlies of the public duty doctrine.

be a trend towards abolition of the rule,
majority op. at 158, the majority of states
probably still adhere to the rule, majority
op. at 158. Without the benefit of briefs
by the parties and interested amici, the
court is in a poor position to determine
whether the public duty rule has force and
content independent of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. A determination of the
continuing vitality of the rule would be
better left for a later day.
Finally, I note that to the extent that the
public duty rule is either a function of
sovereign immunity or identical in effect to
sovereign immunity, sec majority op. at
160, the legislature clearly has the power
to reimpose the public duty rule in statutory form. "If the General Assembly
wishes to restore sovereign immunity and
governmental immunity in whole or in part,
it has the authority to do so." Evans v.
Board of County Coynmissioners, 174
Colo. 97, 105, 482 P.2d 968, 972 (1971).
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The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Michael Anthony ARMSTRONG,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 84SA365.
Supreme Court of Colorado,
En Banc.
June 9, 1986.
Two counts of second-degree assault
on a peace officer were dismissed by the
District Court, Pitkin County, Judson E.
DeVilbiss, J., and the People appealed.
The Supreme Court, Vollack, J., held that:
(1) statute proscribing assault on peace officer by one who is in custody applies to
field arrest situations as well as to deten-

tion facilities; (2) one is in custody for
purposes of the statute after arrest has
been effected; and (3) conviction for both
resisting arrest and assault on a police
officer while in custody would not necessarily result in different sanctions for the
same criminal conduct, in violation of equal
protection guarantees, but required consideration of the facts of the case after evidence had been presented at trial.
Reversed and charges reinstated.
Lohr, J., concurred specially and filed
opinion.
Dubofsky, J., dissented and filed opinion.

1. Statutes e=*217.2
When meaning of statute is clear, it is
unnecessary to examine its legislative history.
2. Assault and Battery «3=*60
Second-degree assault statute, which
proscribes assault on a peace officer by one
who is lawfully confined or in custody,
applies to field arrest situations as well as
to detention facilities.
C R S. 18-3203(1X0.
3. Assault and Battery <^>I8
Definition of "in custody' as contained
in pattern jury instruction is not controlling
as to meaning of that term in second-degree assault statute which proscribes assault on a peace officer by one who is
lawfully in custody. C.R.S. 18-3-203(l)(0.
4. Criminal Law <s=*805(l)
While pattern jury instructions carry
weight and should be considered by trial
court, opinion of an appellate court is controlling.
5. Constitutional Law <S=>250.3(1)
Statute prescribing different sanctions
for what ostensibly might be different acts,
but offering no rational standard for distinguishing such different acts for purposes
of disparate punishment, contravenes equal
protection guarantees of the State Constitution. Const. Art. 2, § 25.

